To ensoul Europe.

The Gospel in the Struggle for Freedom, Justice and Truth.

Paul M. Zulehner

Vienna 2019/2022

Translated together with Rod Pritchard-Smith.

Content

To ensoul Europe. 1

Content 2

A three-fold struggle 5

The contribution of the Gospel 6

Instruments of co-creation 6

Europe 7

A pragmatic concept of Europe 8

The European House 9

Give Europe a soul 10

Urgency 10

Freedom and solidarity are endangered 11

Insecure truth 11

Part 1: Struggle for Freedom 14

Europe - a freedom project 14

Freedoms gained by revolution 15

Freedom revolutions 15

Totalitarian interruptions 16

Elected Fascism 16

Imposed totalitarianism 17

Back to the path of freedom 17

The revolution of ‘68 18

Flight from freedom in the midst of guaranteed liberties 19

Causes 19

Right-wing populism and nationalism 21

Nationalism 21

Right-Wing Populism 22

Christian Churches and freedom(s) 25

Protestant Church of Freedom 26

The Catholic Church (From Syllabus to Vatican II) 27

Religious freedom 1864 and 1965 28

Democracy: consent and concern 29

Eastern (Central) European freedom-scepticism 30

The polarized church peoples 31

Religious fundamentalism 33

Vision: Churches as advocates for freedom 34

God's almightiness as a threat to human freedom? 34

Theology of Modern Freedom Culture 35

Autonomous ethics 35

Soft re-institutionalisation 36

Democracy-Fitness 38

Democracy within the Churches 38

Develop a European Identity 39

Help shape further development 40

Worship makes you free 40

Part 2: The Struggle for Justice 42

To wring freedom from justice 42

The Old Social Question 42

Solutions 44

Welfare state and generation contract 45

The new social question 46

Solidarity stock 48

Dimensions of solidarity 48

Desire and action 49

Fear desolidifies 50

Fear potential 50

Become superfluous 51

Understanding and overcoming Angst 53

Vision: Churches as advocates for solidarity 54

Social teachings 54

Chain of being 54

Universal solidarity 55

An ethic of dynamic compromise 55

Social Practice 56

To be connected 56

Social Education 58

Part 3: Struggle for Truth 59

Christian Occident 59

A "christian-like" Europe emerges 60

The wounds of the divisions 60

The trauma of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) 60

Judaism and Islam 61

The current situation of Christianity in Europe 61

At the pan-European level 62

Religious imprinting of the continents 62

Developments of religions worldwide 63

Christianity is growing everywhere, only not in Europe 64

Diverse development in individual countries in Europe 66

Confessional differences in Eastern Europe 68

Atheising cultures 68

At the level of the person 69

Preliminary remarks 70

Typologies 71

Not secularisation, but pluralisation 73

Vision: Churches as advocates for truth 74

Atheism 74

Life as last opportunity 75

Respiritualisation 75

Interreligious dialogue 76

The ethical impact of religions 77

Competence for truth 77

Postlude: Peace 79

Si vis pacem, para iustitiam 80

Introduction

It was after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Forty years of communist totalitarianism came to an end in Eastern Europe. The now independent countries of Eastern Europe were open to building a democratic society.

In this historic time of transformation, the Catholic bishops of Europe gathered in Prague in 1993. The invitation came from the Chairman of the Council of European Bishops' Conferences (CCEE) Miloslav Cardinal Vlk, Archbishop of Prague. This gathering had already been planned for 1990. However, ad short notice a European Synod was called in Rome in 1991 by Pope John Paul II which led to the postponement of the planned symposium of the European bishops.

A three-fold struggle

The bishops of Europe had chosen the title for their assembly in Prague in 1993: "The Gospel lived in freedom and solidarity". Three central themes of recent European history were put on the agenda: the struggle for freedom, the struggle for solidarity as well as justice and finally all this against the background of the constant struggle for truth about God and the world. The Catholic Church recommended the young East European reform democracies, released by communist totalitarianism, to respect the triad of freedom-justice-truth. Through this, they could assume their traditional place in the turbulent development of the European continent. In the future, Europe should breathe with two healthy lungs, as the Polish Pope John Paul II wished.

This three-fold struggle was intended to integrate the reform democracies into the unification of Europe. The ultimate goal was to overcome the horrors of war and open the continent to a time of peace.

I prefer to use the word "struggling". It is intended to signal that in Europe's modern history the path to more freedom, justice and truth was by no means always easy and not always straightforward. In the German language the word is fitting, because the result of "struggling" (“Ringen”) in the hoped for positive outcome is "achievement" (“Errungen-schaften”): results that one has won, eked out, fought for. Freedom, justice and truth are, so to speak, hallmarks of what can roughly be called the European culture that has evolved over the centuries.

Sometimes, instead of "struggling," we can speak of "dimensions”, but also of "value flows”, which have shaped the cultural development on the ancient continent and continue to form up till now. However, today the term "values" is rather tentatively used, because it seems rather complex and is used in the daily business of politics - often in connection with the discussion about a "leading culture" - in such a way that it has an exclusionary effect.

It may come as a surprise that at the beginning of the working document of the Prague Meeting of Catholic Bishops a text from a European political document of the Protestant Church was quoted: "In fact, the search for freedom, truth and community is the highest, oldest and most enduring desire of European humanism."¹ This quotation from the Protestant sister church serves as proof of good cooperation between the Christian churches in their commitment to a humane Europe: a collaboration that reached its first peak in the European Ecumenical Assembly of Basel in 1989. Thereafter, further cooperation followed in Graz (1994) and Sibiu (2007).

The quote from the text of the Protestant sister church also reveals the triad of freedom-justice-truth, albeit somewhat modified in terms of language: focused on the person with their inviolable dignity and freedom; the community and with it the common good, justice and solidarity; and finally truth. And all are named in the mode of searching. This suggests that Europe's history is a constant struggle and balance of the "powerfulness" of these three cultural values. They are praised as the "oldest and most enduring desire of European humanism". One of the co-creators of the transformation, the deputy to the Sejm (Polish Parliament), Polish economist and founder of the party Nowoczesna is also convinced "that we pursue the right goals, noble goals: peace, freedom, social security, human dignity and welfare.“²

I take this ecumenical consonance with regard to the triad of freedom-justice and truth as a basis for the structure of my ideas presented in this book. I will begin with the struggle for more freedom. (part 1) - in constant alignment with the struggle for more justice (part 2). And all of this as an expression of the struggle for the questions of human identity, what is the meaning of History, where everything comes from and what the final goal of evolution is - and within all this, the struggle for truth (part 3).

The contribution of the Gospel

The question of the role of the "Gospel" is woven into the development of the three great themes of freedom-justice-truth. The Gospel is that great Christian narrative entrusted to the Christian churches. Their task in the world today is not only to remember the Gospel in ever new dialogic efforts and to bring it to the European continent, which has been shaped by the churches for centuries. They see it as their task to involve themselves so that the so-called "Christian Occident" retains or regains some of its Christian power in the Europe of today.

With regard to the content, this is a very demanding cultural and social mission for the churches. It makes them "political" in the strict sense of the word because they are responsible for the "polis“ and here again for the common good. This does not turn the churches into a political party, but they inevitably become politically partisan. They understand their mission entrusted to them, with the grandiose vision entrusted to them of a (more) humane (s) world, of a "civilisation of love" (John Paul II), to make a lasting contribution to the human development of culture and social life in Europe and to the role of the church in today’s world.

Where that happens, according to the language of the Bible says something of the "Kingdom of God" comes into the world. This means that within the force field of God, the world becomes more human. At least partially. Building on the Gospel, the churches in Europe are helping to secure and increase freedom, justice and truth. The Churches are engaged in creating a "Europe with a human face, " with a "soul".

Instruments of co-creation

The Catholic Church has created powerful institutions for the political shaping of today's world. And this in all regions of the world. For example, following the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church, one of the most important global players, has instituted associations of Continental Episcopal Conferences: in Asia, the Federation of Asian Episcopal Conferences (FABC), in Africa, the Symposium of Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar (SECAM) and the Latin American Council of Bishops (CELAM), which became known in its comments on the theologies of liberation and grassroots Christian communities.

Already during the times of the division of Europe, in 1971, an association of the Episcopal Conferences of "all" European countries was established for the European Continent with the Council of European Episcopal Conferences (CCEE). Although the continent was politically divided at this time, the Catholic Church united the continent through the confederation of Episcopal conferences across the Iron Curtain. The CCEE's hands were often tied in socio-political aspects because of the division of the continent. Eastern Europe was under repressive communist rule, which eased slightly in regard to religious freedom after Helsinki in 1975. In the „free“ West an economic and political dynamism began soon after the second World War. To be sustainably present in this Western European integration process, in addition to the CCEE, the Commission of the Episcopal Conferences of the European Community (COMECE) was established in 1980, in agreement with the Vatican.³

The focus of the COMECE agenda are the great questions of politics in the (at that time Western) European Union, and of course the broader horizon of the Gospel and, above all, the Catholic Social Doctrine. According to its website⁴, its main fields of responsibility are: „Migration & Asylum, Ecology & Sustainability, Social & Economic Affairs, Research, Health & Bioethics, Justice & Fundamental Rights, Freedom of Religion, Dialogue, Intercultural & Education and Foreign Policy“.

Europe

Until now, the term Europe has been used in its everyday sense. According to current scientific evidence, "Europe" was populated from Africa and East Asia. Therefore, the populating of the continent is therefore due to migration. A well-documented cultural development of "Europe" already occurred in the Paleolithic and accelerated in the Neolithic and the Bronze Ages. Europe matured into a continent of great cultures: Jerusalem, Athens and Rome became landmark cultural centres. Today's European culture owes its existence to Jewish, Hellenistic and Roman influences.

In later centuries, Europe also became enriched by Islamic culture. It is clear that Jews, Christians and Muslims can trace back their roots to the common progenitor Abraham and share many beliefs and therefore are not alien to each other.

In the course of European history, societies, states, nations and peoples emerged, all of which, in their respective beauty, size and singularity, contributed to the mosaic of „the“ European culture.

The question still remains, which has a political implication: how far to the East does Europe reach ? Depending on the interests of power, Europe and another in the Soviet Union. Some states, which gained independence in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, are currently combining their independence from Russia with the Western-oriented quest for integration into a united Europe.

A pragmatic concept of Europe

The following considerations are based on a pragmatic concept of "Europe". It includes those countries whose Episcopal Conferences are members of the Council of European Episcopal Conferences (CCEE).⁵ This "continental union" of Catholic Episcopal Conferences consists of the following 35 countries: Albania, Belgium, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Germany - Berlin Bishops' Conference, England and Wales, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Scotland, Switzerland, Serbia, Scandinavia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Czechoslovakia - then Czech Republic, Turkey, Ukraine Byzantine - Latin, Hungary, Belarus.

Figure 1: European countries in the CCEE

What is remarkable about this pragmatic definition of "Europe" is that the (very small) Episcopal Conferences of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Turkey are present in the CCEE, not Cyprus and not the small states of Liechtenstein and San Marino (these are not because they do not have their own bishops' conference). The seat of the CCEE has been in St. Gallen in Switzerland from its foundation until today.

The European House

A European integration process, a common house, a European house, should be created for all these countries. The European Ecumenical Assembly in Basel 1989 referred to this process of unification, and considered its structure, organisation and house rules in three sub-points:

"(66.) Recently our ideas of Europe's future have been inspired by the image of the common European house. How realistic is this vision in a continent that has been and is so separate and divided for so long and in so many ways? The idea of a common European home reminds us that all people and states in Europe have common ground in their history, their cultural heritage and their values. And it reminds us that ‘Europe’ is not the name of only a part of this continent. In a common house, there are shared responsibilities. It may not be allowed to worsen the position of some parts while others shine in luxury. In a common house, life is determined by the spirit of cooperation rather than confrontation. It is important that the idea of a common European house includes criticism of all separating walls, trenches and barriers that make communication impossible.

(67) The picture makes it clear that we need to learn to live with many people on a small continent. There is little space and the available supplies are scarce. Some basic house regulations are therefore necessary, a set of 'house rules' that makes living together possible. These rules should include:

the principle of equality for all, be they strong or weak;

the recognition of values such as freedom, justice, tolerance, solidarity and participation;

a positive attitude towards followers of different religions, cultures and beliefs;

open doors and windows - in other words: a lot of personal contacts and a lot of exchange of ideas;

conflict resolution through dialogue and not through violence.

(68) The European House should be an open house, a place of refuge and protection, a place of welcome and hospitality where guests are not discriminated against but treated as members of the family. Nobody in this house should be afraid to speak the truth. In the European House, the inhabitants should do something about the gap between the poor and the rich in Europe, against the rift between North and South on this continent, against the discriminatory treatment of non-citizens, against the injustice of mass unemployment, against the neglect of youth and the abandonment of the elderly. The daily bread should be distributed justly among all."

Give Europe a soul

One of the founding fathers of the European integration process, Robert Schumann, pointed out that it is not enough to build the house, ie to create institutions. Rather, it is about giving Europe a soul:⁶

"One would make a mistake and be the victim of a dangerous illusion if one believed that, in order to make Europe, it would be sufficient to create European Institutions. It would be like a body without a soul.“

Freedom, justice and truth, and together with all these "soul forces", peace, could make up the "soul of Europe", that is, the identity of the continent, and that in all its different historical and cultural manifestations. The Christian Churches were invited by Jacques Delors to make a substantial contribution:

That's the lesson of our experience Economic know-how alone The potential of the Maastricht Treaty is not to be realized without some form of inspiration".⁷

Pope Francis has expressed this in a salutation from 25th August 2016 to Cardinal Péter Erdö thus:

"As a caring mother, the Church contributes to the rebirth of Europe by striving to treat the wounds of humanity with love and to heal them through Divine Mercy. Therefore, I urge you to involve the European episcopate, their communities and the various charitable and social institutions more and more in the task of proclaiming the Gospel to those who, for various reasons, have lost their orientation in their life.

I still dream of a European humanism that needs memory, courage and a healthy and human utopia. On this path of humanisation, Europe, the cradle of rights and cultures, is called not only to defend spaces, but to be a fruitful mother which puts in train processes because it respects life and offers hope for this life.

With these desires, I urge you to find new ways and procedures that will guarantee the possibility of integration, dialogue and rebirth for those who are already living or coming to Europe so that we can truly become a united family of nations. I assure you of my fervent prayer for the building of bridges and the demolition of separating walls, and I am pleased to grant you the Apostolic Blessing."

Urgency

The contribution of the churches to the development of Europe today has a growing urgency. The situation of the World has become unstable. America has a president in power whose leitmotif is "Make America great again". He is concerned only about his own nation. Therefore, he withdraws from international obligations, which he says bring no benefits to the country. The tried and tested world order in the economic as well as in the political sphere is thereby being destabilised and Europe is affected.

The withdrawal to one's own national interests also characterises the political development in Europe. Parties n all European countries have it in their programme. In a growing number of countries, such parties are a part of or in government. Europe is divided about its political future. While some want "more Europe" in order to assert themselves in the concert of the great world powers (such as China, Russia, USA), others plead for „less Europe“. According to the second of these, there should only be so much "common Europe" in which it is guaranteed that the paramount national interests are safeguarded. Processes of de-Europeanisation and re-nationalisation of the continent seem to have started. The tip of the iceberg is BREXIT, the desire of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union.

This development touches on all three major themes of European development.

Freedom and solidarity are endangered

Nationalism, together with a plea for an "illiberal democracy", questions hard-won freedoms. Even the current dominant neoliberal economic concept appears to be a threat to freedom, not only for the rich, who are modernisation winners, but above all for the growing proportion of people who live below the poverty line even in wealthy societies and count as modernisation or globalisation losers.

At the same time, this nationalism proves to be highly divisive and corrupts solidarity. Even more, the precious cultural asset of hard-won European solidarity is firstly damaged with regard to foreigners, migrants and refugees, ie the „others“. But once solidarity as the fundamental force of a society is damaged in one area, in the long run it will also become lacking in other areas.

This weakening of freedom and solidarity is also evidenced by the fact that those political forces who have fought for them over the course of history now seem exhausted. Democratic socialism is weakening throughout Europe, which has historically achieved great for the disadvantaged and has made an effective contribution to the development of one of the hallmarks of Europe, the welfare state. At the same time, the liberal parties are also politically marginalised, even if the economy is designed to be neo-liberal: authoritarian parties attract the most interest at present. Last but not least, also those political groups, which up until now in European history stood for the balance between freedom and solidarity are showing weakness: the Christian Social parties. How weakened those social "camps" who have fought passionately and historically successfully for freedom and solidarity as well as their balance are by now, is shown by the fact that they have ultimately lost the power of their "ideology". They lack a vision that guides them and motivates them to implement it. In practice, this means that the liberals are no longer liberal, the socialists no longer socialist, the Christian Social are no longer Christian Social. They have become "pragmatic" and are subject to the dictates of election strategists and the maintenance of power.

Insecure truth

The current development in Europe is marked not least by the struggle for truth. This can be seen in the fact that the anti-Semitism that was believed to have been overcome is enjoying a return and this side by side with an aggressive Islamophobia. The peace between the great Abrahamic religions is being jeopardised for short-sighted political advantages.

It is beyond question that the great world religion of Islam, because of its rebound to pre-modern cultures, has to clarify a lot of questions that were posed to Christianity centuries ago through the Enlightenment: the question of religious tolerance, separating Allah from violence, the advocacy of human rights, among them the freedom of all religions including the "religion of atheism" - ie secularity. Fundamental to human rights are women's rights, which make it easy to decipher the compatibility of a religion with modernity. All these questions must be answered by Islam by itself. Political coercion tends to lead to a hardening of positions. It is better to give the Islamic Community access to free research facilities and establish chairs of Islamic theology and didactics.

But one aspect of the renewed struggle for truth also concerns Christianity itself and its role in Europe. In this regard, the members of the Christian churches and some of their leaders turn out to be highly polarised. Political diversity is reflected in the church folk. In addition, Christianity is being misused for political purposes. For example, a political group in Eastern Germany with a Christian background has begun to save the "Christian Occident". At the same time, however, this political group is based on resentment of minorities, fuelling various economic (globalisation, social decline) and cultural (Islamisation, alienation in one's own country) fears, considers diversity a threat and propagates an ethnically pure nation. These are political projects that are incompatible with the Gospel.

These concrete demands show how diverse can be the interpretation of what is Christian in today's political discourse. Should it be shown that in this context the "Christian" rather serves to legitimise non-Christian realities, then the motto would have to be reforged. Because then it would not be "to save the Christian Occident", but to save "the Christian in the Occident".

In this book, we will deal with current questions such as these in greater depth. With an eye to the Christian Churches, we will ask whether to defend and strengthen the acquired goods of culture is now one of their prominent tasks in Europe? But then the Churches have to intervene competently and with commitment in the rekindled struggle for freedom, justice and truth.

For the Catholic Church, at least regarding the struggle for freedom, this is a historically high demand. From the declared opponent of modern freedoms, it should turn into their unbending lawyer. Then, with renewed credibility, it could bring in its rich historical experience into today’s struggle for more justice. But since freedom and justice are closely related to the image of humankind and the world, the Church will prove to be an open space in which to search and struggle for truth, especially in Europe.

With these colourful preliminary considerations, I hope I have clarified the choice of this book’s title and subtitle. I want to express my vision that the Christian Churches are "inspiring Europe" through their courageous commitment. They can do this practically by creatively involving themselves in the struggle for freedom, justice and truth.

When Pope Francis delivered a speech to the European Parliament in November 2016, he called on MEPs that "to work on a Europe that rediscovers its good soul". He clarified his desire by suggesting that Europe connects the transcendental with the inner-world dimension: "A Europe that is no longer able to open itself to the transcendent dimension of life is gradually becoming a Europe in danger of losing its soul and also its 'humanistic spirit', which it loves and defends. Precisely on the basis of the necessity of opening to the transcendent, I would like to affirm the centrality of humankind, who otherwise becomes the plaything of trends and the respective powers. In this sense, I believe that not only the heritage that Christianity has left to the socio-cultural configuration of the continent in the past is fundamental, but above all the contribution it intends to make to its growth today and in the future. This contribution does not jeopardize the secularism of the States and the independence of the Union's institutions but enriches it. This is shown to us by the ideals that shaped Europe from the beginning, such as peace, subsidiarity and reciprocal solidarity - a humanism centred on respect for the dignity of the individual."

Vienna, 2022.

Paul M. Zulehner

Part 1: Struggle for Freedom

Europe - a freedom project

"The European Union is a freedom project. If it really serves that purpose, I am sure that our future and the future of succeeding generations is safe."⁸ This statement by the Deputy to the Polish Sejm Ryszard Petru in 2016 on the already half century old realisation of the European idea, initiates this first major chapter.

Some people today doubt that this goal is still valid. As Ulrike Ackermann, director of the John Stuart Mill Institute for Freedom Research at the SRH University of Heidelberg wrote: "It seems forgotten that the unification of Europe after the two World Wars is not only a peace project, as we are pleased to attest, but also a freedom project in response to the totalitarian experience. The founding fathers took up the values and achievements that European culture had overtime produced. We owe to the Greek polis the idea of the citizen and the constitutional state; to Roman law the right to private property; to the Enlightenment and its emphasis on Reason the separation of state and religion and the postulation of the freedom of the individual. The hard-won human and civil rights were for centuries the precondition for the emergence of parliamentary-representative democracy. Technical progress and the Industrial Revolution promoted the market economy. European culture has been successful because it is characterised by openness and scepticism, the capacity for self-reflection and self-correction."⁹

This opinion already reminds us that the multifaceted ("liberal") freedoms in Europe have been hard fought for, for centuries. As a first step, I outline below stations of the European Freedom Project in modern times.

Figure 2: Overview of the European History of Freedom

Freedoms gained by revolution

Modern history is characterised by a sequence of "freedom revolutions". It is probably a coincidence that these took place mostly in the '89s: 1689, 1789, 1989.

Freedom revolutions

It was the year 1689. It was a high point in the tug-of-war for power between King Charles I and the citizens of England.¹⁰ The 16th of December 1689 marks the birth of European parliamentarism.¹¹ It is a milestone on the way to an enlightened state with a parliament. In this "Bill of Rights", parliament was strengthened in relation to the King. In practice, the Declaration of Rights guaranteed a number of achievements: the King was obliged to convene Parliament on a regular basis; Parliament had to agree to collect taxes and duties from now on. Parliament controlled the use of torture and the maintenance of the standing army during peacetime. The MPs were promised immunity, which gave them complete freedom of speech in the House of Commons; in case of an offence, only the parliament was in charge, not the court of the King. For the citizens themselves, the Bill of Rights initially had only two rights: the citizens have the right to petition and to bear arms.

Later liberal constitutional systems, such as the Declaration of Human Rights and Civil Rights of 1789 in France, or the first ten amendments in the United States Constitution, were based on this Bill of Rights in England. In America, these were - rooted in the English tradition of a "Bill of Rights" - passed on the 25th of September, 1789 and ratified by 11 States. On the basis of the values of the Enlightenment, they guarantee inalienable fundamental rights to the citizens within the framework of a free and democratic society.The most important are recorded in the first of the ten additional amendments: Separation of Church and State, Freedom of Religion, Freedom of Speech, Press Freedom, Freedom of Assembly and the Right to Petition.

Securing the rights of citizens and their participation in public life also bore fruit in other European countries.¹² Freedom revolutions of great significance occurred in the whole of Europe in 1848. In Vienna, citizens of the "third estate", and at times also „estate-less proletarians", participated.¹³ The uprising in Vienna was crushed by the imperial troops. A new era of "restoration" followed, in which the absolutist conditions were newly implemented. But in 1867, it was then succeeded in the „Ausgleich“ to establish parliamentarism in the Habsburg Empire. It was formed by political liberalism, mainly by the bourgeoisie, and again only by men: women in Austria gained suffrage only in 1918. With the end of the Second World War many European nations changed to a form of democratic government. Even those countries in which a Ruling House could remain were given a democratic basic order.

Totalitarian interruptions

The freedom achieved in the French Revolution showed its dark side at an early stage: Jacobean violence and terror escalated.¹⁴ Since then, the freedom gained always had to be defended, and indeed constantly recaptured. How endangered the European history of freedom was, was shown by being dramatically interrupted, indeed reversed, in the 20th century. For a variety of reasons, both social and national, in Europe undemocratic systems were established in several countries. These illiberal forms of society were on the one hand chosen by the majority of the population, on the other people were forced by „parties“, who exercised their power in a totalitarian way. The acclaimed or imposed lack of freedom had two faces: that of Fascism¹⁵ and that of totalitarian Leninism / Stalinism.

Elected Fascism

These political systems abolished the acquired liberties in favour of a "party". The so-called "middle level" of the organisations of free citizens in the social and political sphere, typical of democracies, was removed. State and party merged. Both „totally“ misused the citizens for their political interests.

It cannot be overlooked that not a few dictators were chosen because of their promises. It was down to Theodor W. Adorno¹⁶ to investigate academically this question after the end of the National Socialist dictatorship in Germany. He wanted to clarify why so many people were willing to blindly follow a "leader" (Führer). He coined the term authoritarianism to describe this willingness of citizens to voluntarily and unconditionally submit to an authority.“ He who is above, is right" is the concise description of authoritarian attuned people. But what produced this authoritarianism, which had serious consequences for the history of freedom? The fear of social hardship and unemployment? The national humiliation of the losers of World War II by the victorious powers in the Treaty of Versailles 1919/1920? A specific form of upbringing?

In any case, Fascism came to power in many European countries, in Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Romania, Hungary. Fascist parties arose in almost all European countries. Even outside Europe, Fascism took root: in Egypt, Brazil, Chile, Israel, Japan, South Africa, Syria and Lebanon and also in the United States of America. This right-wing Fascism fought against leftist Marxist totalitarianism, which mirrored it in its destruction of democratic freedom. This led some church leaders in Europe to sympathise with right-wing fascists because of the associated fight against atheism.

Imposed totalitarianism

The October Revolution of 1917 in Russia laid the foundation for the totalitarian interruption of the history of freedom in Eastern Europe with the violent seizure of power by the communist Bolsheviks led by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. By that time, the Tsars were already disempowered. The social problems in the country were grave. The Soviet Union, founded in 1922, was set up to provide a better life for workers and peasants. The path to was supposed to be achieved through the "dictatorship of the proletariat". In choosing this path, the new rulers invoked the ideology of Karl Marx.

After the end of the Second World War, based on the outcome of the Yalta Conference in 1945, the Soviet Union succeeded in establishing its totalitarian model of society in the Eastern European countries.¹⁷ They bundled them into two blocs, politically into the so-called „Eastern Bloc“ (Ostblock) and militarily into the "Warsaw Pact". Thus, Europe was split politically and soon separated by an Iron Curtain. The "Berlin Wall"¹⁸, erected in 1961, and the hermetic closure of East Germany from West Germany, and the division of Berlin, became a symbol of the now divided Europe.

Back to the path of freedom

The end of the Second World War once again opened the way to democratic freedoms for the countries of Western Europe. The European unification process was set in motion. This was not only to ensure lasting peace after two World Wars in Europe through strong economic ties. Democratic freedoms should also be permanently safeguarded against totalitarian systems. This safeguarding of liberties is at the core of the European Constitution, which was signed in Rome in 2004 by the then Member States. It describes "the values, the essential objectives and the areas of activity of the European Union and organizes its institutional mechanisms". It "defines the Union as a democratic and open union of equal citizens and states. In addition, she announces her values"

"The European Union is based primarily on values. The Preamble and the first articles of the Constitution set the direction: The Union draws on Europe's cultural, religious and humanist heritage and thus defends the universal values of inviolable and inalienable human rights and of freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law. It wants to be 'united in diversity' and open to all European states that respect their values. It emphasizes the rights of minorities, as well as pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and gender equality. With reference to the "will of the citizens and the States of Europe to shape their future together", the Constitution clearly affirms that the European Union is both a Union of citizens and a Union of States (Article 1 of the Constitution)."¹⁹

While this process of unification in Western Europe proceeded rapidly in accord with democratic values, the eastern part of Europe remained firmly in the totalitarian sphere of influence of the Soviet Union for forty years. In Helsinki in 1975, under economic and political pressure, it was possible to establish approaches to freedom. However, the real breakthrough was made only in 1989. Starting from East Germany, the hitherto last great freedom revolution took place in Europe. The dividing Berlin Wall fell. This meant that Europe's unification process could extend to the newly-freed countries of Eastern Europe. They were quickly adopted into the European Union and thus into the choir of democratically formed countries. The transformation from totalitarian to democratic societies, however, is proving to be a great challenge. Over forty years, the people of these countries had been culturally ingrained by totalitarianism and its rule by fear and terror. A kind of "homo sovjeticus" developed which is characterised by a self-protective retreat into privacy and public disengagement as well as mistrust.

The revolution of ‘68

The freedom of Europe is not only seen in a democratic constitution. Equally important are democratically-prone and -able citizens. If these are lacking, it can happen that democracies are de-elected and dictators are elected to office in free elections, as happened in Germany in 1933. This possibility is not excluded in a democratic system. In anticipation of the foreseeable ongoing migration to Europe, Bertrand Kaiser and Alexander King, experts at the Club of Rome, predicted in 1991 that they would „lead to a marked intensification of a defensive racism in the destination countries and could help right-wing dictators in general elections and to power“.²⁰

The revolution of 1968 brought with it a significant boost in freedom to the European population.²¹ The goal was to enable the self-determination of individuals and to liberate them from all repressive powers: these were associated with institutions²², norms and authorities.

This can be clarified by the example of marriage: It was considered a repressive institution interested in favour of the capitalistic interests of capitalism, securing possession within its own "family". The institution of marriage was to be replaced by "free love".²³ This did not mean promiscuity but aimed at the deinstitutionalisation of love and sexual morality with the aim of eliminating moral and economic repression.

In the course of the cultural revolution of 1968 all three social forces, denounced as repressive, sustained profound crisis. That was the programme: Individuals should be able to be responsible for themselves how to interpret and shape their lives. Everything was to become "selectable", which Peter L. Berger later called "the heretical imperative "²⁴, ie the "must-choose": modern humans can choose anything, only not if they wants to choose.

Freedom-minded people show, according to Adorno in his study of fascism, less willingness to be subjugate themselves. In fact, in European countries, people's willingness to subjugate themselves in the wake of the generation of sixty-eight has diminished empirically and measurably. This is shown for example by representative studies, for Austria, which date back to 1970.²⁵ For example, the approval of one of the items in forty years fell dramatically: 85% who praised obedience in 1970 as the primary educational goal decreased to 32 percent by the year 2010. The proportion of authoritarians in the total population decreased from 79% in 1970, through 69% in 1980 to 51% in 1990. The figures for young people under the age of 30 have also fallen dramatically from 61% in 1970, through 48% in 1980, to 30% in 1990. The fact that a personality trait changes so profoundly in such a short time deserves to be called "revolutionary".

Flight from freedom in the midst of guaranteed liberties

Renewed growth of authoritarianism and its causes

This rapid expansion of the "freedom culture" at the level of the individual by the revolution of ‘68 has stalled since at least the beginning of the nineties. The number of (even young!) people and here again more men, who want to get rid of the annoying burden of freedom, is measurable. Authoritarian willingness to subjugate is in a cultural upswing. The percentage of (very or rather) authoritarian in Austria rose from 51% in 1990, to 65% by 2012. Similarly, among the under-30s, the trend was from 30% (1990) to 56% (2013).

Figure 3: Development of Authoritarianism in Austria 1970-2020

The Leipzig authoritarianism study of the year 2018 comes to the same conclusion.“ According to the results, about 40 percent of respondents are willing to support an authoritarian system. Authoritarian characters, therefore, tend to embrace rigid ideologies that allow one to submit to an authority, participate in their power, and demand the devaluation of others in the name of that order. This personality trait favours questionable political consequences: ‘Germany is overrun with foreigners and a dictatorship is not a bad idea." The foreigners are 'racially' devalued. Right-wing extremist attitudes are based on the idea that people are not equal. This is expressed in the fact that one sympathises with dictatorial forms of government, downplays National Socialism or shares chauvinistic, anti-Semitic, xenophobic and social Darwinist views, according to the study... in particular Muslims are affected by this. Their devaluation increased 'terrifyingly'... in 2010, one third of the respondents felt like 'strangers in their own country' because of Muslims; eight years later, more than half of them feel that way."²⁶

An aspect in the evolution of today's society is the shift of emphasis from freedom to security. Of course, these two issues do not fundamentally contradict each other. But there are times when people demand (more) freedom, others in which (more) security is sought. The accent has shifted in recent years from a desire for freedom towards a desire for more security. One can only agree with Benjamin Franklin’s concern: "Whoever gives up freedom to gain security, will lose both in the end." In times of threat by terror, people say: "In doubt for security." Security is currently trumping freedom. However, the political scientist Thomas König warns: "As a result, this political development leads to the demise of democracy. This development can only be achieved by linking the adoption of security measures in times of great threat with so-called Sunshine clauses. This allows the effectiveness of the measures to be reviewed over time, and more importantly, the freedom needed for democracies will not be permanently curtailed."²⁷

Causes

The causes of this reversal in the development of freedom at the level of the individual are currently being researched.

* Ulrich Beck refers to an important, primary cause. He calls the gained freedoms "risky"²⁸. The relieving power of institutions was noticeably weakened in the course of the ‘68 Revolution. The individual is left alone in this rapidly evolving world. This can overwhelm certain people.

* The increasing risk of freedom has to do with the fact that today's world has become increasingly "unoverviewable", according to the philosopher Jürgen Habermas.²⁹ The unstoppable "globalisation" in all areas of life (such as business, media, politics) seems to be making increasingly more people fearful. The confidence to be able to master one's own life in our culturally entrusted freedom weakens in cultures of fear.“ People who can deal with ambiguity and tensions or are oriented towards a stable meaning of life can live with them. But for many people the unmanageable pluralism, the individual responsibility for the question of meaning is obviously too much. Many are looking for narratives that give people spiritual, cultural and social homes in the context of globalisation."³⁰

* But not all lose the competence for freedom. They can cope with the challenges of a confusing globalised world. They form the meanwhile despised³¹ "elites", who are mostly globalisation winners and therefore drive it forward.

* The growth of authoritarianism plays the weakening of familial environments plays a significant role. The „fertile spaces characterized by stability and love“³² that are so important for the development of a person with a distinct identity and a "strong ego" have become more unstable. The formation of identity is progressively bumpy in the next generation in our free societies.“ The real causes of frustration lie elsewhere, deeper - these are a loss of identity and feeling of disorientation and fear of a confusing world. Kierkegaard spoke of the dizziness of freedom, which sees its possibilities."³³ The balance between the requirement of the confusing world and the ability of the person to master it, tends towards excessive demands. The temptation to borrow an "identity" increases. New "leaders" in all sectors of society³⁴, in the counselling scene, in the private education market, in religious communities, and not least in politics willingly respond to this need and in skilfully manage it. Führer love the submissiveness of others and use these ably and unscrupulously for their interests.

* The suspicion that the advancing economisation of life, the widespread consumer culture with its "secret seduction" favours an "oral" ego-weak personality type does not seem to be unfounded. As early as the 1970s, Pier Paolo Pasolini³⁵ diagnosed a "fascism of consumerism"³⁶, ie a "totalitarian" hold of the consumer-driven economy on the soul of man. This consumer-based "oral" feeling is perhaps facilitated by the absence of fathers and the delegation of the early development of children mainly to mothers. It is suspected that this results in an „over-mothering“ and „under-fathering“ of the next generation.³⁷

* For men, under the pressure of a successful women's movement, the traditional male role has is also visibly changing.³⁸ The traditional image of men, that provided hegemony and security for them, has measurably lost social acceptance in recent decades. The "new" masculinity is considerably more strenuous than the traditional one. The reason for this is that it obliges men - in reverse to women - on their part to connect professional to family life, which is increasingly overwhelming particularly younger men. Many of them are insecure in this situation, sometimes overwhelmed, and long for new certainties, often nostalgic for the socially embarrassing, but in "men's bubbles" on the Internet or right-wing party organisations re-celebrated traditional male role, with a strong masculinity. And if they cannot do it all by themselves, they join ‘strong’ men in spiritual communities and political circles.

These are by no means all, but probably some plausible reasons for the paradoxical fact that in the midst of centuries of hard-won freedoms the number of in particular young people who rid themselves of the burdensome burden of freedom, is increasing.³⁹

Right-wing populism and nationalism

This development among more and more people in European free societies is having a lasting impact on social development in many European countries. In his social encyclical Centesimus annus, John Paul II already described in 1981 the possible consequences of this development in almost prophetic terms: "The old forms of totalitarianism and authoritarianism have not yet been completely defeated, and there is a danger that they will gain new impetus. This urges renewed efforts for cooperation and solidarity between all countries." (CA 29)

Concerned voices about the decline of the liberal social order (democracies) have recently increased: "When describing the future, one usually extrapolates from the immediate past. In doing this, you are almost always wrong. Ten years ago people were convinced that liberal democracy and the free market would conquer the whole world - the matter was set in stone! But then came the financial crisis, then came the Brexit, then came Donald Trump! Everything went in a completely different direction. This period is now again being used for the latest forecasts. Now you can hear everywhere: we will experience more nationalism, religious fanaticism will gain the upper hand, we will be surrounded by demagogues and dictators. In truth, things turn out in a totally unexpected way.“⁴⁰

The danger, against which the Pope from Poland, to whom Europe owes next to Gorbachev the bloodless Velvet Revolution of 1989 warned, has two faces: nationalism and right-wing populism.

Nationalism

Increasing nationalism is mostly seen as a reaction to the threatening process of globalisation, even of Europeanisation. The resistance, on the other hand, focuses on the interest of one's own nation and its culture. Everything else is subordinated. This is what US President Donald Trump has brought to the fore with his motto "America first!" Other politicians have now done the same: "Austria first!" A political party posted placards in the election campaign "Prima Italia!" This is the Italian version. In the meantime, there are parties in every European country that are using nationalism and are increasingly winning over female voters and even more male voters.

We should not overlook the fact that nationalists also speak of freedom. But "the notion of freedom of nationalism, which the European project sought to overcome or at least defuse, is necessarily limited to its own collective. They are at best indifferent to the rights of others, whether migrants or Greeks, whether the world's poor or oppressed."⁴¹

This new nationalism is different from the feeling for one’s homeland, whereby the term homeland can be given a thoroughly nationalistic flavour, as was the case during the Nazi period. ‘Homeland’ can also be a term to latch onto for people in need of security, roots and an identifiable community, and as such is booming. Homeland is then the appreciation of the local, of encounters and faces. The local is then in no way contrary to the global, but is in a creative tension in relation to this. As a result, experts have coined the term "glocalisation”, which brings together the global and the local in a fruitful relationship.

However, nationalists have no sense of the value of the global. It is presented negatively in their political discourse. The interests of the nation are foregrounded. Nationalist politicians seek to exit international networks, treaties, agreements and trade treaties as soon as they get scared from these " drawbacks” for the nation.

Right-Wing Populism

Right-wing populists exploit the feelings of those ‘fleeing’ freedom in modern societies. They play with the fear of globalisation, which overwhelms many in their risky freedom. Among those overburdened are not a few "globalisation losers" who cannot use their guaranteed isolated freedom for economic benefits.⁴² These have the subterranean feeling of being "superfluous" in the over-economised world. This feeling is accompanied by humiliation and an experience of devaluation. Superfluous people feel worthless.

Others, for whom globalisation seems to be economically beneficial, are afraid of and stoke fear of cultural alienation and thus a loss of their national identity. When asked, they enthusiastically agree with the statement that they feel alien in their own country.

The Austrian politician and state lawyer Andreas Khol distinguishes a right from a left-wing populism. He identifies in both a typical message, opportunism and certain strategies of action. They both agree that they have neither "basic programmes that have been decided on, nor an unspoken or traditional catalogue of basic values, but are guided by the moods of the moment, their own instincts and the results of social research and the opportunity that follows from these. The latest example: The 5-Star movement in Italy.” Then he outlines the opposing populist camps:

Right-wing populists have basic programs and aggressively put forth fundamental values. They are homeland-and thus nation-related, globalisation enemies, strive for a Europe of the fatherlands instead of a European State, exclude ethnic minorities, are xenophobic, anti-elite protectors of "the little man" and supporters of direct democracy, they play the top, the corrupt and often erring elites, against the pure people, which cannot be wrong, put freedom before equality, are bureaucratic and social state-critical, and fight the intrinsically left-leaning debt policy of the state at all levels, reject wealth and inheritance taxes, represent classic family roles and often mockingly fight all forms of 'political correctness' and 'gender democracy'.

Left-wing populists also have basic programs with a long Marxist tradition and fell themselves to be the only ones standing up for a programme and therefore dogmatise their values. They are internationally oriented, often stand for free trade but not always, Europe-friendly and basically for the European State, supporters of representative democracy, put equality before freedom, are oriented on class-struggle thinking, are inclusive, additionally minority-friendly, support all forms of human conviviance, 'political correctness' as well as 'gender democracy'. Bureaucracy is supported as a means of achieving equality, the high taxation state as a prerequisite for redistribution, and consequently they support wealth and inheritance taxes, and they advocate public debt and the ‘strong state’."⁴³

For all who are fearful, "populists" in their political practice promise protection from the winners of globalisation, which means from the ultimately envied “elites”. The elites are juxtaposed against "the people" and they are enraged against the elites. The humiliation transforms the humiliated to humiliators. “The new social networks are giving the spreaders of 'liquid rage' the opportunity to anonymously shout out their aggressiveness, vulgarly badmouthing public figures, and spreading fake news, alarming news, slander and contagious hateful slogans almost unrestrictedly. The new social networks play a deeply antisocial role: they disrupt society, form 'bubbles', small virtual worlds in which people reinforce their prejudices and where the news and information that destroy such stereotypes cannot penetrate and lead to critical thinking."⁴⁴

The desire for simple explanations and solutions is therefore accompanied by a rejection of all those who undauntedly refer to the complexity of reality and thus unsettle the sought-after simplicity in analysing and searching for "solutions". Dissenters who admonish quickly become opponents of their psychic survival strategies. For such dissenters there is no respect and no tolerance, rather hatred and defensive violence whose cruel goal in the extreme case is elimination, as the mayor of Cologne Henriette Reker in 2015 experienced at a campaign event. Multicultural diversity is experienced as unbearable and is discarded.“ Plurality tolerance" (Hermann Stenger) is not suitable for populists and their followers. There is a simplifying black and white thinking: nuances do not occur.⁴⁵

If such a personality nevertheless encounters with "others" (other opinions in the country, with people who come from other cultures and have a different worldview), these others jeopardise the sought-after or in the meantime gained simple worldview. These "others" are fought in order to fend of confusion. In the Middle Ages, pyres were erected. Today, media pyres are burning, demonstrations of violence are encouraged, refugee homes that have not yet been occupied are torched, and people seeking protection are mobbed and attacked without being protected; in social media there is merciless hate and hounding. If there are psychologically damaged people, of whom there are enough in modern cultures, this could result in barbaric "violence against persons and things".

Such violence manifests itself in the language.⁴⁶ Postings bring it unrestrained to light. The distance from the language of violence to violence itself is not far. That populist leaders like to use crude and violent language, is negligent and makes them complicit in the criminal acts of violence in their environment. The goal of such violence is always the same: It is to verbally and brutally eliminate what bothers their own simple worldview.

These analyses of the mental health of a growing number of people, do not mean that there are no real challenges, even threats, in modern developments. The opportunities, which these developments bring, are however deliberately masked by the populists while some of them (like modern means of communication) are used of course.

This first approach already reveals that right-wing populism certainly has to do with "external circumstances", but even more so with the inner constitution of individuals. This can be recognized by the fact that in one and the same real world-development there are not only people who are dependent on simplification and therefore fear diversity, but others who really enjoy variety. The plurality-opponents are opposed to pluralism-lovers, who see in diversity a cultural enrichment.⁴⁷ The one viewpoint risks being open for the whole world, the other demand secure closure. Some defend, the others engage. Some agitate, others help. Some feel mainly anger, others concern, further others confidence. Society splits into those who are fleeing freedom and others who are freedom-artists. It is astonishing that there are more freedom-fleers among young men (they tend to vote for populist parties), among young women there are more freedom-artists (they tend to vote green).

A preferred strategic activity of populist politicians are the virtual bubbles of social networks. There they fasten themselves and use the fears of the bubble-dwellers for their "politics". They launch conspiracy theories. Every political order that stands in the way of nationalism is attacked: the European Union⁴⁸, which was also created as an "answer to globalisation⁴⁹. No one denies that the relatively young freedom project Europe is in development. On the basis of the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity, it is still important to establish a (better) balance between what can be mastered nationally and for what the solidarity-based power of the European Unification is needed. But there is a clear difference between further expansion or targeted deconstruction of the European Union of people and countries.

Populist offer - and when they are in power - install an "illiberal democracy”⁵⁰. This term was used and made popular in a keynote speech by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban.⁵¹ It is a cumbersome, if not paradoxical term, but fits in well with development in Europe and beyond: In same way as citizens, in the midst of securitised freedom, get rid of the burdensome burden of freedom politicians want to reduce democratic freedoms in the name of democracy. The result seems like a "wolf in sheep’s closing": democracy takes on undemocratic features, but deceitfully retains its name.⁵² No wonder that the guardians of Europe's democratic Constitution are alarmed at the creeping de-democratisation of member states and accuse the governments involved of breaking the European Constitution.

This development of liberal democracy may be illustrated using an excerpt from a speech by Viktor Orban: "Of the Hungarian leaders, Hungarian citizens expect that they will find, forge and elaborate the new organisation of the state, which makes after the era of the liberal state and liberal democracy the Hungarian community competitive again - of course, respecting the values ​​of Christianity, freedom and human rights… The Hungarian nation is not a mere accumulation of individuals, but a community that needs to be organised, strengthened and built. In this sense, the new state that we are building in Hungary is an illiberal state, not a liberal state."⁵³

But do the (right-wing) populists really have a remedy for the fears of the people? What do populist actors do with the fear of social comedown and the feeling of being "superfluous”?⁵⁴ How do they strengthen tolerance and, with it, the capacity to experience cultural diversity not as a threat but as an enrichment? What happens to give people the courage to cope with the inevitable globalisation of the world?⁵⁵ Are the problems ultimately really in the fears and not rather in the lack of trust and confidence? Confidence could foster a policy of justice for all in one humanity, and bring about lasting peace in the One World which is beset by so many issues. The true challenges of the world community could be tackled boldly: in ecology, in economics, in migration triggered by hopelessness, wars or natural disasters, or ongoing global digitalisation?

Instead, populists love strong speeches, playing with hate and xenophobia - as if foreigners were the problem. They undermine democratic achievements in direction of authoritarian concepts and curtail human rights wherever they can. Those who are overburdened by the turbulent world development are offered a "primitive black and white world view and a mixture of fear, frustration, depression and the resulting increasing aggressiveness". They succeed "with an excellent ability to express exactly what people think, who do not think".⁵⁶

Fear of Islamisation

A politically favoured xenophobia is the fear of Islam. The fear of an Islamisation of the Christian West is virtually basic for today's populist right-wing movements.⁵⁷ This fear proves to be largely irrational. They see only the dark sides of Islam; the positive experiences in history (for instance between the mystics of both religions in South Spain) are studiously ignored. The Sharia is summoned as a threat, ignoring the fact that Sharia is a highly developed legal system that certainly contains premodern instances like also our older Book of Civil Rights: After the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy established in 1908 in Sarajevo a special academy for the training of Sharia judges. That women in traditional Islam are subordinate to men, that the traditional means of punishment seem to us medieval, that the Suras of the Qur'an are interpreted in a fundamentalist way and without a hint of enlightened exegesis: that's what Christian fundamentalists in North America also do in reading the Bible. In addition, a not inconsiderable proportion of men in our European countries, according to our own studies, adhere to traditional role models of men and women. Many young Muslim women, on the other hand, are coequal in their image of women to our young women.⁵⁸ They also have a similar desire for children as local young women of the same age. The fear that refugees with many children could "swamp" a Europe lacking in children, is because of an imaginary battle against Muslim women, but not with real Muslim women. Diffuse fear avoids reality. It blinds and paralyzes.

Christian Churches and freedom(s)

The Christian Churches have responded in different ways to the modern struggle for more freedom. The Churches of the Reformation began with a strong theological commitment to the "freedom of the Christian man". Throughout history, they have not always held this standard in every respect. Today, however, they unreservedly present themselves as "churches of freedom".

The Catholic Church, on the other hand, vehemently opposed democracy and its freedoms "anti-modernisticaly". For a long time, it was unable to get rid of the interwovenness with absolutistic political systems and proved prone to support authoritarian systems. The breakthrough to the acceptance of modern freedom and thus human rights took place around and at the Second Vatican Council.

But today's commitment of the Christian Churches in the "Western Church-tradition” should not obscure the fact that in matters of freedom and authority the church members of all churches are polarised. This is what we need to explain now.

Protestant Church of Freedom

The text "De libertate humana" from 1520 is one of the fundamental writings of Martin Luther. The Reformer grew up in a medieval, Christian-coloured worldview. This built on a divine world order. Christianity comprehensively reproduced and enforced this sacred order in the world. The individuals had to fit into this order. Only then could they find the way to eternal salvation. The Church as well as the State benefited from this basic assumption.

When Martin Luther at the Diet of Worms was summoned to submit to the ecclesiastical guardians of this world view and threatened with a “ban” in the case of the insequacity, he rebelled against this worldview. He wrote his pioneering work "Von der Freyheyt eyniß Christen menschen".⁵⁹ There one can find the much-quoted sentence: "A Christian is a free lord over all things and to no one subordinate. A Christian is a servant of all things and subject to everyone." In his justification, Martin Luther relied on the apostle Paul and his encouragement to the Christians in the Church in Galatia: "But you, dear brethren, are called to liberty." (Gal 5:13)

Luther's option for the Gospel of Freedom of Saint Paul is accorded a far-reaching significance for the European history of freedom: "’Von der Freyheyt eyniß Christen menschen‘ marks a historical boundary between the Middle Ages and modern times. In his theses he postulated the sum of Christian freedoms. These do not stand side by side independently but, according to current understanding, represent a series of arguments. The central idea is a reversal of the hitherto valid basic conception of the relationship between religion and freedom."⁶⁰

It was an interweaving of theological and political factors that led, after the break at the Diet of Worms in 1521, to the separation of Martin Luther from the "Roman Church" and caused the formation of a Protestant and Catholic denomination. From then on, the Catholic Church was reputed to defend the traditional world order with divine authority, while the churches of the Reformation earned the reputation of being "churches of freedom" in the name of God.

One of the great spiritual masters of that time, who also in a modern way valued the freedom of the individual before God, but did not leave the church, was Ignatius of Loyola. For him too, the inviolable person stood in the middle of his faithful concerns. In his main spiritual work (the "Religious Exercises") he wanted to help each individual to clarify what is God's holy Will for them personally and for the shaping of their lives.⁶¹

Luther's concept of freedom had to be repeatedly defended in the course of the history of the Reformation against a morally reprehensible arbitrariness, but also against tipping over into violence. In order to prevent such occurrences, freedom was bound to the primacy of love. The political attempt to balance freedom and solidarity in the social teachings of the Christian Churches and in the political movements which orient themselves around this teaching, announces itself.

Luther's emphasis on freedom soon led to political consequences that the reformer did not agree with at all. The serfs used it to justify their struggle for freedom. Luther had to distance himself (probably also for political reasons) in 1525 in his work "Against the murderous rotting peasants" harshly. For him, freedom was a theological category that cannot be easily translated into politics. The doctrine of the two realms – the earthly and the divine – which is not easy to implement socio-politically, becomes visible here.

Even Luther left the path of his claim to freedom in his tragic confrontation with the Jews.⁶² As a child of his time he was an anti-semite and racially denounced human rights for the Jews in the country.⁶³ Luther's antisemitism was used by the leaders of the Third Reich to legitimate their crimes.⁶⁴ Part of the Protestant community found itself siding with the Nazis.⁶⁵ Another part resisted to the death. Outstanding among them: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, executed at the age of 39 on April 9, 1945 at the concentration camp in Flossenburg (Bavaria).⁶⁶

After the war the Churches of Reformation admitted ruefully to this inglorious collaboration with a brown totalitarianism which despised human freedom. In memoranda⁶⁷ the German Protestant Church endeavoured to regain its profile as a "Church of Freedom" and to clean its historical conscience. The later president of the EKD (Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands), Wolfgang Huber, writes confidently: "The Christian faith contains an understanding of human freedom that unites individuality and sociality, self-determination and responsibility for one's neighbour." The Church has to take this into account.⁶⁸

The Catholic Church (From Syllabus to Vatican II)

The history of Catholicism was different in relation to modern freedom than that of the Churches of Reformation. In their authoritarian worldview, which guarded religious and secular authorities legitimated by God’s grace, it distanced itself at the beginning of modernity from the liberal demands for more freedom in society. The attack of bourgeois liberalism on the by-God-legitimated medieval order interpreted it as an attack on God himself and the truth revealed by him. At the same time, it feared with the downfall of the old secular order her own downfall, at least the loss of her pivotal position in society.

From then on it seems consistent that Pius IX in the “Syllabus errorum” of 1864 abjured the burgeoning liberal ideas. Among the many rejected errors were the following: The Catholic religion should no longer have a monopoly, and immigrants should be free to practise their religion. The "bourgeois religious freedom" corrupts mores and spreads indifference. And then, as a crowning “error”: The Roman Pope can reconcile himself with progress, liberalism and the new formation of humanity.⁶⁹

It was inevitable that time-sensitive theologians and officials would try to enter into fruitful dialogue with the advocates of liberal demands. In this situation, the leadership of the Roman Church, anticipating the danger to the pre-modern church order, resorted to harsh measures. It began the dark time of “Antimodernism” in the Catholic Church.⁷⁰ This was an inquisitorial period, which fell victim to many eminent personalities of the church life and theology. Anyone who took on an ecclesiastical task, had to first swear the “antimodernism-oath”. The church founded Sodalitium Pianum, as a secret service, a kind of "KISI", which spied on people in leading positions in the Church and academic theology and reported suspects to Rome. None other than the later Pope John XXIII was also denounced. In his personnel file - he had already been elected Pope - he found the note: "suspected of modernism. He earned this reputation for his commitment to workers and unions and for his open-minded attitude ".⁷¹

The following event is characteristic: The Patriarch of Venice Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli sent a postcard from holiday to a school friend. The recipient was the scientist and priest Ernesto Buonaiuti.⁷² He had been reprimanded for his support in founding a political party that could not be controlled by the bishops. Angelo Roncalli however remained his friend.⁷³ When he became Pope, to his astonishment in his personnel file he found his postcard to Buonaiuti, which had never arrived, but brought Roncalli himself under suspicion of modernism.

It was exactly this Pope who put an end to Antimodernism and its fight against a liberal order of societies. In order to open the windows of the Catholic Church, sealed like a fortress, to the modern world, he convened the Second Vatican Council.⁷⁴ After a decade-long anti-modernist "high-risk pregnancy”, which lasted from 1864 and paralysed the development of the Catholic Church, it should finally be "born” into modern times. The goal was not adaptation, but dialogue with the world of the day. Pope John XXIII wanted an "aggiornamento". The basic requirement for this opening up was the belief that even in the modern world - unlike the pessimistic "church-bricklayers"⁷⁵ - God's Spirit is at work. In his opening address to the Second Vatican Council, John XXIII said:

“In the daily exercise of our pastoral office, we sometimes have to listen, much to our regret, to voices of persons who, though burning with zeal, are not endowed with too much sense of discretion or measure. In these modern times they can see nothing but prevarication and ruin. They say that our era, in comparison with past eras, is getting worse, and they behave as though they had learned nothing from history, which is, none the less, the teacher of life. They behave as though at the time of former Councils everything was a full triumph for the Christian idea and life and for proper religious liberty.

We feel we must disagree with those prophets of gloom, who are always forecasting disaster, as though the end of the world were at hand. In the present order of things, Divine Providence is leading us to a new order of human relations which, by men's own efforts and even beyond their very expectations, are directed toward the fulfilment of God's superior and inscrutable designs. And everything, even human differences, leads to the greater good of the Church.”

Religious freedom 1864 and 1965

The example of religious freedom is intended to clarify this process of opening up. While the Syllabus in 1864 rejected any religious freedom, in 1965 the Council, after years of struggling⁷⁶, wrote a specially dedicated document entitled "Dignitatis humanae". Religious freedom is now regarded as an essential element of true Christian faith. Faith and thus love can be born only from the depths of human freedom. In the name of the inviolable dignity of every human being,⁷⁷ but also on the basis of a deeper penetration into the nature of faith and the search for truth, it is demanded that Nations secure freedom for all religions: for individual believers, for religious communities, but also in the missionary activity of the religions themselves.

This transformation was probably easy for the Catholic Church and for the other religions because their position in society had changed profoundly. In the post-Reformation period, membership in a denomination and participation in Church life could be enforced on the population by state power. Since that time, political systems emerged in many parts of the world that promulgated atheism and banned "opiate" religions as destructive to the people and anti-revolutionary. They discriminated against the faithful and imprisoned or murdered the leaders of the Churches. The "incurably" religious were banished to the sacristies and the social underground. All social institutions were taken away from the Churches: schools, hospitals, old people's homes, the diaconal ministry to the vulnerable. The religious education of the younger generation was largely withdrawn from the Churches.

In this new situation, the question of the Catholic Church was no longer whether it wanted to tolerate other denominations, religions or even unbelievers next to it: this intolerance could once normally be enforced with the arm of the state. Now the question was: How could believers survive, how they could come together for public services, proclaim the gospel freely, educate children without hindrance in private or public schools and assist the poor in public institutions. The catholic church had a loss of power enforced by the course of history. A church of power became a church of powerlessness. A church that had persecuted religious dissidents became a church persecuted by those who thought differently (and in this sense were also ‘dissidents’).

However, this does not diminish the theological insights of the Council Decree on Religious Freedom. But it shows that for the Church suffering and persecution were necessary in learning to appreciate religious liberty.

The sufferings of the brothers and sisters under the yoke of communist totalitarianism thus compelled the Catholic Church to issue the declaration on religious freedom, “Dignitatis humanae”. A passage from the Pastoral Constitution "Church in the World of Today" (Gaudium et Spes) puts this new attitude in a nutshell: “Hence the Church protests against the distinction which some state authorities make between believers and unbelievers, with prejudice to the fundamental rights of the human person. The Church calls for the active liberty of believers to build up in this world God's temple too.” (Gaudium et spes, 21) But the Council also had consequences for the Churches missionary activity. The long history in Christianity of missionary coercion was rejected: “The Church strictly forbids forcing anyone to embrace the Faith, or alluring or enticing people by worrisome wiles. By the same token, she also strongly insists on this right, that no one be frightened away from the Faith by unjust vexations on the part of others.” (Ad Gentes, 13)

Democracy: consent and concern

In terms of democracy as well, the defensive attitude of the Syllabus has profoundly changed latest at the time of the Council, albeit under the two popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI serious concerns were expressed about some of the consequences of democratic freedom.⁷⁸ True, democracy as a basic form of modern societies is not being called into question. However, both popes were concerned that democracy can exhaust its foundations and not respect its borders. Nevertheless, these foundations a rooted within the history of European Christianity: and these include the individual and (ever more clearly formulated) social human rights. The more these basics weaken in the face of the ideological neutrality of the state and, as the title of a book by Franz Josef Wetz, for example, programmatically states, makes human dignity palpable in the philosophical discourse,⁷⁹the more we must question whether with this the meaning of democracy does not get lost: namely to protect freedom in justice for all persons and communities. Who or what prevents a society from voting in majority for the annihilation of a race or a religion or even over the life of the “unneeded” and “superfluous” aged, if is not allowed to water down human rights by majority decision? Who protects democracy from disestablishing itself through democratic means?

At this point in our discussion, we come up against the immeasurable problem of the relationship between freedom and truth for future development. The tension that undoubtedly prevails between them is diminished on the one hand in a fundamentalist and "truth-totalitarian" way by sacrificing freedom for the (supposed) truth. On the other hand, there is the supposedly modern dissolution, in that in a "radical-constructivist" way truth is relinquished for the (supposedly only in this way redeemable) freedom. The result of this is a "dictatorship of relativism",⁸⁰ which was castigated by Joseph Ratzinger as Pope Benedict XVI. as one of the greatest dangers for humanity⁸¹ and that according to Johann B. Metz in a modification of Luther ("Here I stand and cannot do otherwise!") can be clothed as: "Here I stand and I can always do otherwise!"

The theologically responsible solution lies in the fact that the concept of freedom and truth are personalized: truth is then understood as the entrusting accommodation of God and freedom as “freedom for love”. It is precisely this formula with which the Protestant Church protects the justly claimed freedom from abuse.

So even though democracy has become politically accepted throughout Europe and is now also supported by all Christian Churches, the question remains open, whether today in Europe (in addition to the already observed flight from liberty by citizens and the trend towards right-wing populist parties, which weaken democracy) are there not yet subtle "totalitarian" currents? The suspicion of Pier Paolo Pasolini, that there is a latent "fascism of consumerism”, is by no means to be dismissed.⁸² The main features of modern democracies would be “totalitarian”, if they are not freedom-preserving but (often unnoticed) freedom-robbing. For the most part, it is a matter an unnoticed intrusive violation of humans by humans in the name of the economy, consumption, modern science, administration or, most recently, national security.

Eastern (Central) European freedom-scepticism

With the fall of the Wall, the Eastern European countries were freed from the totalitarian rule of Communism. Nevertheless, it seems that there is a premodern, latent scepticism towards freedom in the Churches of these countries. The Churches enjoy a legal and de facto freedom. Church properties were restituted in most countries. It is possible for Churches to engage on the civil-societal meso-level with their own facilities such as kindergartens, schools, teacher-training, hospitals, retirement homes and hospices for living and dying with dignity. And all this became possible after decades of the most brutal deprivation of liberty and discrimination against openly professing Christians in accessing higher education and influential public offices.

Nevertheless, after the collapse of the external enemy Communism, some leaders in these Churches have found a new enemy in Western European Liberalism. This refers less to its economic aspects: What is questioned, however, is moral liberalism, which is rejected as "libertinism". The intrusion of this enlightened liberalism into the Church is held responsible by the Church leaders in Eastern Europe for the crisis of the Church in the so-called "Free West". Against this “libertinism”, the Churches in Eastern(Central)Europe should be immune. A kind of "Church-Wall" is raised between the Churches in Western and Eastern Europe.

The Churches of the East(Central)Europe are therefore in an enormous dichotomy with regard to modern freedom: They lay claimed to it in terms of religious policy, but are mistrustful of moral politics (at least in its western form). However, the Churches of the Vysegrád countries - Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland - move in step by step with their governments, which have set in motion a move towards "illiberal democracy". So, is Eastern Europe on the way to a bisected freedom? Or looking at it optimistically: Is this perhaps just another nationalist-coloured intermediate step on the way from totalitarianism to stable democratic freedom?

The polarized church peoples

The fact that, today, doctrinally the official representatives of all Christian Churches are basically democratic and enshrine the rights of freedom, does not mean, however, that all members, employees and officials tow the line.

This observation applies not only to individuals, but also to groupings and spiritual movements. Exactly because of the positioning of the Council - among other things - for religious liberty, so soon after this large Church gathering in 1969, "traditionalist" bishops and Church members around the Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre schismatically separated from the Catholic Church. They accuse the abandoned mother church of adopting the ideas of the French Revolution at the Council: Fraternity is found in the decree on the collegiality of the bishops, the Equality in the Constitution of the Church, that due to the rebirth in Jesus Christ among all believers, true equality of dignity and vocation rules, and Liberty in the Declaration on Religious Freedom. The appreciation by the Catholic Church of the conscience ion relation to the ecclesiastical magisterium is decisively rejected as a betrayal of tradition.⁸³

Socioreligious studies show that the members of all churches and religious communities are highly polarised in regard to freedom. “Freedom-artists" and "freedom-fleers" take aggressive stances towards each other. In the long-term study "Religion in the life of the Austrians 1970-2020", the relationship between "willingness to subordinate" (authoritarianism as Theodor W. Adorno defines it) and the religious and ecclesiastical attributes of a person could be examined. There were several combinations. A first type is middle religious and middle authoritarian (2010: 27%). The second is non-religious and authoritarianism is moderate (15%). Finally, two types are considered "religious", one of them is authoritarian (30%) but the other is not (28%).

Ecclesiastically engaged religiosity occurs in two combinations: one with and one without authoritarianism. So there are people with religiosity ready for submission and others ready for freedom. Even the religious and church-bound people in modern cultures thus prove to be deeply polarised in their attitude to freedom. This makes internal discussions on some issues difficult within all Christian Churches.

This polarisation, as the Austrian religious study shows, affects the respective Churches and religious communities differently. The two types are distributed differently depending on the classification in respect to their beliefs: we find the religious-authoritarian type (2010) the least among the non-members (14%). Next come the Protestants (22%).⁸⁴ Then come those who left the Catholic Church (27%). There is 28% among the Orthodox and 31% among the Catholics. The percentage of freedom-minded religious non-authoritarians is lowest among the Catholics (25%) and highest among the non-members (56%).

The distribution among the Muslims who live in Austria is highly differentiated. On average, 55% are authoritarian-religious, 21% non-authoritarian-religious. But that is changing from generation to generation. In the first generation, 61% are considered religious-authoritarian, while in the second, only 39%. The attitude to freedom of male and female Muslims is obviously changing as they migrate from pre-modern Arab cultures to modern Austrian culture.⁸⁵ The “willingness to subordinate” decreases, while the openness to modern freedoms grows.

TABLE 1: Religiosity and Authoritarianism according to (Non) Membership

religious + authoritarian

middling religious + middling authoritarian

non-religious + middling authoritarian

religious + not authoritarian

catholic

31%

30%

14%

25%

protestant

22%

30%

11%

38%

Urban (large)

16%

32%

13%

39%

Tolerance areas (Upper Austria)

45%

10%

13%

32%

(Burgenland) / Carinthia

19%

41%

9%

31%

orthodox

28%

16%

18%

39%

islamic

55%

12%

12%

21%

first generation

61%

12%

15%

12%

second generation

39%

13%

36%

11%

left Church

27%

19%

14%

40%

non-member

14%

9%

22%

56%

all
30%
27%
15%
28%

Austria 2010

That the majority of authoritarian-religious believers expect authority from the church (57%) is not surprising, nor that non-authoritarians do far less (48%).

It is a noteworthy denominational-studies question why all these differences in the relationship between religion and authority / freedom exist between religions, Christian denominations, and the non-denominational. One might think that the modern variant of European Christianity, namely Protestantism, with its pathos of the Freiheit des Christenmenschen („the freedom of the Christian person“) emerged at the beginning of the "modern age", as a "Church of Freedom"⁸⁶, and therefore is only slightly compatible with authoritarianism. And not only in the texts of the church leadership, but in the real "texts" of the life of the members. In fact, that is not the case.

In the search for a satisfactory answer to this question, it can first of all be pointed out that the decisive factor is not religion, but the personality stamped by a culture in the course of one's life. Pre-modern cultures have a higher degree of authoritarianism. This obviously also shapes the image of God. The ritual of bowing down of devout Muslims in their mosques is revealing. And even in pre-modern Christianity, the submissive obedience to God, his Church, and the princes allied with it, was valued more than the freedom of conscience.

Modern cultures of freedom want to attract and educate their citizens to take the risk of freedom. But that does not leave the religion untouched. If a culture is more hierarchical, the image of God also carries this feature. Conversely, the image of God in liberal cultures receives liberal traits. Then an authoritarian stylised God, who demands blind submission, becomes a God who, as a counterpart, speaks to a person who loves freedom, and also gives him the freedom to live in love.⁸⁷

This theological transformation process of the image of God, which goes hand in hand with the transformation of the (n) freedom culture, has long been needed in Christianity and has only achieved partial success in the church folk, which the church members not only on the scale of freedom-subjugation, but also in terms of an authoritarian and a dialogical image of God polarized.

Islam faces this challenge today, especially when devout Muslims and Muslims migrate from pre-modern authoritarian societies to liberal societies. This demands a huge effort from the Islamic religious community, which cannot be taken from without, but must grow from within. What can be done is to generously provide research opportunities to Islamic theologians at universities in free countries. This has the advantage that Islamic theologians are enabled to advance the necessary further development of their image of Allah in spite of expectable resistance from their own religious community.⁸⁸ In order to move forward in this work, Islamic theology certainly needs a modern, historical-critical exegesis of its sacred book.⁸⁹

Religious fundamentalism

From this point of view, it is easy to understand that members of the Church who want in a societal crisis of freedom to get rid of the burdensome burden of their freedom, also behave in the religious realm freedom-sceptical and freedom-fleeing. In their cosmos of faith, the focus is on a God who does not expect freedom of them, but demands obedience. Freedom-fleeing tendencies in the culture can then easily become a breeding ground for religious fundamentalism, which in turn can give tremendous cultural updraft to the flight from liberty, in all religions and denominations.

In 1991 Pope John Paul II in "Centesimus annus", his commemorative encyclical to Leo XIII Rerum novarum of 1891, had already warned of unpleasant developments in relation to religion and church: "In some countries, new forms of religious fundamentalism are emerging." (Centesimus annus, 29)

Religious fundamentalists shape the entire religious-ecclesiastical cosmos in an "authoritarian" manner. In the God-image of fundamentalist groups, omnipotence is foregrounded. The relationship of humans to God and his commandments is characterised by obedience and submission. God watches over them as judge, rewarding the good and punishing the evil. The priests are the worldly face of this demanding, judging and punitive God. They remind folk of his commandments and forgive their transgressions. The likelihood of a person achieving salvation is rather low. Fear of hell is the stamp of the religious life of fundamentalists. This type of Christian faith has enormous implications in private and political life. Fundamentalists have a rigid morality, especially in the area of sexuality. The unconditional (absolute) is foregrounded, circumstances hardly play a role in the judgement of guilt. In the political arena, religious fundamentalists are fond of authoritarian leaders, even dictators. Donald Trump can count on the "evangelicals" in the United States.⁹⁰

The image of God is quite different in the sphere of a culture that frees a person to love responsibly but does not lead to arbitrariness. Even the concept of "obedience" is then understood liberally by listening to the approaching God and in their freedom to the will of God. Obedience is then "Ge-horch-sam" (hearing) and not unquestioning submission. The relationship with God is no longer characterised by fear but by trust. All this becomes possible because mercy is recognised as the essence of God.

Since the Big Bang, this God has dedicated himself to the bond with his creation and his creatures. His basic gesture is that of loving care and of commitment in the incarnation and death. This God is not the great unapproachable authority, but the God of love, who heals wounds and takes the smallest sliver of gold as a basis to lead someone to their life fulfilment: feasibly through an "eternal"- "hellish" seeming process of purification and healing. Those who believe in God on the basis of liberated freedom trust God to save everybody in the end. At the end of time God will be all in all (1 Cor 15:28).

Vision: Churches as advocates for freedom

We now turn to the question of whether the Christian Churches can make a contribution today to the struggle for freedom in Europe and, if so, what. Could the Churches today have as their vocation to be reliable advocates of hard-won freedoms in Europe and with that the world? And especially the Catholic Church, which has been freedom-sceptical for so much of its history?

God's almightiness as a threat to human freedom?

The Christian Churches, as advocates of true freedom, make a valuable contribution when they uncover, in a religious-critical way, how the human willingness to subjugate coins the image of God, which in turn explains the emergence of a divine justification of an authoritarian, illiberal power structure. God is then claimed and abused to legitimise illiberal societal structures. For God's sake and for the sake of the people, church should resist such a legitimation of undemocratic structures.

The Christian Churches are burdened with the task with which their founder was engaged and was not always successful - not even among the religious leaders of his people: to purify the image of God from human deformations and to prevent the destruction of human freedom in the name of God.

Christian theology is able to claim that it has mostly fought for human freedom and its theological justification. This was opposed by the assumption of the almightiness and freedom of God.

Thus, the theological struggle for human freedom took place in the context of the ultimately unsolvable question of how the always prevenience grace of God and the freedom of man are compatible with one another. The temptation was to emphasise the freedom of God and his grace in such a way that basically "next to this" human freedom could no longer have room. An ultimately depressing result was the doctrine of Predestination of humans for salvation: God knows before each free act of a person, even before the beginning of their life, whether they will be saved or not. It probably is one of the wisest decisions of the Roman magisterium in 1607, in which Pope Paul V ordered the competing schools of theology, the Molinists and the Banezians to leave this question open as unsolvable. Even if it cannot be explained how there can be a human freedom apart from God's all-mightily conceived freedom: It remains undisputed that both God and man ultimately have to deal with each other in the freedom of love.

Theology of Modern Freedom Culture

Helpful for the appreciation of modern freedom is a well-elaborated theology of the World. The Second Vatican Council, encouraged by the opening address of John XXIII, has greatly contributed to this. He accentuated, in opposition to the "calamity prophets," who saw only evil in the modern world: "In the present evolution of human events, through which humanity appears to enter into a new order, one must rather acknowledge a hidden plan of Divine Providence.“

It is the traditional position of Christian theology that the spirit of God is at work everywhere, even in that "secular" world that in its claim for autonomy withdraws from any ecclesiastical influence. Of course, in the concrete world, there is the unseparable mixture of wheat and weeds (Mt 13: 24-30), good and evil. So a constant discernment of spirits is necessary.

This also has consequences for the activities of the Church in the word of today: For even now, the Church is not spared its task of prophetic criticism. It is right to criticise possible and real consequences of modern freedom and the Enlightenment: individualistic arbitrariness, abuse of freedom for terror and violence, a "civilisation of death", which could be behind abortion or euthanasia. There are also good aspects in the modern development of freedom: the unbending commitment to the dignity and inviolability of the person, the absolute validity of human rights for all.⁹¹ Therefore, within the struggle for freedom can, facing the undeniable dark sides of the history of freedom, the partially successful work of the Holy Spirit can definitely be seen.

Autonomous ethics

This theological appraisal of the modern history of freedom and thus of the inviolable dignity of the free person can also be seen in a growing (Catholic) appreciation of the conscience of each individual and the ability of the "secular world" to develop a well-founded autonomous ethics.⁹² Again, it is not denied that for some "autonomy" means arbitrariness and does not allow preconditions that relativise them (Gaudium et spes, 36). But theology trusts that, thanks to their conscience, people who do not know God - as well as believers - can be highly ethical and know what is good. Nor is it denied that conscience in the knowledge of what is true and what is good can be overshadowed by "power and interests“. Therefore, it is good for the conscience to enter into a serious discourse with others. However, this relief of the conscience by the community does not eliminate the statement that the ultimate responsibility lies with the conscientious persons themselves. Pope Francis has expressed this in his letter about marriage, family, divorce and remarriage - looking at the expected activity of the church today - has expressed this as follows: "We have been called to form consciences, not to replace them." (Amoris laetitia, 37)

Soft re-institutionalisation

In this way, the church takes a "modern" position that is commensurate to the culture of freedom. It encourages the person to freedom, demands and promotes education to strengthen the responsible use of freedom. At the same time, however, the Church is ready to accompany people responsible before God for themselves in their consciences.

Thus, the Church proves itself to be quite up-to-date. For facing the growing risk of freedom, the alternative is either flight from liberty or support for people in the context of growing demands for freedom. In social science, the defence of freedom under threat is discussed today as "re-institutionalisation". This is described as "soft", which signals that this process should not eliminate freedom but make it possible through easing.

The argumentation for the desirable re-institutionalisation makes use of the dual function of institutions⁹³. On the one hand, institutions bind individuals to societal patterns of action, thereby limiting their creative freedom; On the other hand, society and its institutions can relieve citizens of the challenge of freedom. So it is important to rehabilitate intelligently the institutions that were devaluated by the sixty-eighters simply as repressive, but not as disburdening. At the same time, the risk of freedom should be reduced by "soft" re-institutionalisation, without touching freedom itself. It is assumed that, decreasing the risk, serves the protection of freedom. Freedom is, if it is eased, less "risky" (Ulrich Beck). Therefore, the gentle re-institutionalisation of life patterns is an important contribution to the preservation of freedom facing the impending flight from liberty.

Institutions can be defined as a bundle of proven patterns that are bindingly transmitted from one generation to the next. African culture, therefore, sees in its works of art one generation on the shoulders of the previous ones. In this way, culture has been able to accumulate an ever-greater supply of proven life-knowledge.

Of course, the "codification" of what was once proven may include the danger that what has been handed down can become obsolete, that the heritage may be ‘musealised’, that patterns for the new era may prove unfit. Institutions can petrify. They no longer create liveliness, but stifle it.

In addition, power interests play a role in the "construction of reality"⁹⁴. Patterns developed in patriarchal times serve men’s interests more than women’s. Patterns from pre-democratic times benefit the governing class more than its subjects. This makes it understandable that in the wake of the women's movement, the inherited patterns and sometimes the institutions in which these were bound were questioned. For example, as women's growing self-confidence reveals that the institution of "marriage" is more for men than women, they seek either to abolish the patriarchal institution entirely (as the sixty-eighters preferred) or transform the patriarchally-shaped institution of marriage into an equal partnership.

Precisely this example shows what soft re-institutionalisation can mean concretely : The idea of completely de-institutionalised love (without the institution of marriage) can prove to be stressful and risky in everyday life. The fact that even nowadays more and more people decide on marriage, and thus "institutionalise" their love for the sake of children and for their own sake, also signals the desire to ease freedom in love. “Re-institutionalized love" probably has more chances to survive than "free love" without the benefit of the soft re-institutionalized "marriage new". This is now not a patriarchal institution, which enshrines the subjection of women to men, but a realm in which love borne of freedom gains more stability.

The Churches could offer people such soft re-institutionalisation in the face of the growing risks in freedom. This could be a relief from weighty questions for them and encourage the people of today as well as help them not to flee their given freedom.

Even in questions of faith, in times of pluralism and the inevitable growth of doubt,⁹⁵ "plausibility structures" that offer relief are helpful and supportive. In everyday life, in a climate of ubiquitous scepticism, modern persons can rediscover themselves supported in a Christian group or congregation which, in their stories and rituals, in explaining and doing, give the seekers the opportunity to know that, "that’s how it is with us." The ecclesial community gives the individual a solid foundation for their faithful life, without fostering fundamentalism.

The Churches do not fulfil this service of relief irrationally, but for centuries they have been trying their best to justify their common "knowledge of life" about God and the world before reason.

If a Church in cultures of freedom wants to relieve people in questions of faith and ethical orientation too, it must preserve liberty. This mean, that it must be clear what a church in its essence stands for. Because in times of diffusion what counts is position. It also needs people who are convinced of the teaching and have chosen to take on interpretation of life and a lifestyle typical for the Jesus movement for which the Churches stand. At the same time, such Churches of freedom, with all certainty, respect the freedom of their members. They support personal searching. They accept it when people "choose" from the ecclesiastical cosmos of beliefs or only identify themselves temporarily and partially with the church, that is, often only going part of the way without being a member. Churches stand for a hospitable Jesus movement with no barriers.

Paradoxically, among those who have "converted" some have problems with the above-described freedom of a religious community.“ Converts" mostly take with great energy the arduous way from an "old man" to a "new man".⁹⁶ This is all the more possible if they meet and interact in a in the faith community, which are „plausibility structures for them“, with "significant others" in a lively way. Then one day the decision for the "new way" is made, often in a solemnly celebrated ritual. Through active commitment and commitment in community life, the conversion is stabilised.

Not surprisingly, converts cannot do much with those Church members who doubt and seek, question what is handed down to them and desire reforms. Through such members of their Church they become unsettled in what they have achieved on the often rather challenging path of their conversion. Their decision can be destabilised by being confronted with alternatives. Converts not only demand firmness and a secure foundation. They are also at risk of becoming religious fundamentalists. This reminds us once again that fundamentalism is the kind of belief of people who seek due to uncertainty firm ground in their lives. This irritation by possibly even legitimate alternatives not only unsettles them, but also makes them defensive, even aggressive, against those who think differently. Converts are in danger of being intolerant. Moreover, this intolerance does not only refer to possible alternatives. It also affects the seekers and those who live the shared knowledge for live only partially and selectively. Converts tend to the standpoint "all or nothing". They also seek the "pure doctrine" and mistrust popular religiosity, because it waters down the gospel and connects it with pagan elements.

Democracy-Fitness

One vehicle that is available to all Christian Churches, which have already had good experiences with these institutions, is their broadly established educational system. This ranges from kindergartens to seniors' education. All Churches have large education and social academies, especially in German-speaking countries. Together they can contribute to an effective civic and political education in Europe.

One key aspect would be to understand current developments. Insight should be gained into how democracy, human rights and with these the freedoms in the European countries as well as worldwide are developing in different ways. Schools and in adult education institutions, should be encouraged to build strong personalities because this lowers the susceptibility to authoritarianism and increases resilience against right-wing populist developments. The purification of the image of God and other statements of faith would also be important.

Democracy within the Churches

A contribution to strengthening the gained democracies and their freedoms would be if the members of the Church in their own communities of faith could themselves learn democracy by practising it. It's not about votes about the inheritance of faith. Nor is it called into question that God's action always pre-supposes man's actions and that God's grace is unearnable. Seen in this way, the basic message of the Churches is not the product of the wishes of the religious needy.

But this does not hinder the Christian Churches from forming their community life together and making their decisions democratically. This word is not used gladly by those responsible for the ecclesial community regarding the Church. That may well be true to the passed down "truth" of faith: it makes no sense to vote on whether there is a God and hope for resurrection. Yet, in the course of the history of the Churches, bishops have gathered in councils to vote on the texts that have been formulated. Also the pope is elected in a conclave. Similar electoral processes have existed for a long time and can still be found today in religious orders. In Switzerland, in some dioceses local bishops are elected. In the course of history, such democratic processes have been repeatedly called for. The Decretum Gratianum, written around the year 1040, demanded that all should be decided by all - a position that found its way into the law of the Catholic Church in 1983.

However, one names these processes, they are clear forms of participation in decision-making in church life. This is also in the terms of the synodality, which, according to Pope Francis, is a challenge for the Catholic Church. For example, he demands that those concerned be questioned before the World Bishops' Synods on the subject and not only advise bishops behind closed doors.⁹⁷

Of great importance to the Catholic Church is "separation of powers". It contradicts the basic democratic feeling of many church members, when all "power" is in the hands of the clergy, which enacts laws, enforces their application and, last but not least, does not control its activities. The events in the abuse crisis but also in dealing with women have brought the fatal side effects of this church system to light.

Related to synod is subsidiarity. The social teachings of the church call these for our societies. In this principle, the high value of the individual people and their small lives is appreciated. Higher-ranking bodies, especially not the state, should relieve them of their responsibility. They should only intervene if the smaller units are overwhelmed in coping with a challenge. Ultimately, undemocratic societies do not accept subsidiarity and, with it, a strong civil society. However, the Church cannot only teach and demand subsidiarity. It would be more credible if it would implement this in its own realm. The Catholic Church still has a long way to go.⁹⁸

However, the more "democratic" participation there is in the lives of the churches, the more skilled members of the Churches will become in the political life of democracies. The rule should be today that Christians are not surpassed in democratic sentiment and competence. Especially not Catholics. This would enable the freedom-minded Churches to uncover and prophetically protest against deprivation of liberty, especially among the weaker in democracies. That would be an astonishing variant of the option for the "poor", because they are most likely to be victims of basic totalitarian attitudes.

The wish of Robert Schumann, one of the founding fathers of the European Union as a project of freedom, is able to be fulfilled: “Those that are so lucky as to be able to contribute to this, thanks to their spirit of brotherhood based on a Christian conception of freedom and human dignity - will be among the best architects of a Europe thus renovated and united.”⁹⁹

Develop a European Identity

One more note: One of the tasks of Christian Churches could be to contribute to the formation of a "European identity". Many people in Europe feel very national, and even provincial in some countries. Not a few shy away from "the global". The same goes for "the European".

Eastern (Central) European countries were other-directed for forty years and their national feelings and culture were humiliated. It may be understandable, then, when some people - populist and nationalist - fear that they will negotiate a new foreign rule through Brussels after having been dependent on Moscow. Building a European identity is not easy in such a historical context.¹⁰⁰

It is almost a privilege of the Catholic Church - and this in comparison to the other two major Christian denominations - that it is a universal church, so not nationally bound. The Catholic Church is local but it is not a national church. True, in European history, the rulers have always tried to make the churches dependent in their dominion. The Augsburg Peace and the Peace of Westphalia fostered, with the ius reformandi and the ius emigrandi, the amalgamation of dominion and confession, in mutual dependence and with profit on both sides.

Regina Polak suggests in a contribution on (right-wing) populism that the Christian churches should contribute to the formation and strengthening of a "European identity". Although this is as much as "a minority program" as "a global, universal-humanistic oriented solidarity. The latter is not innate, but must be practised and learned.“¹⁰¹

Help shape further development

The churches have good lobby facilities in Brussels. These should be used by them for the future development of the European Union. At the same time, Europe should continue to be a worldwide exemplary freedom project. This will only succeed if, on the one hand, the balance between the national and the European is held. The churches can refer to the principle of subsidiarity which they teach (which the Catholic Church is hesitant to implement in its own realm). Maximal participation of citizens is indispensable in the further development of Europe. At the same time, there must be more solidarity, as the next section of this book presents.

Ulrike Ackermann from the Institute for Research on Freedom points to this matter, writing: "It is high time to strengthen the diversity of national cultures, the diversity of paths and the principle of subsidiarity against a single state. The Dutch government has responded wisely to the mantra of the lack of alternatives on this path: 'European, if necessary, national, if possible'. Further steps towards integration can only succeed if they are democratically legitimised, if they strengthen the confederation of sovereign states - and if the citizens are involved in the decisions. Otherwise, it looks dark for the freedom project Europe."¹⁰²

Worship makes you free

The main task of the churches, however, will be to use the means of religion to strengthen freedom and thus the democratic competence of the people of Europe.

The goal of any true religion is ultimately the unification process between God and the world. This basic melody started sounding in Christianity with the singing of the angels at the birth of Christ, who praise the unfathomable event of God's union with humanity.

This melody echoes in the writings of the mystics of all great religions. Within the Christian era mention should be made of Hildegard von Bingen and Teilhard de Chardin. Christian scientists speculated on final oneing. Already five years before Charles Darwin, the English geologist and Christian Hugh Miller wrote in 1854: "What, I ask, is the essence of the earth's history or that of the creation story? The key in both is progress. In both, we find the rise of dead matter to modest, then to higher life forms. But is this ascent over? No. God still lets higher things follow lower. Now God is in the process of preparing the poor man for a higher status. The work of the seventh day is salvation. Finally, creation and Creator will unite in one point as one person. God's goal was the ascent of dead matter to man. From the beginning to this point of the oneing. True God and true man. They recognise the adorable Lord of all future."¹⁰³

This is not about theological reasoning. Rather, it should be noted that religious people above all "seek" this oneing with the One they name God. The search for God, which means being already found by God, runs through many psalms of the Judeo-Christian prayer tradition. From the perspective of believing Christians, this quest for God-oneing characterises the human being in the depth of his existence. The great teacher of Christianity, Augustine of Hippo, spoke of a restlessness of the human heart, which only comes to rest when man rests in God. He presupposes that God's heart is "restless" until it comes to rest at the heart of humanity: a process that runs from the creation of the world to its completion in the cosmic Christ and in its eschatological phase (LG 32, 1 Cor 11,10) in which we are.

For our considerations, it does not matter if this core of religion is "true" and how it can be understood. Crucially, truly believing people have recognised this as the innermost dynamic of their lives and live their lives according to it. In all religious acts, personal or in the rituals of their community, they intend to do it. Worship is a good way of expressing the yearning of believers for God-oneing.

In this description of the innermost of religion, one might get the impression that it would distract people from acting the world and narrow, even impede, like an opiate their willingness to change the world through political action. But that was not the case in the history of Christianity. Worship became the basis of indomitable political dangerousness. And this especially for those totalitarian systems that wanted to usurp human beings totally, completely. Totalitarianism lives from total control of human beings.

And it is precisely this total control that religion rejects by linking human beings back to God. This explains why the most determined and stubborn "enemies" of totalitarian rulers have always been the true believers. The long list of martyrs that exist in all religions bears witness to this fact. Supposedly apolitical worship carries in itself the highest political explosive power. It deprives humans of the ultimate source of fear of the supposedly strongest weapon of totalitarian rulers: the threat of torture and death.

It is told of the great Pope from Poland, John Paul II, that during one of his first visits to his homeland - in the midst of martial law - he said: "He who bends his knee before God never bends before the party!"¹⁰⁴ This statement about faith probably contributed a lot to the fall of Communism in Catholic Poland.

At the end of this chapter on the struggle for freedom, it can be said that this cannot be detached from the struggle for truth and solidarity. It is ultimately a struggle for true humanity, for a humane world and for peace in the One World.

Part 2: The Struggle for Justice

To wring freedom from justice

England is not only the country from where freedom originated. The industrial revolution was also successful there decades earlier than on the European continent and began its triumphant march to the mainland. In this early capitalist phase, the "free citizens" were not least able to use their freedoms profitably. However, the emerging industrial proletariat had, according to the pointed criticism of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, no benefits from these freedoms.

During this time, the priest Jean-Baptiste Lacordaire (1802-1861) engaged himself critically with this new social and economic development. With a view across the Channel to the country of origin of European industrialisation, where it began around 1760, he clearly perceived the division between industrialisation winners and losers. To protect the new proletariat, he formulated as a socio-political motto: "You always have to wring justice from freedom!"¹⁰⁵

Figure 4: The Old and the New Social Question

The Old Social Question

The invention of the steam engine and the associated change in the way of production had a lasting impact on social development. It formed today’s so-called Social Question. Factories were built on the outskirts of the cities. The rural population moved to the city and lost their roots. Working conditions were extremely precarious for them: child labour was widespread, working hours long, pay poor. The housing conditions were miserable. It was hardly possible to feed a family with the "pittance".

There are depressing reports about the misery of the first generations of industrial workers.¹⁰⁶ In 1896, in the Wiener Kirchenzeitung, the moral theologian Joseph Scheicher told the often socially-blind clerics of his time the situation of the proletarians: "In a former factory there is a whole colony of tradespeople: scrubbers, shoemakers, bed-linen makers etc. They buy the things they need from a traveling tradesman who at the same time serves beer and wine. I bought a piece of bread in this shop. As I walked through the courtyard, a small dog looked at the bread, so I threw him a piece. Instantly, from a box in the yard, a child threw himself at the dog and tore the bread out of his throat. The child led me to his mother, a washerwoman, and I asked her about her employment situation. She told me that, despite the hardest work, she could not earn enough weekly to fill her belly. She was thinking over how to survive but she needed fifteen Kreutzer a day to live. When the time comes to pay the rent, they have to forego the food to save for the rent. I did not ask further.“¹⁰⁷

Karl Freiherr von Vogelsang a migrant from the Protestant Prussia to the Catholic Austria analysed in 1883 in "Vaterland" (a monthly for Christian social reform, founded in 1878 and edited by him), the conditions of the industrial proletariat in the vicinity of Vienna: "The Pottendorfer cotton factory belongs to a corporation and there are about 1000 workers employed there. Work takes place from 5 o'clock in the morning until 6 o'clock in the evening with a one-hour break all- year round; thus in fact for 12 hours a day; on Sundays they rarely worked. Children under 14 are not employed. The greater part of the workers live in factory flats, for which they have to pay between 21 and 25 florins a year for rent, depending on the size of the room... From what has been said, an unmarried worker earns an average of 200-210 florins a year, a married one 195-200, a female worker earns 120 fl; if one takes off another 20-25 fl. for the rent, then one can get a sense of how these people live with the above-mentioned respective food prices [1 kg of beef cost 64 kr; 3-4 eggs 10 kr. 1 kg of flour 16-24 kr.]. Under these conditions, it is hardly expliquable that in commerce expertise an expert sent from Pottendorf declared the employment conditions as good.“¹⁰⁸

These witnesses of the social misery of the working people in the new factories reflect the profound transformation of the social fabric. In a few decades, the class system dissolved, which was supported since the French Revolution by the free bourgeoisie as the third estate, alongside the nobility and the clergy. There had been socially romantic attempts to integrate the new growing number of industrial workers as a "fourth estate" into the old estate class system, thereby giving them rights and social protection. But this attempt had already failed in the early phase of industrialisation. The later renewed attempt in the Austrian Estates Staat (Österreichischen Ständestaate) in the 1930s was of lesser duration.¹⁰⁹

In a short time, the concept of class society prevailed. The first to write about this were Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, in the first half of the nineteenth century. Just half a century later (1891) in the Catholic Church, Pope Leo XIII followed this social analysis in the first Social Encyclical.

This high-level Encyclical was preceded by diverse social activities in theory and practice. Monasteries and ecclesiastical institutions participated.¹¹⁰ This is also evident in indirect testimonies from that period. Thus, a liberal minister noted in 1869 about the construction of workers' housing in Vienna: "It was necessary to put the concern for the workers' housing in reliable hands. At present, only those close to the clergy have accepted this challenge and this is dangerous."

And Karl Marx wrote in a report about his journey through the industrial area to his friend Engels in the same year: "On this tour of Belgium, stop in Aachen and trip down the Rhine I have convinced myself that the pastors, especially in Catholic areas, must be vigorously attacked... The dogs flirt, wherever they can, with the Labour question.“¹¹¹

The first Vatican Council also wanted the consideration of the Social Question. Eight members had tabled the motion stating, "All people of goodwill expect, indeed yearn for, the ecumenical Synod to proclaim and protect the correct and sacred principles of social order, and in a particularly the religiously-sensitive workers raise their eyes and hands to the Mother Church in the expectation that it will reawaken in all their hearts the laws of Christian love and justice and restore them in society."¹¹² However, this proposal was not dealt with because the Council ended abruptly due to the occupation of the Vatican State.

Solutions

The Social Question was born and shaped politics more and more. Serious efforts to mitigate misery, due to the pressure of the needy "proletariat" through social political measures, were unfolding. All political movements, which step-by-step became parties, designed programmes to solve the Social Question. These went in three directions:

* Liberalism, supported especially by the factory owners, relied on the "well-understood self-interest" of the entrepreneurs. Starving and ill workers would not benefit their profit. “Sick cows do not give milk!" So the working and living conditions would have to be made more bearable. However, the extent of these worker-friendly measures depended not only on the framework conditions (eg with regard to child labour) that had gradually been achieved in socio-political terms, but also on the goodwill of the factory owner and the growing competitive pressure in the emerging market.

"Liberalism" signals that the protagonists were concerned with safeguarding their freedoms in the entrepreneurial field as well. In their entrepreneurial freedom they saw the key to their economic success.

* A contrary approach followed the workers' movements. These were inspired by the social-economic analyses of Karl Marx. Soon two major socio-political tendencies emerged - the socialist and the communist. One more focused on reforming the society, the other on the revolution of society. The goal was the same in both directions: the overcoming of class society through the non-violent establishment or violent enforcement of a classless society.

The communist strand, which was put into power by Lenin in the October Revolution of 1971, realized the dictatorship of the proletariat, led by the Communist Party. It also ideologically shared the assumption of Karl Marx that religions and their communities weakened the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, since they held it by participating in their struggle through the opiate of religious consolation and thus prevented the overcoming of the causes of misery.

The socialist strand, on the other hand, was thoroughly Marxist in social analysis; In some regions (as in Austria¹¹³) the revolutionary Marxist rhetoric was maintained, but at the Gotha congress in 1875 under massive protest by Karl Marx separated the religion from the churches for tactical reasons. The Socialist Party assumed (quite Marxistically) that with the end of misery, religion would disappear by itself. But it fought with all means "clericalism," that is, the use of religion for the stabilization of that form of society that wanted to bring down the socialist movement. The militant weakening of the churches was seen as part of the weakening of the feudal social system.

The self-designation of these tendencies as "socialism" makes it clear that not freedom, but justice was above all the focus of attention on those who were deprived of capitalist economic activity: and this on a totally non-free or - as the development of socialism to social democracy shows -On the democratic way. In opposition to Marxist ideology, even a more peripheral flow of "religious socialism" developed.

* The Christian Social movement took a middle course. This was inspired by the social teachings in the Catholic Church, which go back in their approaches as early as the thirties of the 19th century and in 1891 a pooling in the first Catholic social encyclical of Pope Leo XIII. have found. Determining is the attempt to balance freedom and justice. This was done through the development of a Catholic Social Doctrine based on three principles: that of personality, and again in balance the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity.¹¹⁴

These three currents impressively demonstrate the socio-political struggle for more justice for as many (working) people in Europe as possible. Christians were involved from the start, albeit partially past-oriented and not realistic enough, engaged in this struggle.

Welfare state and generation contract

The result of the struggle for more justice, especially for the exploited industrial proletariat, is a broad welfare state with a viable network of social situations that has been threatening to the weaker sections of the population and is still present: sickness, unemployment, old age.

The welfare state is something like organized solidarity. It has become a hallmark of people's quality of life in Europe¹¹⁵ and, like democracy, represents a European export article.

This welfare state lives on solid funding. The phrasing of liberal economic politicians in particular is: "You cannot spend money that you did not earn before." Part of the financial revenue goes through a virtual generation contract, which is used not only for the great social dangers, but also for education and care. Parents ensure a good development for the children, children are responsible for ensuring that the parents are not left alone in old age. Thus, at a symposium in Rome in 1989, the European bishops were able to formulate a socio-political vision: "Just as the parents give birth to the children, in the future the children should be able to accompany the parents from the world." The socio-political challenge lies in the word "can".¹¹⁶ For this, the socio-political prerequisites must be created, such as exemption from nursing, care allowance, parental leave, etc.

In the meantime, in most welfare states, the funds that are paid in to guarantee the social welfare benefits achieved in decades are no longer sufficient. More and more tax money must be poured into the direct social contributions of employers and workers. In addition, aging in many European countries is creating new challenges for the developed welfare state. The growing number of asylum-seekers has also led to new discussions about the welfare state. There is talk of "immigration into the social system" or "immigration into the welfare state" (Sebastian Kurz¹¹⁷), with the aim of excluding people who live legally in the country from access to the welfare state, at least for a certain period of time, or the social state Greatly reduce benefits. The UN seeks to alleviate such impediments to the people burdened by displacement, flight and migration, and has developed a migration pact, but some migrant countries (such as the United States of America, the Visegrád states in Eastern (Central) Europe or Austria) unfortunately not signed.

The new social question

The old Social Question could be mastered in a decade-long, sometimes bloody struggle for more justice for the industrial proletariat. But there is a new social issue coming up.

This too is triggered by a technical progress. Just as the invention of the steam engine played a decisive role in the emergence of the old Social Question, changing the conditions of production and, consequently, social conditions, digitization is now massively changing the conditions of production and will not remain without profound effects on social developments. Industry 4.0 is on the rise.¹¹⁸ It carries revolutionary potential.

This technological development is also embedded in a new phase of "capitalism". In 1989, the communist strand of socialism failed economically and politically. Liberalism was not just "victorious". Rather, he increased his room for manoeuvre in the process of increasing "deregulation" of economic processes. Thus, equipped with even more freedom of action, the "neo-liberal capitalism" could develop globally quickly. International corporations shape the global economy and at the same time weaken the nation states in terms of taxation. Digitization gave this globalization of the economy an additional boost.

On the one hand, this accelerated global development, which is difficult to shape by individual countries in terms of social policy, could on the one hand generate growing unemployment primarily in the lower educated classes,¹¹⁹ but on the other hand lead to considerable uncertainty among those who (still) have a place in the working process.

In any case, industrial societies in particular are facing enormous new social challenges in the course of their transformation into information societies. These are aggravated by the fact that the financing of the traditional welfare state is becoming increasingly critical due to the smaller number of children and the pleasingly higher life expectancy. In addition, because of natural disasters, hopelessness associated with chronic poverty, and war / persecution, migration is on the rise, pushing people from the East and South to Europe from the East and the South, despite attempts at military separation of the external borders and dealing with multiple causes of flight. The internationally enforced asylum law is increasingly affecting the efficiency of the welfare state.

The socio-economic changes are predictably leading to violent conflicts in the development of the welfare state. The alternatives are manageable: either the social state is reduced,¹²⁰ or certain groups are excluded (for a certain period of time), or new sources of funding are sought, such as the taxation of wealth, the introduction of long-term care insurance, the elimination of tax evasion and taxation international corporations that, thanks to transnational links, usually pay taxes where they are lowest.

This mixture of intertwined challenges, if not courageously and effectively addressed, not only leads to social upheavals, but also - accelerated by these - to political developments that have already been discussed in the chapter on the struggle for freedom. This is a good time for political leaders who provide simple solutions for complex challenges in emotionally charged language.

As early as 1991, two experts from the Club of Rome looked ahead to this development when they wrote about the predictable mass migration and its political implications:

"Great migrations are predictable, and not just for reasons of political, racist or religious persecution, but for the sake of economic survival. In the future, such migratory movements will take place in Europe not only from the East to the West, but even more from the South to the North. The demographic development is different in the southern hemisphere than in the northern. By the middle of the next century, the inhabitants of today's industrialised countries will not even amount to more than 20% of the world's population. This creates enormous population pressure, which, coupled with lack of equal opportunities and tyranny and oppression, will trigger massive emigration to the north that cannot be contained. Our descendants will probably experience mass migrations of unknown magnitude. This process has already begun, just think of the boat people from the Far East, the Mexicans who come illegally to the United States, and the Asians and Africans who are pushing to Europe. One can easily imagine that in extreme cases, countless starving and desperate immigrants will land with boats on the northern shores of the Mediterranean.“

As the Club of Rome announced in 1991, the large number of refugees seeking shelter, peace and prospects for their children causes a sense defence from many people. There is talk of "defensive racism": for the experts of the Club of Rome in 1991, "it is clear that no measures will effectively stop the immigration movement, which could lead to a intensification of defensive racism in the target countries and could help right-wing dictators in general elections come to power.“¹²¹

Europe is facing (like other parts of the world) socially troubled times. The struggle for more justice will increase again as the number of people below the poverty line increases. New social movements will come into being. They will once again seek to wrest justice from the freedom of globalised and digitalised neoliberal capitalism. Will this lead to a renaissance of Marxism¹²² or to a revival of social democracy, which is currently weakening throughout Europe?¹²³ Or could social issues reconnect with national ones because globalisation is seen as a major cause of growing poverty? This would be a repetition of events in the 1930s, though history never simply repeats itself. But not a few far-seeing people are worried that developments could go in a similar direction, which does not bode well for peace in Europe.

Such a renaissance of parties, whose focus is traditionally "more justice", is currently prevented, however, by the fact that those worried by fears of the future entrust themselves to more "right-wing populist" movements for secondary reasons, but most of them are ultimately following an unhelpful neoliberal economic policy.

Apparently, these populist-charged parties, with the help of the fight against an "aggressive Islam" and with a regressive nationalism, distract the insecure from the fact that, as globalisation losers, they in fact serve the triumph of neoliberal economies as "useful idiots". The afraid are currently choosing those political leaders who they should actually be afraid of because of their socially undomesticated economic policies. How long will it take for the opportunistically abused voters to become aware?

Solidarity stock

But how can a policy for more justice be carried out in modern democratic societies for as many people as possible? This is only possible if citizens provide political parties with a governing majority to enhance justice. This requires a population that is very open for solidarity.

Solidarity is not a feeling but a virtue: in other words, as competence, strength and an ability to stand up for (more) justice, both privately and politically. Solidarity is a certain strength within a person with which one commits oneself to open the way for as many as possible the dwindling life chances of the developing world: drinkable water, breathable air, uncontaminated soil, family formation, access to education and work, both personal and communal practice of religion. While solidarity demands a high degree of empathy in unjust circumstances and the suffering caused by them, it is also a highly political virtue.

This raises the question of the supply of resilient solidarity in modern societies. Since 1992, I (in a long-term study together with Hermann Denz¹²⁴) have followed the development of the stock of solidarity in Austria's culture.¹²⁵ There have been striking connections which I will briefly present.

Dimensions of solidarity

Initially, three dimensions of solidarity emerged:

A first dimension can be outlined as microsolidarity. It refers to the "small living environment", ie the family and relatives, the immediate living space.

The second dimension concerns the "middle" level and therefore bears the name "mesosolidarity". Solidarity in the workplace is attributable to it.

Finally - as a third dimension - there is macrosolidarity: now we look to Europe or the One World.

Most citizens are equipped with microsolidarity, as a core result of the studies shows. The "small living environment" is important to most people, indeed "holy". There they have their roots in a changing and confusing world. Microsolidarity has a regressive, therefore not necessarily malignant colouration: it is the retreat into the familial environment. Some suspect that these „small living environments“ are often too small and that the people living in them are increasingly overstrained. The question is whether this microsolidarity does not have a strong group-egoistic Shadow.

Macrosolidarity is fragilely developed. Few respondents feel as if they are European or World citizens. The local neighbourhood, the village, the city district count for a lot.

The separation from strangers is strongly marked.“The shirt is closer to most than the stranger", according to the title of the Report of the Solidarity Study 2002.¹²⁶

Mesosolidarity lies between micro- and macrosolidarity, with mean values. It has to do with solidarity in professional life, at the workplace. It also shows itself in a variety of civic engagements.

Desire and action

In order to understand the endowment of modern populations with solidarity, another key outcome of the solidarity study is helpful. It turned out that, on the one hand, the majority of people subjectively consider themselves to be solidarian. To be solidarian is like being religious, expressing that you are a reliable person.

If, however, people are asked about their willingness to act in solidarity, the figures decline dramatically. Further analysis reveals that the desire for being solidarian on the long road to action seems to be suffocating in a jungle of fears. This affects less microsolidarity in the small worlds of refuge, but meso- and even more so, macrosolidarity.

A similar result was found in a study on dealing with refugees after the autumn of 2015, during which many people, especially from the war zone in Syria, sought protection not only in the surrounding countries, but also in Europe. In by-election polls, the opinion research institute SORA in 2015 asked in Upper Austria and in 2016 in Vienna what feeling respondents had in view of the refugees and the respective policy towards them. Three emotions were identified: anger, worry and confidence. The majority placed themselves in the middle position, worry. At the extremes about the same number were angry or confident.

It was possible to more accurately determine the profile of the marginal positions of anger and confidence. These are items that consistently received high approval from those who felt anger:

Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban did the right thing when he had a barbed wire fence built on the border with Serbia and Croatia.

Economic refugees should be sent back immediately.

Because of the refugees, crime and violence in the country will increase.

It will end in disaster.

There are certainly also terrorists among the refugees.

Most of the refugees are economic refugees.

Europe will be islamised by the refugees.

The boat is full.

Many refugees abuse our welfare state shamelessly.

One can certainly be a good Christian without advocating for the incoming refugees.

Barbed wire fences should be built quickly at the borders.

Those who do not speak German after one year, should be deported.

Refugees bring diseases into our country.

The young male refugees are a danger to our women/girls.

The research should then clarify the question of how such contrasting emotions arise in the face of one and the same reality (many seekers have crossed our borders and were welcomed by many). The position of "anger" was characterised by defence and desolidarisation, while the position of "confidence" could be interpreted as an attitude of solidary acceptance.

Fear desolidifies

The hypothesis was that multi-faceted fears "explain" why in a person one of the three feelings becomes "dominant." The stronger the fears, the sooner one encounters the feeling of anger. In the case of slight fears, on the other hand, people are more confident.

To check this assumption, a long list of possible fears was included in the survey. The statements on the manifold individual fears were then calculated into an "anxiety potential" index. This allowed a correlation between the three possible emotions and the fears to be calculated.

The result is impressively clear: the higher the anxiety potential in a person, the more likely it is to feel anger (and thus to be non-solidarian and seal oneself off from refugees). The lower this anxiety potential is, the more likely someone is confident (and thus stands for a "welcome culture"). The anxiety potential is of course only one of the factors - albeit a weighty one - which "explains" the correlation with one of the three emotions. In more profound analyses, "authoritarianism" (after Theodor W. Adorno) is added. Anxiety potential and authoritarianism reinforce each other.

This has the consequence that the group of people who feel defensive anger at the same time is loaded with a strong authoritarianism and thus tend towards right-wing populist parties (such as AfD) and ‘Führern’. Anger is therefore, if one wants to use this political scale, rather "right" (in Austria FPÖ, AfD in Germany), confidence rather "left" (in Austria as in Germany THE GREENS, but in Germany also a part of the CDU sympathisers). According to the study, the two fringe groups also each have a figurehead they praise: The people with anger appreciate the policies of Viktor Orban, those with confidence support the mantra of Angela Merkel: "We can do it!" The one "orbanisieren", the other "merkeln". These attitudes are currently polarising all European countries, their governments, and populations, to varying degrees.

Fear potential

What is revealing in this study, is the realization that people's fears have many faces and that by no means all of them have anything to do with the fear of strangers and people seeking protection. Some just belong to human life (like the ‘Urangst’ - primordial fear - described below), others are culturally conditioned. Five dimensions of fears could be statistically well defined in the refugee study:

First there are biographical fears: death, finiteness, illness, an accident, the fear of losing one’s partner.

Then many of the interviewees are afraid of social decline; these are mainly based on the uncertainty of their own jobs. With regard to the refugees, some are worried that hard-pressed entrepreneurs could misuse them as cheap labour and thus for wage dumping. However, such fears arose earlier than the fear of safety-seeking refugees - they have to do with globalisation and the financial crisis of 2008.

But also people who live in social safety and are financially well-placed, express fears. These are not social, but cultural: one can no longer feel at home in one's own country, alienation looms, the burka and headscarf should therefore be prohibited; Islam threatens the Christian Occident.¹²⁷

Another facet of fear is to be "be left short" in this life. This has to do with the culturally widespread "(empty) consolation of the people in the here and now", which has replaced the religious "consolation in the hereafter" criticised by Karl Marx. To be sure, people still carry a boundless longing in themselves. This shows in moments of love, insight, good work or play. The limitless longing could be well cultivated religiously under an ‘open heaven’: one hoped for the great happiness in the heaven to come. On this earth, earlier generations were still at peace with the fragments of happiness, even though they were sapped by suffering. But because today for so many people in their everyday lives heaven is closed, they seek happiness free of suffering on earth: the (worldly) life is for them "the last opportunity”¹²⁸. People today seek immoderate happiness in a moderate time. But such a life becomes quickly overwhelmed and is characterised by the fear of falling short. The result is a culture of permanent hunting for luck, but also happiness rivalry. It is precisely this "civilization of rivalry" that makes solidarity difficult.¹²⁹

One last variation of fear is probably the most powerful: it is the diffuse, faceless and nameless fear. Omnipresent, this can darken life. It puts a strain on all areas of life. In extreme cases, it makes a person sick and in need of therapy.

Such fears bolster one another, swinging high. This angst is different from fear: angst is in the stomach, fear in the head. Angst is irrational, fear rational. Angst paralyses, fear causes fights. Angst desolidifies, fear can make one engaged in solidarity.

Become superfluous

Years ago, the writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger pointed out a special form of fear. Pope Francis has repeated this socially critical thought in several speeches. Enzensberger wrote: "Even in rich societies, each of us can become superfluous tomorrow. What should we do with him, with her?“¹³⁰

It can be explained quickly who is in danger of becoming superfluous. They are those who do not meet the top requirements of modern societies: in a society of work those who do not work, in a consumer society those who do not consume because they have no purchasing power, in a knowledge society those who do not update their knowledge quickly enough, in a thrill-seeking society those who are not able to participate in the amusement and fun, in a bio-science society those who have the wrong genes.

With the help of these criteria, the endangered can be easily tracked down. They belong to those groups of people who are in the time to come in particular danger of losing social attention. No-one (socio-politically) cares about them and they become social outcasts.

These include:

the dying, whose (often "overmedicalised"¹³¹) passing is too expensive for which could be planned a "socially acceptable early death", as the 1998 ‘nonsense-phrase of the year, formulated by the then president of the Medical Council Karsten Vilmar¹³² to raise public awareness;

*...the people are threatened with today's epithet "differently abled", which are prenatally screened and aborted, which massively puts under pressure not only the expectant mothers, but also those who become disabled through accident or illness after birth;

*... millions of women and men willing to work who are being sedated in ever lower financially supported long-term unemployment.

More and more children are becoming superfluous; they often disturb the lives of adults who have hardly any energy left which they would be able to share relaxing with their children. As a consequence, Europe’s is doing away with itself¹³³ - a statement based on the extrapolation of current birth rates in Europe.

The sense of humiliating superfluousness is probably also one of the factors for the "right-wing populist tendency" in many wealthy societies. It splits society into those who win and those who lose. Some are respected and appreciated, others are overlooked and underestimated. This becoming superfluous is ultimately a devaluation, an attack on dignity. In the political field, on the other hand, it helps when someone starts to inflate the greatness of the country. For example, the humiliated not only hear "Make America great again!", but hope that it also brings dignity and greatness to themselves: "Make me great again!".

In the long run, however, this does not just demand a "dignity contest" but tangible measures against becoming superfluous. A high-level active social policy is demanded. Only such a policy can overcome the splitting of society. For this exists less between the people and the elite, but between modernisation winners and modernisation losers (or in a linguistic variation with globalisation: between globalisation winners and globalisation losers). To put it another way: between them, they who descend socially and those who ascend. The margins become larger: The number of extremely wealthy is increasing, as is the number of those living below the poverty line. The middle class, which is necessary for peaceful societies, is shrinking, at least in the minds of those who still have a good job but are worried that they might lose it soon.

This tendency to become superfluous is the dark back side of a development that also has a bright front side. Because time and again, people with social empathy stand up for those who are threatened by the "casting aside". There is a hospice movement for the dying, committed associations and laws that promote inclusion for people with disabilities. Concepts to tackle long-term unemployment are being considered, and are also „lobbies for children“ being founded: not only by women, but also by non-traditional, so-called "new fathers".

Understanding and overcoming Angst

Today "Angst" is being researched at the transdisciplinary level. The causes and consequences of it are explored. Ways of taming the angst are detected and tested. From the wide range of contributions, I have chosen three approaches in recent interdisciplinary angst research.

A first approach comes from depth psychology. A good example of this are the studies of Monika Renz: Understanding fear (Angst Verstehen).¹³⁴ We all have Angst, according to the Angst expert, from the very beginning. We come from the depths of being, from a paradise of blissful unity and sheltering security. With this feeling we start our existence in the womb which is like an extended paradise. We gradually begin to "recognise" ourselves vis-à-vis the world. Every human being, as the book of Genesis mythically tells us, eats from the Tree of Knowledge under which we awaken to consciousness. Now primordial angst can bury entrench in our existence, which overlays the primordial trust brought from the "paradise".

The primordial angst has two dimensions. One facet is, "too much" flows into the awakening consciousness (for example, the mother's perceived booming heartbeat). The other facet is, after the umbilical cord has been cut, "too little" is available for survival. Birth is the definitive "expulsion from paradise" from which we came.

This primordial angst can be overcome if, in addition to the burgeoning primordial angst, there is enough primordial trust brought from Paradise, or if access to it is constantly opened: through parents, through education, through politics, through religious rituals. If the (original) primordial angst dominates, then humans seek to protect themselves from it. The strategies for this are violence, greed and lies - these can also take political forms such as terror, avarice and corruption. Therefore, angst makes people evil. Angst hinders us from becoming what we are: beings created for love. Only when primordial trust has the upper hand can humans believe, hope and love. To become a human being is thus bound to reconnecting with the primordial trust. This analysis shows that this reconnecting is the key task for religious communities in cultures of fear.

This ubiquitous angst can be calmed and overcome through a culture of trust. But this is, according to political scientist Dominique Moïsi,¹³⁵ made culturally complicated in some parts of the world today. There is a large region of hope in the world. This is for Moïsi India and China - which he bundles to “Chindia”. In the Arab world, on the other hand, the emotion of humiliation by Western arrogance dominates. Ultimately, North America¹³⁶ and Europe¹³⁷ - ie the rich countries of the world - are characterised by "fear". The fear that resides in every human being is in a cultural upswing in such regions of the world.

In addition, political forces today use this fear to gain votes. They do not tame the fears of people through a "policy of trust", but fuel them with a "policy of fear". Tabloid media bolster these politicians. For example, it succeeds in increasing the fear of refugees and migrants through the exclusive and looping narration stories of violence. It is undisputed that there are (as in the indigenous populations) criminals also among the protection seekers. The society has to prosecute this crime as well as those of locals. However, representatives of a „politics with fear“ (Ruth Wodak¹³⁸) succeed in generalising¹³⁹ individual cases and thus increasing irrational fears.

Gradually, this also changes language (Zygmunt Baumann¹⁴⁰). The word refugee appears mostly in threatening expressions such as crisis, wave, swarm, avalanche. Europe must "bulkhead itself", so that the "boat of Europe" is not sunk by the "flood of refugees". Fences should be built. The initially positively connotated „welcome culture“ has been negatively re-coloured. Islam is (exclusively) discussed as Islamism, anti-Semitism widens to Islamophobia and revitalises dulled xenophobia. The population is attuned to fear and defence and willingly gives their votes in elections for populist parties.

Political scientists point out that these political groups not only multiply and manage fears, but that their political proposals in the long term, regarding the economy as well as peace, do not lead to a good future.

The short-term party-political gain can turn out to be a tragic political aberration for nations and humanity in general. The statement by Franklin D. Roosevelt at his inauguration speech as 32nd President of the United States of America is therefore still relevant: "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself!"¹⁴¹

Vision: Churches as advocates for solidarity

In the struggle for more justice, which will intensify in the decades to come, the Christian churches, other religions, and ultimately all people of goodwill, can make a sustainable contribution.

This can be done in words and deeds, in teaching as well as in projects.

Woodcut-like, this is outlined here using the example of Christian Churches (and here with emphasis on the Catholic Church¹⁴²).

Social teachings

Chain of being

The starting point of Christian doctrines for the social field is the philosophical knowledge of a deep unity of all being. This was discussed in the tradition with the help of the metaphor "chain of being": This "chain of being" stretches gradually from the stone to God. Distinguished representatives of this doctrine can be found, from Aristotle to Bonaventura to Ken Wilber. Within Christian teaching the following can be formulated: "There is only one God. Everyone is one of us."

This unity of being is fundamentally opposed to any nationalism, any national arrogance. Participation in the One Being gives everyone human inviolability and dignity, regardless of gender, race and religion.

From this unity in being, not only does an interwovenness result, which holds reality together, but also a relation of all reality to itself. Modern neuroscience and other disciplines name this interwovenness with the musical concept of "resonance".¹⁴³

Universal solidarity

These very few statements about God and the world alone have far-reaching political consequences. If we are interdependent in one humanity, then the five-year-old Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi, who drowned in the Aegean, is one of us.

More fundamentally, it can be concluded that humans are not allowed to live exploitatively at the expense of the world around them - and that also out of self-interest. An erroneous interpretation of the phrase in Genesis' Creation Report that man must subjugate the earth overlooks the fact that the original purpose of the biblical order is to garden, nurture, care for and cultivate nature.

Action follows Being. The inviolable dignity of persons, who can only be human in relation to each other, leads to a solidarity that is in principle universal. Each person and each group of people in their dignity and freedom, which is realised in responsibility for oneself and in good conscience, should do for themselves what they can: This is expressed in the principle of subsidiarity. At the same time, the principle of solidarity reigns, and not just out of necessity, but as a consequence of being in unity with other peoples. Solidarity is universal and knows no upper limit.

An ethic of dynamic compromise

The concept of a "universal solidarity without an upper limit" is polemicised today from various sides and with different arguments, including politicians who feel in affinity with Christianity. Some theologians offer them a helping hand. Some bible experts are at risk of transferring the logic of tribal cultures to the modern world, despite their historical-critical exegesis, thereby giving (often without any intention) theological support to right-wing populist and nationalist tendencies.

Some of these are based on an unfortunately not updated interpretation of a lecture by Max Weber in 1908 on „Politics as a profession“. The sociologist of religion is quoted as saying that an ethics of conviction (Gesinnungsethik) is not enough for political action. Rather, politicians must practise an ethics of responsibility (Verantwortungsethik): ie, to ask what is politically responsible in the particular situation with the given population. The churches are then given the right and the duty to strengthen the. However, they are not entitled to give advice on or criticise everyday politics.¹⁴⁴

It is true that from the Gospel one cannot not directly derive a concrete economic or social order. Based on their insights, the churches do not know what is actually to be done or what is possible in migration and refugee policy. This is to be agreed.

But the division of labour, which gives the churches the conviction and the politicians the responsibility, falls short and does not meet the concerns of Max Weber, even if in this way it is so often misunderstood. The problem of today is no longer that there are representatives of conviction without responsibility. Rather, there is the danger that, under the pressure of elections and media-driven fears, the responsible parties will put aside their convictions. Then Social Democrats are no longer socialist, Christian Democrats are no longer christian-social. So, interpreters of Max Weber would have to ask themselves how Max Weber would have written his speech in today's context. The recourse to a nineteenth-century academic lecture resembles the logic of fundamentalists who forbid women to speak in church because St. Paul forbad this in a text to the Corinthians.

A way out of such non-workable drafts could open up an ethics of dynamic compromise. At the same time the attitude of a "universal solidarity without upper limit" is maintained, as well as politicians regarding their responsibility do not have to renounce their conviction and in this sense become conviction-less. The politician, however, is granted a right to political compromise. It is assumed that the desirable ideal can never be fully realised but can only reach fragments of it. To put it a bit more sharply, the politician always has the right not to be morally squeaky-clean and cannot be.

The key question of the politician is not whether he is allowed to make compromises and has to be responsible for them. His challenge, which arises out of his own conviction (Christian convictions, not convictions of the Churches : Churches are merely inconvenient reminders and influencers), is a two-pronged question:

* Do compromises lie ahead on the way towards the ideal? And:

* With some good will and serious encouragement of the people, would it not be possible to take a further (albeit small) step towards the ideal? This second challenge is the reason why the term "ethics of dynamic compromise" is chosen.

Social Practice

Churches do not only teach, they also "incarnate" their teachings in projects. They promote the solidarity of their members through their everyday activities in the diaconal field, in a multidimensional education (formation of the personality, political as well as interreligious education) and in the liturgy. Here, Christian churches as well as other religions realise their core strength.

To be connected

The Franciscan mystic Richard Rohr from New Mexico once wrote: "It is not necessary to be perfect, but to be connected." Thus religions are primarily (as the word religion suggests which derives from religare¹⁴⁵) "One-ing," "God-uniting," and less about the moral arming of the people. Moral action is then the consequence of the connectedness that characterises being. The believing basic assumption is: Who is God-united, can love and become a true human being.

Therefore, the main task of the Christian churches is that, in the midst of their fears, human beings become aware of the connection with God as the source of Primordial Trust, or - if the connection has been broken - are reconnected. Here, the position, which is anchored in depth psychology as well as in a theological anthropology, is taken up again, that it is always (primordial) fear that makes human beings evil.¹⁴⁶ This primordial fear (Urangst) can be defined as "original sin", that is, the inclination that appears at the beginning of life to ego-centered self-defence against this Urangst, which makes one evil, manifested specifically as violence, greed and lies. The "connectedness" with the divine source brings people into contact with primordial trust (Urvertrauen). The more this connectedness increases, the more primordial trust can determine the life of an anxious person. This person can then persist within fear and this context believe, hope and love. Loving, however, always means to love in a solidarian way. The religious interconnectedness of the anxious human being can thus release resilient solidarity.

It should not be overlooked here that religiosity is not the observance of religious doctrines and moral norms, but God-oneing. This is a mystical experience, not a cognitive insight alone. In her study of the Mystic of Nazareth¹⁴⁷, Monika Renz notes that Jesus also lived through tremendous fears but did not abandon trust in his father even in the agony of death on the cross.

Perhaps the most fundamental contribution to the struggle for more justice, which needs solidarian populations to succeed, is thus the unintentional re-connection of as many people in the country as possible to this divine source.

And because fears can interrupt this bond all the time, it is necessary for the faithful Christian, who wants to love in solidarity, to repeatedly establish the bond with God and thus to strengthen his trust (in God).

Diverse ways to connect are open to religious seekers. They can pray, meditate, seek God in all things, read the scriptures, share the Bible. A role that is often underestimated today is played by liturgies, whose priority for Catholic communities is the celebration of the Eucharist. Those who take part are involved in a four-fold transformation with their entire existence: the transformation of violence into love on the cross, the transformation of the gifts of bread and wine, the transformation of the gathered into a community. These, through the deep one-ing with the Risen One, are transformed into the the "Body of Christ", symbolising the Body of Christ which is fulfilled cosmically at the End of Time. Because this community is a moment of the One World, of humanity, "Eucharistic celebration" is "world transformation”.¹⁴⁸ Those who are prone to open themselves in a celebration of the Eucharist to "God-danger", enter the celebration with their fears and come out as a "foot washers" - as a loving people in solidarity.

Where people let themselves fall into this "dangerous memory" (Johann B. Metz¹⁴⁹) and in the Eucharist are transformed into foot-washers by the Oneing with the Risen Christ, oases of alternative style of live and action are formed in a world threatened by fear and with a tendency towards desolidarisation. In the midst of "cultures of fear" form "overflowing oases of trust". People who are gripped by this trust in God are urged to act with love and solidarity: in their personal environment, in social life and in politics. They promote the competence of parents to build postpartum attachment for the formation of the basic ability of each person to trust. They encourage loving couples to experience their love as a source for shared trustful engagement for others. They encourage politicians "out of Christian responsibility" not to make a "policy of fear" that is potentially helpful in gaining votes, but to pro-actively and confidently promise people "a policy of trust". These will then not foment opportunistic fears but reduce fears. In the long run, the fear of foreign immigration can be reduced through targeted global trade policy and cooperation on development projects. Paths of legal migration in the form of humanitarian corridors can be created to reduce the fear of uncontrolled illegal immigration. Meetings can be organised with people seeking protection, knowing that the fear becomes smaller when you look of protection seekers in the eye and they tell their stories of flight togethers with the many dangers and traumas they faced.¹⁵⁰ The social-ethical rule can be: not to fight migration, but fight poverty from which migration springs and which often accompanies migrants throughout their lives.¹⁵¹

The churches can feed societies, which in the future will struggle more for justice, with people who think and act in solidarity, because - as one woman from the not always easy refugee work declared - when it becomes especially difficult, I felt a "divine tailwind".

Social Education

Another focus is social education. Thanks to their social catechism and their ecumenical social teachings, the churches have well-established teaching materials for socio-political education at their disposal. The churches must succeed in attracting well-prepared committed Christians, to go into politics and actively shape policy.

Various sides often against such activities, that the church should focus on God, his heaven and how somebody gains entry, not on politics. Such critics are right insofar as the churches are not political parties but they are not right insofar as the churches are politically very partisan. “Christians are not on earth to go to heaven, but now heaven is coming to us." (Klaus Hemmerle) In traces, at least. Jesus was therefore concerned with the coming of the “Kingdom of God”, the "Kingdom of Heaven", that is a way of life and coexistence of human beings compatible with God. “For the kingdom of God is not a matter of eating and drinking, but of righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit." (Rom 14:17)

There are some non-negotiable positions that are inextricably linked to the gospel. In woodcut-like brevity: "If there is only one God, then each is one of us." So the Christian tradition starts from a deep unity of Being and of humanity. Typical images of the Christian worldview are the "One World", the "One Humanity", the "One World House". From unity in being, however, follows a universal solidarity on the level of action. In principle, this his has no upper limit. It remains undisputed that on the way towards more solidarity in everyday politics there are always only steps, approximations. But even here, the churches have to ask if the direction of the steps is right.

Part 3: Struggle for Truth

The struggle for truth is one of humanity's oldest challenges. The big questions are: Where do we come from, where do we go and what is the meaning of the whole? And last but not least the question in the Greek myth about Orpheus and Eurydice: What is in the end stronger, death or love?

The religions have always played a central role in the search for answers. The mythical narratives in the scriptures revolve around "God" as the sacred, intriguing and numinous, and around the story that the fane (the fanum, the sacred) has with the profane (the pro-fanum, the pre-sacred). Ultimately it is about "God and the World".

Today such questions are no longer a monopoly of religions. The philosophies have carved out these questions away from the context of religion and have tried to find their answers solely on the basis of reason. However, Christianity attaches great importance to the fact that faith and reason are in the end not contradictory.¹⁵² Systematic theology and fundamental theology, moral theology and social ethics are the attempt to be in dialogue with contemporary thought, especially with today's philosophies.

This book does not focus on the complex history of this discourse between theology and other human and natural sciences, but rather on the evolution of Christianity and its role in the struggle for truth in Europe. Moreover, it is not about which narratives and theological processing Christianity has offered and is still proposing today. Rather, the focus is on the extent to which Europe and its populations have taken up Christianity and still accept it today.

Christian Occident

The focus on Christianity currently also has political grounds. Often not authentic Christian political movements fight for a "Christian Occident". It is debated in everyday politics about whether Islam belongs to Europe. From the answer to this question the respective migration and religious policies are influenced. With regard to Judaism, since Auschwitz there seems to have been an embarrassed silence, although anti-Semitic resentment is recurrent in European populations.

In the following, the path to a "christian-like Europe" will be described in a nutshell. From history, it is already possible to recognise why the situation of Christianity in Europe today can be described as precarious. What this situation looks like in more detail will be explained in a second step. This statement will be made on three levels:

* at the European level, and here in comparison with the development of Christianity in other regions of the world; it will be shown that the modern development of Christianity in Europe is a "special case" compared to other continents;

* at the level of individual countries in Europe, which are stamped by history - and therefore also by the consequences of the Reformation;

* at the level of the person - a perspective that arises solely from the fact that due to individualisation an enormous variety of ideological types has arisen.

A "christian-like" Europe emerges

Between 49 and 52 AD the missionary Saint Paul first entered European soil in Neapolis, today's Kavala. Along the Via Egnatia he reached Philippi.¹⁵³ There he founded his favourite church. The "doctrine of the way" (Acts 24:14, 22) quickly spread from there to the Greek cities of Ephesus, Corinth and Thessaloniki. In Rome also the "community" grew quickly: By 175 there was estimated to be about ten thousand Christians, into 254 already thirty to fifty thousand. One of the reasons was that at the Lord's Supper all sat equally at the table, the slaves as well as their masters. That gave dignity to the humiliated.¹⁵⁴

For a long time, Christians were cruelly persecuted in the religious pluralistic Rome with its Imperial cult. But Constantine the Great began to promote them. Emperor Theodosius I. elevated Christianity to the religion of the state. In the Mediterranean region, it soon became the only publicly recognised religion.

After the collapse of the Roman Empire and in the Barbarian Invasion, Christianity was "the only remaining institution of order; it thereby increased its power and its reputation".¹⁵⁵ Christian missionary activity brough Christianity to Northern and Eastern Europe. The complete Christianisation of Europe was achieved only in the late Middle Ages.

The wounds of the divisions

The strong interdependence between political and ecclesiastical power¹⁵⁶ soon had grave adverse consequences for Christendom. The rivalry of the two emperors in East and West Rome (Constantinople) led in 1054 to the first major schism. The struggle for the independence of princes against the Emperor "by the grace of God" in the West was interwoven with the reform of the Church by Martin Luther and the reformers Huldrych Zwingli, John Calvin and Jan Hus. The Western Church split into ever more denominations. In order to restore the "Landfrieden", the "ius reformandi" and the "ius emigrandi" were decreed: the rulers could now determine the denomination of the subjects; Subjects who refused to comply could emigrate but without possessions. In fact, they were deported.

Nevertheless, peace could not be permanently established by this ruling, which was adopted at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 and confirmed in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The violent enforcement of the recatholisation of Bohemia in the form of a "denominational purge" by the Catholic House of Habsburg led in 1618 to the "Prague defenestration" and in the wake of the bloody Thirty Years’ War. In the name of God, there was plundering, murdering, burning and raping. Along with plague and hunger, in war-torn areas populations were so dramatically decimated that they did not recover until the next century.¹⁵⁷ Additionally, in the war years witch hunting reached its highpoint.

The trauma of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648)

This religious war caused long lasting damage the reputation of Christianity in European populations. The consequences of this discrediting of Christianity through the use of brutal violence in the name of God discredited the Churches, and ultimately God himself. Since then, two ideological socio-religious formats have emerged that are found to this day in the sociology of religion surveys in the populations of Europe:

* One format is "religion without a church". In the name of reason, Voltaire fought the power of the churches and demanded their extermination: "Écrasez l'infâme!" ("Crush the infamous!") was his battle cry. He saw in the power of the (Catholic) Church the cause of the calamity that the religious war had brought over Europe. He certainly valued religion, at least as a dimension of the lives of the broad masses. He sympathised with a world religion of philosophers. However, the enlightenment he supported demanded a clear separation of state and church. Religion should be deprived of political power and politics should be deprived of religious legitimacy. Law and morality were unbound.

* However, the Enlightenment did not stop with the development of a "religion without a church". In France, the second format which arose, was a European atheism. Not only the churches were fought with "anticlerical" pathos because of their "bloody hands", but religion and, with it, God himself.¹⁵⁸

Christianity has become its own "enemy" through the religious wars in Europe for which it has been responsible. There was, as it were, a "war of Christianity against Christianity", just as today there is a "war of Islam against Islam" (Navid Kermani).

Judaism and Islam

Apart from Christianity, Judaism has always existed on the European continent and Islam since its spread to southern Spain and the Balkans.¹⁵⁹ On the continent, the relationship between these three Abrahamic religions was mostly ambiguous. Jews were summoned and courted by rulers for economic reasons. At the same time, a theologically legitimised anti-Semitism developed early on, leading to pogroms and finally to the Shoah during the NAZI-time. The number of Jews in Europe sank in this time of systematic destruction in no time. A small part of the Jewish population succeeded in fleeing abroad. Few returned to Europe after the end of National Socialism. Hatred of Jews is by no means a thing of the past: in recent years anti-Semitic tendencies have been increasing in many European countries.

A broad Christian defence alliance against the Islamic conquerors grew. Crusades were conducted. The invasion of the Ottoman Empire from the east was stopped twice before the gates of Vienna. But there was another side to the relationship between Islam and Christianity, especially in southern Spain. A common mysticism formed the bridge between the two religions. Teresa of Ávila and John of the Cross¹⁶⁰ appreciated the mysticism of the Sufis. They became friends. The masterpiece of John of the Cross, "Living Flame of Love" (Llama de amor), is full of images of Islamic mysticism.¹⁶¹ After settling in southern Spain, Islam succeeded in erecting admired buildings such as the Alhambra and making lasting contributions to European science: in astronomy, in medicine, in mathematics. Islamic scholars had also contributed to the rediscovery of Aristotle in Europe.

The current situation of Christianity in Europe

In the following, the situation of Christianity in modern-day Europe will be presented and discussed in a clear and concise historical context. This will be done in three steps:

First of all, the situation and development of Christianity in today's Europe compared to other continents will be explained. It will become apparent that the development in Europe is a special case.

Then we will explain the considerable differences in the situation of Christianity in individual European countries. The statistics show similarity and diversity. The question is raised as to why, in individual countries of Europe, development has been very different and is still very different. The available findings of religious sociology lead to the question of why denominationally diverse cultures have undergone a significantly different development.

Finally, there will be an analysis at the level of the person. We show important dimensions of the situation nowadays, based on recent surveys. Such dimensions are: subjective religiosity, religion as acceptance of Christian beliefs, ecclesial commitment. A condensing of diverse data and sociological interpretations into manageable typologies on the level of the person is a concern of this third step.

All of these three levels touch upon the question of whether the "Christian" continent, shaped beforehand (but not only) by Christianity, is about to become a "secularised" continent. However, leading sociologists of religion and religious sociology question the interpretive theory of "secularisation", which was widely accepted in Europe in the 1970s. Rather, they perceive a pluralisation of the religious landscape. We address this change in the interpretation of the socio-religious dimension of European culture from "secularisation" to "pluralisation". The future of worldviews in Europe will therefore not be mono-coloured, but multi-coloured.

At the pan-European level

From a sociological point of view, Europe is a "special case"¹⁶², especially as regards the attitude to Christianity, more specifically to participation in the faith and the life of a Christian church / denomination.

We explain these findings step by step. Firstly, we give an overview of where Christians live in the world. Then we present developments and forecasts as well as making a comparison between the continents.

Religious imprinting of the continents

The proportion of Christians in the population is particularly high at 90% in Latin America (plus the Caribbean), 74% of Europeans are members of a Christian church; in Sub-Saharan Africa 63% are Christians. Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa make up 93% of the population. 24% of the population in Asia (including the Pacific) are Muslims. In this continent with 25% the Hindus are largest number and 12% are Buddhists. Noticeable is the high proportion of people "without religion" in Asia (21%) and Europe (18%).

Table 2: Which religions shape the regions of the Earth

| Christians | Muslims | without Religion | Hindus | Buddhist | ethnic religions | other | Jews
Subsahara-Africa | 62,9 | 30,2 | 3,2 | 0,2 | 0,0 | 3,3 | 0,2 | 0,0
Asia-Pacific | 7,1 | 24,3 | 21,2 | 25,3 | 11,9 | 9,0 | 1,3 | 0,0
Europe | 75,2 | 5,9 | 18,2 | 0,2 | 0,2 | 0,1 | 0,1 | 0,1
Latin America and Caribbean | 90,0 | 0,1 | 7,7 | 0,1 | 0,0 | 1,7 | 0,2 | 0,0
Near East and Nord-Africa | 3,8 | 93,0 | 0,6 | 0,5 | 0,1 | 0,3 | 0,1 | 1,6

In percent of respective population in this region. Source: https://www.gordonconwell.edu/ockenga/research/documents/StatusofGlobalChristianity2018.pdf

Developments of religions worldwide

International data show an increase in Christianity of various kinds worldwide. For the period from 2015 to 2060, an increase in Christians from 2.3 to 3.1 billion is forecast. The number of Muslims will increase even more. Their proportion is expected to increase from 2015 to 2060 from 1.8 to 3.0 billion. The membership numbers for the other categories are stagnating (Jews) or are declining (Hindus, Buddhists, without religion, others).

Table3: Distribution and Development of Religions / Worldviews in the World

| Christians | Muslims | without religion | Hindus | Buddhists | Jews | other
2015 | 31,2 | 24,1 | 16,0 | 15,1 | 6,9 | 0,2 | 6,5
2020 | 31,1 | 24,9 | 15,6 | 15,2 | 6,6 | 0,2 | 6,4
2030 | 31,0 | 26,5 | 14,8 | 15,2 | 6,1 | 0,2 | 6,2
2040 | 31,1 | 28,1 | 14,0 | 15,1 | 5,7 | 0,2 | 5,8
2050 | 31,1 | 29,7 | 13,2 | 14,9 | 5,2 | 0,2 | 5,7
2060 | 31,8 | 31,1 | 12,5 | 14,5 | 4,8 | 0,2 | 5,2

As a percentage of the world population. Source: https://www.gordonconwell.edu/ockenga/research/documents/StatusofGlobalChristianity2018.pdf

Christianity is growing everywhere, only not in Europe

Christianity is growing worldwide. A continental breakdown shows that it will continue to grow particularly strongly in Africa (with a growth factor from 1900 to 2000 of 2.87), Asia (2.13) and Latin America (1.20), while stagnating in Europe (0.04). It should be noted that in the European trend, the figures for the Russian Federation are included with a growing number of people who identify themselves as Orthodox. Further breakdowns, which are presented below, show a considerable shrinking process, especially in Western Europe, and here again differing by country and denomination. So, while Christianity is booming worldwide, it is weakening in many parts of Europe.

Table 4: Growth of Christianity in each continent

| 1900 | 1970 | 2000 | Trend | mid-2018 | 2025 | 2050
Africa | 8,458 | 113,519 | 359,640 | 2,87 | 598,996 | 721,431 | 1,252,614
Asia | 20,816 | 91,667 | 272,033 | 2,13 | 397,252 | 461,619 | 588,093
Europe (with Russia) | 368,114 | 467,114 | 545,433 | 0,04 | 549,516 | 538,317 | 489,585
Latin America | 60,027 | 263,589 | 481,879 | 1,20 | 596,936 | 633,162 | 704,585
North America | 59,570 | 168,477 | 208,422 | 0,58 | 231,112 | 235,777 | 258,540
Oceania | 4,323 | 14,442 | 20,986 | 0,98 | 24,999 | 26,456 | 32,785

Source: https://www.gordonconwell.edu/ockenga/research/documents/StatusofGlobalChristianity2018.pdf

Figure 5: Continental development of the proportion of Christians

Source: https://www.gordonconwell.edu/ockenga/research/documents/StatusofGlobalChristianity2018.pdf (19.1.2009)

The decline in members of one Christian church does not affect all denominations alike. While the number of Orthodox Christians (from 4% to 24% in the period 1989-2010) has grown according to the European Value Study, that of Protestants and Catholics has shrunk considerably. For Catholics, the proportion fell from 44% to 29%, that of Protestants from 19% to 11%.¹⁶³

Figure 6: Development of membership by denomination

 Source: European Value System Study (author’s evaluation)

Diverse development in individual countries in Europe

The individual countries on the European continent show very different contexts and developments.

In Eastern Europe, membership in religious organisations in 2010 ranged from 98% (Romania) to 34% (Czech Republic). There are countries with a strong increase of members between 1989 and 2010. The highest percentage increase in Bulgaria with 40 percent. In the Czech Republic, on the other hand, over the same period, the proportion of members dropped from a low figure (40%) by 9 percent.

Equally diverse are the conditions in Western European countries. Membership figures in 2010 ranged from 98% (Malta) to 50% (France). Only a few countries record growth between 1989 and 2010; for example Portugal with 9 percent. In Sweden, however, the number dropped by 15 points. For Western Europe, data for the period from 1981 to 2010 are also available for several countries. During this period, all countries have lost more or less, least of all Malta (-2 percent), the strongest in the UK (-34 percent).

On average across all countries surveyed, those in Eastern Europe gained 11 percent of membership, while those in Western Europe lost 5. The gain was particularly strong for members in Bulgaria (plus 40 percent) as well as in the three Baltic States Latvia (30), Lithuania (22) and Estonia (21) in the three Baltic States.

Table 5: Membership in individual countries of Eastern Europe

"Belongs to a religious organisation"

| 1. wave (1981–1984) | 2. wave (1989–1993) | 3. wave (1999–2004) | 4. wave (2005–2010) | wave 2>4
Romania |  | 94% | 98% | 98% | 4%
Poland |  | 96% | 96% | 96% | -1%
Armenia |  |  |  | 95% |
Moldova |  |  |  | 94% |
Macedonia |  |  |  | 93% |
Kosovo |  |  |  | 92% |
Lithuania |  | 63% | 81% | 86% | 22%
Croatia |  |  | 89% | 84% |
Slovakia |  | 72% | 77% | 78% | 6%
Bosnia Herzegovina |  |  |  | 77% |
Bulgaria |  | 34% | 69% | 74% | 40%
Belarus |  |  | 52% | 72% |
Slovenia |  | 74% | 70% | 72% | -2%
Albania |  |  |  | 71% |
Serbia |  |  |  | 70% |
Latvia |  | 37% | 59% | 66% | 30%
Montenegro |  |  |  | 59% |
Hungary |  | 58% | 57% | 53% | -5%
Estonia |  | 13% | 24% | 33% | 21%
Czech Republic |  | 40% | 34% | 31% | -9%
Average 2 > 4 |  |  |  | 75% | +11%

 Source: European Value System Study 1981-2010 (author’s evaluation)

TABLE 6: Membership of individual countries of Western Europe

"Belongs to a religious organization"

| 1. wave (1981-1984) | 2. wave (1989-1993) | 3. wave (1999-2004) | 4. wave (2005-2010) | wave 2>4 | wave 1>4
France | 73 | 61 | 58 | 50 | -11 | -22
Netherlands | 63 | 51 | 46 | 51 | 1 | -12
Great Britain | 90 | 59 | 84 | 56 | -2 | -34
Belgium | 83 | 67 | 64 | 57 | -10 | -25
Sweden | 93 | 82 | 75 | 67 | -15 | -26
Switzerland |  |  |  | 73 |  |
Luxembourg |  |  | 72 | 75 |  |
Spain | 91 | 87 | 82 | 76 | -11 | -15
Finland |  | 89 | 88 | 76 | -13 |
Northern Ireland | 97 | 90 | 87 | 80 | -11 | -17
Norway | 96 | 90 |  | 80 | -10 | -16
Portugal |  | 71 | 88 | 80 | 9 |
Italy | 93 | 85 | 82 | 81 | -4 | -13
Austria |  | 86 | 88 | 83 | -2 |
Germany | 91 | 79 | 80 | 84 | 5 | -7
Ireland | 99 | 96 | 92 | 88 | -9 | -11
Denmark | 94 | 92 | 90 | 88 | -3 | -6
Iceland | 99 | 98 | 96 | 92 | -6 | -7
Greece |  |  | 96 | 97 |  |
Malta | 100 | 97 | 99 | 98 | 0 | -2
Average of the developement |  |  |  | 77 | -5 | -3

Source: European Value Studies 1981-2010 (own evaluation) - in percent’s

Confessional differences in Eastern Europe

In the countries of Eastern Europe, the religious organisations have suffered between four and seven decades of repression by Communist rulers. However, these have had different effects depending on denomination. The Catholic (average 86%) and Orthodox (average 79%) survived this time of oppression better than the Protestant cultures (average 43%).

Table 7: Denominational differences in Eastern Europe

Catholic countries (Poland, Lithuania, Croatia, Slovakia)

mixed countries (Kosovo, Bosnia, Slovenia, Hungary)

Orthodox countries (Romania, Moldova; Macedonia; Bulgaria, Belarus, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro)

Protestant countries (Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic)

Source: European Value Studies 1981-2010 (own evaluation)

An explanation of these denominational differences is not easy.¹⁶⁴ Catholicism, because of its international interconnectedness and stronger sense of communion¹⁶⁵, was more resistant to adverse social forces than Protestantism, which is less communal and relies more on the freedom of the individual. However, inasmuch as the bond of Catholics in modern cultures weakens, this too is in the future likely to be more susceptible to alienation from their own church.

Atheising cultures

The study Aufbruch (1997, 2007) has shown that there are "atheising" cultures next to the Catholic and Protestant countries. These include the Czech Republic and Eastern Germany as well as Estonia.¹⁶⁶ In these three countries, the majority of those who have assigned themselves in the survey to the category of "atheist" represent the overwhelming majority.¹⁶⁷ Tomàš Halìk calls such persons "apatheists"¹⁶⁸. It is a post-atheistic attitude with a kind of "somethingism" (“Etwasismus”)¹⁶⁹: There must be something of which one has no idea. Persons who consider themselves non-atheist are a minority in these countries (Czech Republic 35%, Eastern Germany 28%). Presumably, this can be explained by the history of the two countries. In Eastern Germany, for example, Christianity had undergone several phases of secularisation: an individualistic phase of a Cultural Protestantism, the dissolution of church affiliation during the Nazi period and oppression in the aggressively antireligious GDR system. Similarly, in the Czech Republic, there were “dechurching” phases: a drastic counter-reformation in the time of the Habsburgs, then the extremely aggressively antireligious system in Communist Czechoslovakia.

In the 1997 Aufbruch study, three questions were asked, all of which contained the answer "I do not believe in God". Remarkably, the respondents did not choose this answer consistently, but differently. This makes it possible to form an "atheism" scale¹⁷⁰, which suggests that the strength of the rejection of a God differs. Thus, there are four groups from non-atheistic (which means religious) to fully atheistic.

Table 8: Diversity in the socio-religious dimension of Eastern European cultures

|  | non atheistic (0 points) | atheising (1 point) | atheistic (2 points) | fully atheistic (3 points)
atheising cultures | East Germany | 28 | 10 | 15 | 47
| Czech Republic | 35 | 12 | 18 | 34
mixed cultures | Hungary | 62 | 14 | 8 | 16
| Slovenia | 65 | 14 | 9 | 13
| Slovakia | 74 | 10 | 8 | 8
religious cultures | Lithuania | 85 | 8 | 3 | 4
| Ukraine | 86 | 6 | 3 | 5
| Croatia | 89 | 4 | 2 | 5
| Romania | 95 | 5 | 0 | 0
| Poland | 96 | 2 | 1 | 1

Source: Aufbruch 2007

At the level of the person

Firstly, we considered Europe in relation to the other Continents. It showed that the number of Christians is increasing, especially in Africa and Asia, while in Europe it is shrinking. This does not apply to the Orthodox, but to Protestants and Catholics.

Then the individual cultures of Europe were compared. The result was a great variety, from the atheising to the religious. This diversity can be found in Eastern and Western Europe alike. However, development after 1989 has been different in East and West. While (after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the overthrow of totalitarian communism agitating against religions and churches) a religious growth is taking place in Eastern Europe¹⁷¹, at the same time membership in Western Europe is declining.

Thirdly, the focus turns to single individuals. Impression of the colourful diversity that showed itself on the country level, increases on the personal level. In the following, we present important results from years of sociology of religion research. The key message is “colouration” (“Verbuntung”), plurality and pluralisation. After some fundamental preliminary remarks, arguments to support this core statement follow.

Preliminary remarks

1. All my research on religion in the life of the Austrians 1970-2010 has shown three socio-religious dimensions in a person:

* the subjective religiosity of a person. By this is we understand how the persons see themselves subjectively: very religious or unreligious? How do they express their religiosity for example by possessing religious objects or praying? What life experiences are perceived as religious?

Religion or faith as a cognitive consent of the person to statements of faith. This concerns images of God, images of death, approval of the religious teachings of one's own religious community, that is, of a Christian church, but also of the Islamic community.

The third dimension is the commitment (”churchliness”) of the person. It outlines the relationship of a person to a religious organisation or a Church. This includes: participation in liturgical gatherings such as worship, attending mosque and participation in religious organisation projects.

2. An important aspect of the socio-religious dimension is its instability, positivity expressed, there is a growing "religious mobility" today. Some are joining a religious organisation, with significantly more people leaving their church. This is connected with the cultural development that Peter L. Berger expressed succinctly "from fate to choice”.¹⁷² While in the post-Reformation period in Europe, throne and altar had a common role for all three socio-religious dimensions of a person under vigorous social control¹⁷³, today it is up to the choosey individual to position themselves in terms of religiosity; they can "select"¹⁷⁴ from the cosmos of beliefs of their own community without any social disadvantages and decide for themselves about the commitment to the religious community that they want to be a member. All this is embedded in the socially forming context of one's own "small life world".

3. However, this option even for choice in religious matters, it not perceived by all persons.¹⁷⁵ Persons with a high degree of authoritarianism also expect their community to have fixed guidelines and are prepared to "submit" to them. At the same time, they develop an attitude of aggression against "liberal", choiceful tendencies in their religious community. This group of people is usually denoted by the term "religious fundamentalists". Because fundamentalists are aggressive towards dissenters, this leads to considerable internal tension-filled polarisation in all major religious organisations / churches. Thus, the Protestant Church, which sees itself as a "Church of Freedom", has strong evangelical groups with a fundamentalist tenor. An exception to the internal polarisation are "sectoid formations" whose main characteristics are unity and similarity of belief. This is based on traditional faith, but has its true foundation not in the tradition of faith, but in the authoritarian personality structure.

4. In the shaping of one's own religious-ecclesiastical lifestyle, gratifications play the decisive role: that is, that which is good for the person, which is the gaining of the connection to a church community and its cosmos of beliefs. Irritations between the member and the organisation, weaken bonds and accelerate processes of distancing. This is especially the case if no attractive advantages (“gratifications”) are felt by the individual.¹⁷⁶

Typologies

When different people in different situations can choose, their relationship to religion and religious communities is, as expected, diverse and colourful. Individual freedom of choice creates very individual forms of religiosity, churchliness and a corresponding selection from the cosmos of beliefs. Taking it to its extreme, every human being is a "special case" (“Sonderfall”¹⁷⁷) in religious-ecclesiastical terms.

Nevertheless, in this variety of biographically, culturally and ecclesiastically formed individuals, various types can be carved out. In each case, certain criteria are defined and the number of respondents is bundled with the help of a cluster analysis in groups. They show similarities in terms of the mean values.

The statistical calculation of the clusters, their number and their designation is to be decided by the researcher. The same applies to the interpretation of these clusters within the cultural-historical context. Some types are not based on representative surveys but are expected given the present-day socio-cultural situations. Below we now present some such typologies.

1. The French sociologist Danièle Hervieu-Léger has suggested distinguish between "pilgrims" and "converts”.¹⁷⁸ The type of "pèlerin"-type (pilgrim) is her term for religious searchers. These people have no fixed pew but are in their lives in search of the meaning life, the world, of suffering and joy, love and death. The "converti", however, are convinced converts. They found what they were looking for. The pilgrims appreciate that they can move freely religiously and can tailor a suitable religiosity and churchliness. The convert reaches - perhaps in laborious conversion processes¹⁷⁹ a fitting result for his interpretation of life and lifestyle. The pilgrim likes mobility, the convert stability. The pilgrim is on his way, the convert has arrived. These are both ideal types. Biographically, sometimes one type follows the other: pilgrims become converts. Or the types change in the course of their lives: from youth to old age. A teenager is a pilgrim, an ageing person a convert.

2. The English religious sociologist Grace Davie described a today dominant type of relationship to religious organisation with the concept of "vicarious religion”. Behind this assumption stands the knowledge that the relationship between people and institutions has changed since the movement of Sixty-Eight. Like norms and authorities, in this cultural revolution institutions have lost their repressive power. This does not only apply to religious institutions - but does include there.

De-institutionalisation and the detachment of people from institutions are not necessarily associated with their loss of meaning. However, the relationship to the institution takes on a different form. With regard to the religious institution, a kind of "vicarious religion" arises. Indeed, only a minority explicitly lives their religion. However, this is seen by a considerably larger number as good. Grace Davie has defined this "vicarious religion" as follows: It is a "kind of religion, which is exercised by an active minority, but in favour of a much larger number, who not only understand (at least implicitly) what the minority does, but quite clearly approves it.“¹⁸⁰ How long such a “vicarious religion "can exist culturally, Davie has left open. But at least - for the time being - it plays an important role.

One can find a similar "politics of substitution" also in other social institutions. For example, trade unions. Many do not join one. But they expect that they be active for the working people - including themselves.

3. The social ethicist and sociologist Johann Schasching proposed the model of "polycentric integration"¹⁸¹ in order to interpret the relationship of modern people to their religious community. He observes that contemporaries find different approaches to the church for their religious needs. Some affiliate because they seek spirituality. Others appreciate the social commitment of their church. An important gateway are the rites of passage in life, ie marriage, birth and death.¹⁸²

4. Based on rich empirical material, a four-part typology was developed in the study "Religion in the Life of Austrians 2010". In addition to atheists, there are searching sceptics, the privately religious and the churchly commited.¹⁸³ Currently, churchly commited people are a “cognitive minority”.¹⁸⁴ Their advantage, however, is that their involvement in the church gives them strong social support for a religious culture of life. By doing so, the churches give other people the opportunity to live the "vicarious religion" as described by Grace Davie.

5. For the post-communist East(Central) European countries, surveys on the religious dimension of each country were carried out in 1997 and 2007. Based on the dataset for 2007, in a first step we were able to identify several dimensions of religiosity. This showed seven dimensions:

First, the rites of passage are of paramount importance.

Ranking second, the attribution of certain qualities to religiousness such as taking care of old people or working in the parish.

Then follow "functions" of religion for personal happiness as well as for political life. It is striking that the religious have a slightly higher value than the wholly religious: a reminder of a kind of “value-Christianity”.

The religious constitute sense of life predominantly in a religious way.

In the next place is the possession of religious objects: those someone owns or are at least present in the living space.

"Religious" is third from last: These include activities such as lighting candles, asking for blessing, fasting and praying. It certainly co-defines the religiosity of the religious.

Impact on relationships, upbringing, profession, politics, and characteristics like being healthier, more loyal come at the bottom of the list. These data apply to the first three categories of fife in the question of religious self-esteem: the very religious, the religious and the neither-norgroup.“

With these seven dimensions, which were processed into indices, the following four types (clusters) were calculated: Religious (33%), Rituals (34%), Cultural Religious (11%) and Non-Religious (22%).¹⁸⁵

The Religious have the highest scores on all indices.

The Rituals connect their religiosity first and foremost with rites and the constitution meaning.

The Cultural-Religious seek in religion human quality and the impact on living together.

The Non-Religious do not give religion any meaning in all matters.¹⁸⁶

Not secularisation, but pluralisation

These different typologies can explain why the European continent, as it was in the 1970s, is not on the way to “modernity” and therefore to "secularisation" but is becoming in socio-religious terms increasingly pluralistic.

Of course, this does not change the fact that there are secularised parts of the population and secular tendencies within the population.¹⁸⁷ Secularisation does not affect society as a whole but a part of its population. The typologies presented earlier show that there is a moderately growing group of atheists in some countries, some of whom in the postatheist age "have forgotten that they have forgotten God”. This statement is attributed to Axel Noack, the bishop of the Evangelical Ecclesiastical Province of Saxony.¹⁸⁸

In addition to these atheists, there are other types, such as sceptics, seekers, privately religious and churchly, “les pèlerins” (pilgrims) et “les convertis” (converts): these are people who are not religiously bound but expect that religious organisations and their members believe for them vicariously and perform a corresponding social service.

Even theoretically, a continuous secularisation in a culture with guaranteed religious freedom cannot arise. Just as a solely Christian society can only come about if all social and cultural forces are strongly co-ordinated in this direction, a solely secularised society can only emerge with the use of every means to oppress religions and churches. Albania appears to have been such a flagship country in communist times, atheised by totalitarian repression. The Czech Republic and the GDR came close to it.

In the 1970s, "secularisation" was understood theoretically either as the unbundling of the central social institutions from each other, which implied a loss of meaning of religious institutions in society, or as a secularisation of the person who observes a decline of the influence of religion in interpretation of life.¹⁸⁹ The driving force behind secularisation was seen the modernisation of societies. The axiom was: "The more modern, the more secular".¹⁹⁰

Already in the seventies, Peter L. Berger was one of the proponents of this interpretation of the religious-ecclesiastical development in modern cultures.¹⁹¹ However, Thomas Luckmann, with Berger founder of the sociology of knowledge, contradicted Berger in his interpretation of the development of the religious dimension of modern cultures. Luckmann’s argument: Every human being is already religious because of their innate ability to transcend visible reality. If they did not, they would stop being human.

What is perceived and interpreted as secularisation, Thomas Luckmann, refers "only" to the fate of religious institutions and to the visibility of the religiosity present in every human being. What disappeared he defined as "invisible religion¹⁹². Religion disappears from the social public sphere into private inwardness. Thus, in modern cultures, no secularisation process takes place: only religion sinks into social invisibility.¹⁹³

Peter L. Berger published his final book, entitled “The many altars of modernity", three years before his death.¹⁹⁴ He clearly distanced himself from the secularisation theory that he had long advocated. On the one hand, an argument was the realisation that there were several modernities¹⁹⁵, a religion-compatible one and a religion-incompatible one. The comparison between the religious situation in different modern continents (such as North America and Europe) inevitably led to this differentiation.

On the other hand, many empirical findings contradicted the secularisation-assumption for Europe. The axiom "the more modern the more secularised" was empirically undermined. A continent like Europe, in which two-thirds are members of a church, believe in God and consider themselves religious, does not support the characterisation “secularised”.¹⁹⁶ It is true that religious institutions are widely separated from other social institutions. The influence of the churches on social processes has changed but has not completely disappeared. This shows the return of religion to the social stage in the context of global migration, which has also affected Europe.¹⁹⁷

All in all, the future - including that of Europe - will not be a secularised culture, but a culture with ideological diversity - just a “Verbuntung” (colourisation). Socio-religious monocultures arise only in unfree societies. Freedom cultures are fundamentally pluralistic.

In his book, Peter Berger also reflects on the exciting question of how contemporaries deal with this pluralism in coping with their lives. His assumption: Diversity must also be reflected in the consciousness of modern human beings. They carry several systems of relevance¹⁹⁸ - a variety with which they can live well. Modern people develop a skilful personal lifestyle to reconcile different worlds of meaning. In one example: An Indian pilot will be secular in his work, but at the same time he can live as a devout Hindu. As passengers, we naturally rely on his secular knowledge. Therefore, in everyday life people in modern societies can be both secular and religious. How these processes take place in the individual human has still not been adequately researched.

Vision: Churches as advocates for truth

Over the centuries, Europe has been transformed into a "Christianity-like continent".¹⁹⁹ It should not be overlooked that in its history there was an economically strong, culturally, artistically and scientifically brilliant and peaceful Judaism and also such an Islam in southern Spain or in the Balkans. Today Europe is also the continent with a powerful and reflective atheism. The Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes has given European atheism an extensive, sensitive and, above all, self-critical attention (GS 19-21). The unforgettable Cardinal Franz König left his mark in this document.

Atheism

This atheism is partly a consequence of an epochal failure of Christianity. Christians have not always proclaimed the true God, but an image of God that modern science could only reject. They did not credit but in discredited God.

Above all, faced with the fatal choice of "God or the freedom of human beings", more and more people decided in favour of human freedom, especially in respect of the modern history of freedom in Europe. This explains the different development of the Christian religion in Europe and North America. While American culture of freedom could unfold in conjunction with the religion of immigrants, freedom in Europe had to be wrested from religion through bloody religious wars.

The atheism in Europe also had "(socio-)political dimension"²⁰⁰: It was favoured as a protest against a church that legitimised pre-modern conditions and also kept many people from the development of the earth, by consoling them to the hereafter misusing religion as an opiat.

In future, dialogue with atheism must be conducted without prejudice. The Christian faith can learn from this: Atheism makes it clear that belief in God is not a compulsion but "A leap into the well"²⁰¹. It also urges Christians to remember God less by words than by credible Christian life. Tomáš Halík's hint also suggests that atheists may stop asking too soon.²⁰²

Life as last opportunity

Across the spectrum of religious diversity, there seems to be a latent atheistic mood prevailing in Europe, which has been explained the teacher and sociologist Marianne Gronemeyer as "Life as last opportunity".²⁰³ It is that form of life which, in the short time of ninety years, seeks to produce optimal and suffer-free happiness: in love, in work and in amusement. It is translated into theological images as the attempt to reach on earth the heavens, which seem to be closed. Or in a modification of Karl Marx: The consolation of the oppressed and exploited people with the hereafter was transformed into a still more grievous consolation of mostly rich people with this world.

Gronemeyer has worked out the logical symptoms of such a life. Such a life is fast and hasty, demanding and overburdening, it is under stress from the underlying fear of being cut short: which in turn desolidarises. More and more people feel literally "they are going astray", which is scientifically researched under the word “escapism”. Escape processes are numerous: into the virtual life of the internet and its chat rooms, in the colourful world of alcohol and many other addictions, in crime, in psychosomatic illnesses, into special sectoidal worlds, into suicide. The narrowness of the ninety years lifespan seems to be limited and frightening for the human heart, which does not want to bow to any limits: a distressing experience that Erwin Ringel called the "presuicidal syndrome". Was John Paul II right when complained that there is no "civilisation of love" that always conquers fear, but a fear-born²⁰⁴ "civilisation of death" in which there are many signs of death besides the signs of life? Therefore, is this another variation of the introductory words of Gaudium et Spes: " The joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age, especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, these are the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ. Indeed, nothing genuinely human fails to raise an echo in their hearts.” (GS 1)

Respiritualisation

Many live from the unshakable hope that in the end the longing of human beings is stronger than their despair. More and more people, especially in the most secularised urban cultures, no longer opt for escapism, but for resistance, for cultural uprising. They are not looking for life in its fulness but are fleeing it. They break up the limitnetnessless. Spiritual journeys with multiple destinations are underway. Spirituality grows out of the exhausted secularity and its restless as well as futile search for heaven on earth. Spirituality has been a mega trend since the late 1990s, according to Matthias Horx, one of the prominent trend researchers of our European cultural area.²⁰⁵

The great dividing lines of tomorrow, at least in Europe, will no longer run between the various organised religions and Christian denominations, even if they retain a socio-political power, but between the secular and the spiritual. Or, as Gerhard Schmidtchen described in a study of the political parties in Germany: the mortals and the immortals.²⁰⁶ Individual and - based on that - social life is designed differently in the confines of this ninety-year world than in a world whose breadth includes heaven. The alternatives are the narrowness of immanence or the breadth of transcendence. People live in worlds with different scope.

The big advantage of the open heaven is: not all happiness has to take place here and now. Also fragments of happiness have their charm. Among the secular and the spiritual there will be people who position their lives around a Europeanised concept of reincarnation and wish to satisfy again and again their unfulfilled hope through constant return into the limited context of their lives.²⁰⁷

Interreligious dialogue

Of course, in the near future there will be an intensified confrontation and at the same time rapprochement of the great religions of the world. Interreligious dialogue is indispensable not only for the sake of truth, but also for the sake of peace. It only takes a little, and the current warlike struggle for freedom and economic interests is overshadowed and exacerbated by the "Clash of Civilizations"²⁰⁸ conjured up by Samuel Huntington.

The future solidarity between world religions, especially the three Abrahamic ones, requires mutual support in dealing with modernity. In this regard, Islam in Europe has a lot to do.

Those responsible within Islam are facing enormous challenges, the religious leaders as well as the Islamic scholars. The topics are well-known: How can the tradition of a "historical-critical exegesis" of the Qur'an, which already exists in Islam but is covered up, be uncovered? The Suras of the time of the prophet in Mecca were written in a context different from those of Medina, whose context was expansion and war with ruthless Christian armies. Moreover, how can Islam, in hard theological terms, achieve that the basic values of European societies are justifiable from a re-reading of the Qur'an? The "Viennese School" of Ednan Aslan or Muhannad Khorchide from Munster with many other Islamic scholars in Europe and other regions are working on this.

It is hoped that Muslims will make a lasting contribution to a "grassroots modernisation" of Islam in Europe. This happens less, as governments would like, through "values courses". Rather, especially second-generation and third-generation Muslims learn from classmates of the same age and from fellow students at the universities that Islam can certainly be lived in a modern way, and that equality between men and women is a matter of course. Awareness of this need for equality is incidentally still open to development among the local population.²⁰⁹ They also learn that premodern parts of Sharia's highly developed legal system need to be developed in exactly the same way as was the European legislation.

It is the task of Christian religious communities in Europe to give sustainable support to Islam in this internal development. A good tool is the establishment of chairs of Islamic theology and academic dialogue between the three Abrahamic religions. At many universities in Europe, this exchange has already begun to flourish.

The ethical impact of religions

The struggle for truth does not only seek a robust interpretation of the world and of one's own life. Apart from the interpretation, it is also about doing. The search for truth thus always has ethical implications.²¹⁰ There is hardly a hospital left today, even a government, that does not have an ethics committee. The European Union is also advised by such a committee.

Worldwide, the need for ethics will increase over the next few years. This is a consequence of the rapidly growing scientific possibilities: in the life sciences in particular, but also in the natural sciences as a whole. Digitisation and robotisation and with it the possibilities of Artificial Intelligence will raise new (social) ethical questions. The grasping of the human mind to the atomic nucleus and the cell nucleus symbolises this ethical ambivalence in modern sciences. In addition to the achievements, for example in the procurement of energy for the post-oil-era, the shadow side in accessing the atomic nucleus has already been revealed. The atomic ruins of Chernobyl and Fukushima, and with them countless contaminated people and long-term polluted nature, are admonishing monuments to deepening ethical questions. The concern that there might be a genetic ultimate worst-case in addition to this atomic scenario is not unfounded.

Enormous funds are currently being invested in the life sciences without at the same time identifying the social side effects of scientific advances. A short-term increase in human life expectancy to 120 years would collapse our social systems. A key question for the years before us will therefore be: Should we do everything we can do? But how does a society come up with answers that will last for generations to come? Ecologically, economically, genetically?²¹¹

Competence for truth

In future, Christian institutions will invest in training people who are capable of dialogue and competent for truth. Characteristics of such Christian competence for truth are:

* Because Christian mystics teach that God dwells in the very heart of the world and in every human being, modern people should learn to sense their often-buried longing for God. This would make every person's life a kind of "Little Holy Scripture" that can be supported and purified in Christian communities to which the “Great Holy Scripture”, ie the Bible, is given. Such events can be defined as "mystagogy". They introduce human being to the mystery that their life in principle has always been (Karl Rahner). This theological assumption applies also to atheists. Many of them are searching. Some stop asking too early.²¹²

* The search for truth is inescapably assigned to every single human being. But it can reach its goal in their “search community”, which hands down proven narratives. It would be good for Europe if many people would again develop an unbiased “critical loyalty” to a church community. On this way the truth about God and people and its ethical implications for the development of the world and the maturing of Europe can unfold. A principle that could provide new incentives for religious communities to engage in shaping Europe in a sustainable way could be: "Without the Christian churches, my country and also Europe would be poorer."

* In the search for the truth, it is important to appreciate and to love the fragmentary: It takes the courage to accept "unfinished truth symphonies". This is especially true for those fragments of truth that can be found in others. This humility in the common search for truth is an antidote to that stubborn fundamentalism that in the name of truth is robbing freedom and, in its often degrading way, does not allow dialogue between worldviews.²¹³

In future, therefore, Europe will need common engagement in the development of the One World of all worldviews, including atheism, in order to master the economic and ecological challenges together.

Postlude: Peace

One of the goals of the European Union is the promotion of peace. Sigrid Pöllinger, Secretary General of the University Centre for Peace Research (UZF), describes this fundamental concern of the founding members of European unification as follows:

"The EU has a special status among European organisations. It should not be seen primarily as an authority or institution in Brussels, not just as an economic market, but rather as a political concept, a peace project, a European idea born and implemented in response to historical experiences in Europe.“²¹⁴

Peace is one of the great utopias in the history of the continent: originating from the Greeks, then in the Roman Empire. In the Reformation, the political and denominational authorities were fighting for a lasting "Landfrieden” (country peace), which only realised after the disaster of the Thirty Years War in a Europe which was bled and starved to death by famine and plague. Immanuel Kant, as a great enlightener, formulated the vision "Zum ewigen Frieden” (eternal peace) and called for a kind of League of Nations. One of the peace visionaries was the Austrian Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. He wrote a "draft for a pan-European pact”. Europe should unite for the sake of peace into a European Union. A concrete implementation of this idea succeeded only after the immeasurable suffering of the Second World War. Soon after the war, Winston Churchill proposed in 1946 to establish a kind of “United States of Europe”.

Sigrid Pöllinger describes how it all began: "On May 9th, 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schumann formulated the ambitious goal of unifying Europe through voluntary economic integration. The European states, which had been at war for decades, should be so closely linked to a community of peace that war between them would no longer be possible. The Marshall Plan in 1947 called for close cooperation between the countries of Europe as a basis for American economic and financial aid. With the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, an economic instrument was used to achieve a political goal. This was followed by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which marks the beginning of the European peace project.

1967 was the founding of the European Community. In 1991, the Treaty on the EU was signed in Maastricht. In the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) was agreed for the first time. The EU Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 incorporated the Petersberg tasks - humanitarian, peace-keeping and peace-making - into the Treaty. 1999 was the birth of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and EU Member States decided to provide a European force of around 60,000 for the Petersberg tasks."²¹⁵

The insight that economics and peace policy are closely interwoven was decisive for the new formation of Europe into a project of lasting peace. The interdependencies - initially with coal and steel - should become so narrow that no war is "worthwhile" for any country. The formula was peace through integration. This also meant that nation states had to relinquish some of their national responsibilities to Brussels. The integration remained not only in the economic field, it has since been extended to other areas (common currency and fiscal policy, common defence policy).

The peace project Europe is a success story. When the European Union received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012, three-quarters of the more than 500 million Europeans polled said that "peace and democracy are the EU's key achievements".²¹⁶

Against the background of the threefold struggle for freedom, justice and truth, it can also be made clear that the peace that has lasted for 80 years is closely related to the three great value streams.

Si vis pacem, para iustitiam

In ancient Rome, the guiding principle was: "Si vis pacem, para bellum!" (if You want peace, prepare for war), so today must be valid: "Si vis pacem, para iustitiam!" (if You want peace, prepare for justice).

War with the ABC weapons available today always creates more disaster than it could overcome existing calamity. It is not just weapons but justice that creates peace: this is not just the motto of civil society peace initiatives, but also of Catholic social teaching. On the way to lasting peace, there needs to be a policy of greater justice not only nationally and in Europe but worldwide.

Closely interwoven with the struggle for justice is the struggle for the freedom of all human beings, but also for the struggle for the truth about the world and the human beings, and for the recognition of the cultures of others, with a knowledge of the deep unity of the Being of all people.

Peace in the context of justice and the integrity of creation is one of the key challenges that since the Ecumenical Meeting in Basel the Church sees as a core contribution in Europe today.

The executive director of the Millennium Institute in Arlington Gerald O. Barney wrote in 1993 a letter to the religious leaders of the world. In it he does not pose the old sceptical Pilate question "What is truth?", but the practical question of what we should do in the face of the enormous challenges in the world²¹⁷:

“We, the people of Earth, need the help and involvement of our spiritual leaders. It is from our respective faiths that we derive our sense of origins, of self, of purpose, of possibility. You are our source of inspiration for what we humans and Earth can become. Your dreams are our visions - and our destiny. We depend on you.

So we come to you both with our perplexed sense that something is terribly wrong on Earth and with our question: What shall we do?"²¹⁸

1)

Europa und der Protestantismus: ein Arbeitsheft mit Dokumenten und Beiträgen [Europe and Protestantism: a workbook with documents and contributions], ed. by Beatus Brenner. Ein Arbeitsheft mit Dokumenten und Beiträgen von Eberhard Jüngel, Reinhard Frieling und Lothar Ulrich, Bensheimer Hefte 73, Göttingen 1993. 

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2)

Petru, Ryszard: Hat Europa eine Zukunft? Es reicht nicht, ein Friedensprojekt zu sein. Bericht über die „Rede zur Freiheit“ bei der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung am 21.4.2016. [Does Europe have a Future? It is not enough to be a peace project. Report on the "Speech on Freedom" at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation on 21.4.2016.] – https://causa.tagesspiegel.de/politik/die-zukunft-der-europaeischen-union/es-reicht-nicht-ein-friedensprojekt-zu-sein.html (29.11.2018)  

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3)

These two-pronged political reasons have lost some of their foundations following the fall of the wall: however, Europe and the European Union are not (yet) congruent. http://www.comece.eu/ 

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4)

http://www.comece.eu/ 

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5)

Fürer, Ivo: Die Entwicklung Europas fordert die Kirchen heraus: Die Tätigkeit des Rates der Europäischen Bischofskonferenzen (CCEE) von seiner Gründung 1971 bis 1996 [The Development of Europe Challenges the Churches: The activity of the Council of European Bishops' Conferences (CCEE) from its founding 1971 to 1996], Ostfildern 2018. - https;//www.ccee.eu/ 

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6)

„Wie viele bestimmende Gedanken in unserer Ideenwelt ist auch die Aufforderung ‚Europa eine Seele geben‘ schwer bis zu ihren Wurzeln zurückzuverfolgen. Sie wird immer mit dem französischen Politiker Jacques Delors - für zehn Jahre ein erfolgreicher Präsident der Kommission der Europäischen Union - in Verbindung gebracht. Er soll diese Aufforderung Anfang der 1990er-Jahre ins Gespräch gebracht haben.“ ["Like many defining thoughts in our world of ideas, the call to 'give Europe a soul' is hard to trace back to its roots. It is always associated with the French politician Jacques Delors - for ten years a successful president of the Commission of the European Union. He is supposed to have brought this call into conversation in the early 1990s.] (https;//austria-forum.org/af/Wissenssammlungen/Symbole/Europasymbole/Seele_Europas; 29.11.2018) - Denz, Hermann: Die europäische Seele. Leben und Glauben in Europa [The European Soul. Living and believing in Europe], Wien 2000. 

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7)

Summary of Addresses by President Delors to the Churches, ed. By the Commission of the European Communities am 14. Mai 1992 (Nr. 704E/92). 

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8)

Petru, Ryszard: Hat Europa eine Zukunft? Es reicht nicht, ein Friedensprojekt zu sein. Bericht über die „Rede zur Freiheit“ bei der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung am 21.4.2016. [Does Europe have a Future? It is not enough to be a peace project. Report on the "Speech on Freedom" at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation on 21.4.2016.] - https;//causa.tagesspiegel.de/politik/die-zukunft-der-europaeischen-union/es-reicht-nicht-ein-friedensprojekt-zu-sein.html (29.11.2018) 

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9)

Von Ackermann, Ulrike: Ist Europa zu retten? [Can Europe be saved?] https;//www.welt.de/print/die_welt/debatte/article120505798/Ist-Europa-zu-retten.html (29.11.2018) - The author is director of the John Stuart Mill Institute for Freedom Research at the SRH University of Heidelberg. 

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10)

The victory of parliamentarism was made possible by the overthrow of James II by the Dutchman William III. 

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11)

Dillon, Patrick: The last revolution: 1688 and the creation of the modern world, London 2007. 

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12)

Rieder, Heinz: Die Völker läuten Sturm – Die europäische Revolution 1848/49 [The peoples are tolling storm - The European Revolution 1848/49], Gernsbach 1997. 

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13)

I examined the leaflet collection for the year 1848 in the Vienna Diocesan Archives: Zulehner, Paul M.: Religion und industrielle Gesellschaft. Zur Entfremdung von Kirche und Arbeiterschaft: eine historische und empirische Analyse [Religion and Industrial Society. On alienating the Church and the working class: a historical and empirical analysis], Ostfildern 2016. 

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14)

Burger, Rudolf: „Ein herrlicher Sonnenaufgang“ oder „Die Tugend und der Terror“, in: Die schwierige Geburt der Freiheit. Das Wiener Symposium zur Französischen Revolution ["A glorious sunrise" or "The virtue and the terror", in: The Difficult Birth of Freedom. The Vienna Symposium on the French Revolution] ed. by Ernst Wangermann u.a., Wien 1991, 96-118. 

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15)

These include the countries Germany, Austria, Italy, France, Portugal, Slovakia, Hungary. 

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16)

Adorno, Theodor W.: The Authoritarian Personality, 1950. 

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17)

The attempt to make Austria Communist failed in 1950 thanks to the opposition of the trade union (Franz Olah). Ludwig, Michael/ Mulley, Klaus-Dieter/Streibel, Robert: Der Oktoberstreik 1950. Ein Wendepunkt der Zweiten Republik [The October Strike 1950. A turning point of the Second Republic], Wien 1991. - Portisch, Hugo/Riff, Sepp: Österreich II: Der lange Weg zur Freiheit [Austria II: The Long Road to Freedom], Wien 1986. 

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18)

Wolfrum, Edgar: Die Mauer. Geschichte einer Teilung [The Wall. The history of a division], München 2009. 

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19)

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/Europe2004/textes/2005-01-10-brochure-constitution-de-v02.pdf 

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20)

King, Alexander u.a.: Die globale Revolution [The Global Revolution], Spiegel Spezial 2/1991: Bericht des Club of Rome 1991, 42f. 

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21)

Brentzel, Marianne: 1968 – Bilanz eines Aufbruchs [Balance Sheet of a New Departure], Vechta-Langförden, 2018. - Vinen, Richard: 1968 – Der lange Protest: Biografie eines Jahrzehnts [The Long Protest: Biography of a Decade], translated by Martin Bayer, Heike Schlatterer, München 2018. - 1968. Eine Enzyklopädie [1968. An Encyclopaedia], ed. by Rudolf Sievers, Frankfurt 2004. 

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22)

The extreme case of the repressive power of institutions is found in "total institutions" (such as prisons):: Goffman, Erving: Asyle, Frankfurt am Main 1972. 

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23)

See more in Zulehner, Paul M.: Heirat – Geburt – Tod. Eine Pastoral zu den Lebenswenden [Marriage - Birth - Death. A Pastoral to the rites of passage], Freiburg 1970, ⁵1987. 

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24)

Berger, Peter L.: The Heretical Imperative. Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation, New York 1980. 

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25)

Adorno's "authoritarianism" was measured over decades with the following four items: The most important thing children have to learn is obedience. - The freedom young people have today is certainly not good. - One should only have a say when one has reached a position through hard work. - Where strict authority is, there is justice too. In a factor analysis, these four items are one-dimensional. With their help, a four-part index was calculated with "very authoritarian", "rather authoritarian", "rather non-authoritarian", "not at all authoritarian". Zulehner: Verbuntung [Colourisation], 2011. 

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26)

Lauter, Rita: Autoritarismus-Studie:40 Prozent der Deutschen können sich ein autoritäres Regime vorstellen [Authoritarianism study: 40 percent of Germans can imagine an authoritarian regime], in: Zeit Online vom 7. 11.2018. - https;//www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2018-11/autoritarismus-rechtsextremismus-antisemitismus-deutschland-ost-west-studie-uni-leipzig (7.12.2018) 

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27)

https;//www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-11/terror-sicherheit-deutschland-gesetze-freiheit 

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28)

Beck, Ulrich: Kinder der Freiheit [Children of Freedom], Frankfurt am Main 1997. – Ders.: Weltrisikogesellschaft. Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Sicherheit [World-Risk-Society. In search of lost security], Frankfurt am Main 2007. 

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29)

Habermas, Jürgen: Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit [The New Confusion], Berlin 1985. 

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30)

Polak: (Rechts-)Populismus [(right-wing) populism], loc.cit. 

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31)

The contempt of elites is certainly not an achievement of today. These were already present in the social conflicts of the Middle Ages. Dümling, Sebastian: AfD (um 1500). Weimarer Verhältnisse? Die frühe Neuzeit ähnelt unserer viel eher. Wutprediger zogen umher und die Menschen entdeckten, dass ein "Volk" gegen die "Eliten" stehen könnte. [Weimar conditions? The early modern era is much closer to ours. Hate-preachers moved around and people discovered that a "people" could stand against the "elites"], in: Merkur 834, November 2018. https://www.zeit.de/kultur/2018-11/demokratie-afd-historischer-vergleich-moderne-weimar-deutschland-politik (16.3.2022) 

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32)

Berger, Brigitte und Peter L.: In Verteidigung der bürgerlichen Familie, Frankfurt 1980 [The War Over the Family: Capturing the Middle Ground, London 1983.] 

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33)

Halík, Tomáš: Populismus in Europa, in: Wir träumen diesen Traum. Theologinnen und Theologen argumentieren weltweit Pro Pope Francis [Populism in Europe, in: We dream this dream. Theologians argue worldwide Pro Pope Francis], Ostfildern 2018. 

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34)

In my online survey on refugee policy in 2015 (Zulehner, Paul M.: Entängstigt euch! Die Flüchtlinge und das Christliche Abendland [Deanxify! the Refugees and the Christian Occident], Ostfildern ³2016). Authoritarian people desire a strong leader much more than the less authoritarian people. 

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35)

Pasolini, Pier Paolo: Freibeuterschriften [Buccaneer Writings], Berlin 1978. 

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36)

Michelis, Ivo B./Pasolini, Pier Paolo: Pier Paolo Pasolini. Annäherung an einen Freibeuter - Ein Porträt [Approaching a Buccaneer - A Portrait], 1986. 

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37)

Zulehner, Paul M./Steinmaier-Pösel, Petra: Gleichstellung in der Sackgasse? Frauen, Männer und die erschöpfte Familie von heute [Equality at a Dead End? Women, men and the exhausted family of today], Graz 2013. 

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38)

Zulehner, Paul M./Slama, Andrea: Österreichs Männer unterwegs zum neuen Mann? Wie Österreichs Männer sich selbst sehen und wie die Frauen sie einschätzen. Erweiterter Forschungsbericht, bearbeitet im Rahmen des Ludwig BoltzmannInstituts für Werteforschung. Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Jugend und Familie [Austria's Men becoming New Man? How Austria's men see themselves and how women assess them. Extended research report, edited within the framework of the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Value Research. Austrian Federal Ministry for Youth and Family], Wien 1994. – Zulehner, Paul M./Volz, Rainer: Männer im Aufbruch. Wie Deutschlands Männer sich selbst und wie Frauen sie sehen. Ein Forschungsbericht [Men on the Move. How Germany's men see themselves and how women see them. A research report], Ostfildern 1998. – – Zulehner, Paul M: MannsBilder. Ein Jahrzehnt Männerentwicklung [Images of Men. A decade of men's development], Ostfildern 2003. – Volz, Rainer/Zulehner, Paul M.: Männer in Bewegung. Zehn Jahre Männerentwicklung in Deutschland. Ein Forschungsprojekt der Gemeinschaft der Katholischen Männer Deutschlands und der Männerarbeit der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland. Forschungsreihe Band 6, hg. v. Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend [Men on the Move. Ten years of men's development in Germany. A research project of the Community of Catholic Men in Germany and the men's work of the Protestant Church in Germany. Research Series Volume 6, ed. by The Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth], Berlin 2009. – Zulehner/Steinmaier: Ausweg aus der Sackgasse [Way out of the Dead End], 2013. 

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39)

Ackermann, Ulrike: Ist Europa zu retten? [Can Europe be Saved?] https;//www.welt.de/print/die_welt/debatte/article120505798/Ist-Europa-zu-retten.html  

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40)

ZEIT-Online: Interview mit Yuval Noah Harari (https;//www.zeit.de/2018/39/yuval-noah-harari-historiker-zukunftsfragen-digitale-diktatur) (29.11.2018) – Dazu: Harari, Yuval Noah: 21 Lektionen für das 21. Jahrhundert 21 [Lessons for the 21st Century], München 2018. 

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41)

So Navid Kermani, quoted from http://blog.initiativgruppe.de/2011/10/24/navid-kermani-beschwort-europa-als-freiheitsprojekt. 

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42)

See the analyses by von Eribon, Didier: Rückkehr nach Reims [Return to Reims], Berlin 2016. See also: Polak, Regina: (Rechts)Populismus und Pastoral: Eine fragmentarische Skizze [(Right-)Populism and Pastoral: A fragmentary outline], in: Salzburger Theologische Zeitschrift 22 (1/2018), 63-84. 

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43)

Khol, Andreas: Antipopulistischer Karneval, in: Multikulturalismus, Migration und Flüchtlingskrise. Essays und Gespräche, Rudolf Burger zum 80- Geburtstag [Anti-Populist Carnival, in: Multiculturalism, Migration and Refugee Crisis. Essays and Conversations, for Rudolf Burger's 80th Birthday], Wien 2018. 

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44)

Halík, Tomáš: Populismus in Europa, in: Wir träumen diesen Traum. Theologinnen und Theologen argumentieren weltweit Pro Pope Francis [Populism in Europe, in: We dream this dream. Theologians argue worldwide Pro Pope Francis], Ostfildern 2018. 

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45)

Bruckmoser, Josef: Warum nur Ja oder Nein regieren. Donald Trump oder religiöse Fundamentalisten kennen keine Zwischentöne. Ideologien verdrängen Vielfalt und Mehrdeutigkeit. Was heißt das für die Politik, die vom Kompromiss lebt? [Why Govern only Yes or No. Donald Trump or religious fundamentalists know no nuances. Ideologies crowd out diversity and ambiguity. What does that mean for a policy that lives by compromise?], in: Salzburger Nachrichten, 22.9.2018. 

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46)

Wodak, Ruth: Politik mit der Angst [Politics with Fear], Hamburg 2016. – Baumann, Zygmunt: Die Angst vor den anderen. Ein Essay über Migration und Panikmache [Fear of Others. An essay about migration and alarmism], Wien 2017. 

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47)

Likewise the Pontifical Council for Migration: Erga migrantes caritas Christi, Rom 2004. 

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48)

“Some intellectuals, such as Adorno's pupil Wolfgang Streek, also complains about this in his pamphlet ‘Bought Time’. After the plausible reconstruction of the European crisis, he also concludes that the introduction of the Euro was a mistake, warns of a superstate and calls for the dismantling of Europe. This has earned him the fierce criticism of Jürgen Habermas, who, like Daniel Cohn-Bendit in the usual manner conjures up the post-national era. Nevertheless, they agree on one thing: politics has become a hostage to the markets, and the 'neoliberal revolution' has finally prevailed.”- Ackermann, Ulrike: Ist Europa zu retten? [Can Europe be saved?] https;//www.welt.de/print/die_welt/debatte/article120505798/Ist-Europa-zu-retten.html 

  ↵

49)

Naß Matthias: Es geht nicht mehr um Krieg und Frieden. Eine Entdeckungsreise in Berlin: Was die deutsche Politik jetzt von Europa erwartet [It is no longer about War and Peace. An expedition in Berlin: What German politics now expects from Europe], in: ZEIT ONLINE Nr.40/29.9.2011. 

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50)

Eatwell, Roger/Goodwin, Matthew: National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, London 2018. - Sedgwick, Mark: Key Thinkers of the Radical Right: Behind the New Threat to Liberal Democracy, Oxford 2019. 

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51)

In his speech as newly elected Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orban said on May 5th,.2018: "The era of liberal democracy is over." To the context: Schelkshorn, Hans: The Ideology of the New Right and Religious Conservativism. Towards an Ethical Critique of the New Politics of Authoritarianism, in: The Crisis of Representation. Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society, vol. 4, Vienna 2019, 124-141. 

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52)

"In the 2010-2014 legislature, Orbán's two-thirds majority decreed among others in a new, in its preamble folkish-clerical constitution the disempowerment of the Constitutional Court, a repressive media law, the elimination of the right to strike, an anti-reform of education and higher education... Hungary is more and more like a personal autocracy of the man who formally holds the Office of the Prime Minister.“ https;//pusztaranger.wordpress.com/2014/07/30/viktor-orban-wir-bauen-den-illiberalen-staat-auf/ (6.12.2018). 

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53)

This passage is taken from a keynote address held by Orban on July 26, 2014 in Băile Tușnad (ung. Tusnádfürdő): https;//pusztaranger.wordpress.com/2014/07/30/viktor-orban-wir-bauen-den-illiberalen-staat-auf/ 

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54)

"Right-wing populism plays a double-cross in terms of the invisible and very frightened people of a society. It claims to represent, above all, the interests of the disadvantaged of the ‘native people’ (and this is the loss of the majority of the so-called autochthonous population), but ultimately uses this for self-interest and - to distract from it - offers the ‘foreign superfluous’ as projection screen for problems. At the same time, this strategy can be combined with a policy that produces the superfluous: the socially disadvantaged, the homeless, the long-term unemployed are declared ‘parasites’ and further pushed to the margins of society through stigmatisation.” Polak: (Rechts-)Populismus [(Right-Wing)Populism], loc.cit. 

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55)

“Right-wing populists, on the other hand, promise "that the rich societies of Europe will not have to change by claiming to be able to restore the old (fictitious) state of homogeneous ethnic communities and to escape the processes of globalization in their national withdrawal. They serve the need of many Europeans to extend the state of the present for as long as possible and to be able to ignore global problems“. Polak: (Rechts-)Populismus [(Right-Wing)Populism], loc. cit. 

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56)

Naß, Matthias: Es geht nicht mehr um Krieg und Frieden. [It is no longer about war and peace.] 

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57)

Murray, Douglas: Der Selbstmord Europas: Immigration, Identität, Islam [The Suicide of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam], 2018. – This book is touted as "an impressive and shocking analysis of the times we live in and the state we are heading towards". 

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58)

Zulehner, Paul M.: Muslimas und Muslime im Migrationsstress [Muslims in Migration stress], Göttingen 2016. 

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59)

Luther, Martin: Von der Freyheyt eyniß Christen menschen [On the Freedom of a Christian], Wittenberg 1520. 

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60)

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_der_Freiheit_eines_Christenmenschen (15.5.2019) 

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61)

Köster, Peter: Zur Freiheit befähigen: Die Geistlichen Übungen des hl. Ignatius von Loyola. Ein Kommentar mit Hinweisen für die Praxis des Begleitens [Empowering Freedom: The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola. A commentary with tipps for the practice of accompanying], Würzburg 2017. 

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62)

Luther, Martin: Von den Juden und ihren Lügen [On the Jews and their Lies], Jena 1543. 

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63)

Kaufmann; Thomas: Luthers Juden [Luther's Jews], Ditzingen 2014: - Süss; René: Luthers theologisches Testament: Von den Juden und ihren Lügen. Einleitung und Kommentar [Luther's Theological Testament: On the Jews and Their Lies. Introduction and Comment], Bonn 2017. 

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64)

The National Socialists also received strong support from representatives of the Church leadership. Thus wrote the Protestant-Lutheran bishop Martin Sasse Eisenach in the preface to his work "Martin Luther und die Juden - Weg mit ihnen!" [Martin Luther and the Jews - away with them!], Freiburg 1938: "On November 10th, 1938, on Luther's birthday, the synagogues burned in Germany. People will... finally break the power of the Jews in the economic sphere in the new Germany and will crown the Godblessed fight of the Führer for the complete liberation of our people. At this hour, the voice of the man must be heard who began as the German prophet in the 16th century as a friend of the Jews, who, driven by his conscience, driven by experience and reality, became the greatest anti-Semite of his time, the warner of his people against the Jews.”  

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65)

Gailus, Manfred: Kirche Amtshilfe: Die Kirche und die Judenverfolgung im Dritten Reich [Church administrative assistance: The Church and the persecution of the Jews in the Third Reich], Göttingen 2008. - Loubichi, Stefan: Die unrühmliche Rolle der Evangelischen Kirche im Dritten Reich [The inglorious role of the Protestant Church in the Third Reich], written on October 26th, 2014 / updated August 19th, 2018, at: https://www.zukunft-braucht-erinnerung.de/die-unruehmliche-rolle-der-evangelischen-kirche-im-dritten-reich/ - In Austria at the beginning of the Nazi period many Catholic church members, due to the critical attitude of the church leadership to Hitler and the introduction of the church tax by the latter, left their Church and changed into the Protestant church. This explains that there are regions with above-average political right-wing orientation in the Protestant Church in Austria to this day. Data can be found in Zulehner, Paul M.: Verbuntung. Kirchen im gesellschaftlichen Pluralismus [Colourisation. Churches in societal pluralism], Ostfildern ²2012. 

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66)

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich: Widerstand und Ergebung. Briefe aus der Haft [Resistance and Resignation. Letters from prison], Gütersloh 2005. - Metaxa, Eric: Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Agent, Märtyrer und Prophet [Pastor, Agent, Martyr and Prophet], Holzgerlingen 2017. 

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67)

Aufgaben und Grenzen kirchlicher Äußerungen zu gesellschaftlichen Fragen [Tasks and Limits of Church Statements on Social Issues],(1970). – Dazu: Püttmann, Andreas: Ein „Ja, aber“ zur Bonner Demokratie. Die EKD-Denkschrift „Evangelische Kirche und freiheitliche Demokratie. Der Staat des Grundgesetzes als Angebot und Aufgabe“ [A "yes, but" to the Bonn democracy. The EKD memorandum "Protestant Church and Liberal Democracy. The State of the Basic Law as an Offer and a Task] (1985), in: Zeitschrift für Politik 36 (1989), Heft 1, 75-87. – This is the most recent memorandum: Kirche der Freiheit. Perspektiven für die evangelische Kirche im 21.Jahrhundert [Church of Freedom. Perspectives for the Protestant Church in the 21st Century] (2006). – An evaluation after ten year by the vice-president of the EKD church office, Thies Gundlach: https://www.evangelisch.de/inhalte/136068/06-07-2016/zehn-jahre-nach-streit-um-kirche-der-freiheit-zieht-ekd-vizepraesident-gundlach-bilanz 

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68)

Huber, Wolfgang: Kirche in der Zeitenwende. Gesellschaftlicher Wandel und Erneuerung der Kirche [Church in the Time of Change. Social Change and Renewal of the Church], Gütersloh 1998. – Review of this book by Joachim Rogge in: Theologische Literaturzeitung 1/1999, 982-984. 

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69)

Eighty errors were formulated and rejected. The last four (77-80) referred to the emerging liberalism and its socio-political demands: „X. ERRORS HAVING REFERENCE TO MODERN LIBERALISM 

77. In the present day it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion should be held as the only religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other forms of worship. 

78. Hence it has been wisely decided by law, in some Catholic countries, that persons coming to reside therein shall enjoy the public exercise of their own peculiar worship.  

79. Moreover, it is false that the civil liberty of every form of worship, and the full power, given to all, of overtly and publicly manifesting any opinions whatsoever and thoughts, conduce more easily to corrupt the morals and minds of the people, and to propagate the pest of indifferentism 

80. The Roman Pontiff can, and ought to, reconcile himself, and come to terms with progress, liberalism and modern civilization.” 

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70)

Neuner, Peter: Der Streit um den katholischen Modernismus [The Fight Over Catholic Modernism], Frankfurt 2009. 

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71)

https://www.erzdioezese-wien.at/site/glaubenfeiern/spirituelles/grossechristen/johannesxxiii/article/36107.html 

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72)

Donini, Ambrogio: Ernesto Buonaiuti e il modernismo, Bari 1961. - https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernesto_Buonaiuti (Stand 7.4.2019) 

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73)

Roncalli, Marco: Giovanni XXIII. Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli. Una vita nella Storia [A Life in History], Milano 2006. 

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74)

Hauer, Nadine/Zulehner, Paul M.: Aufbruch in den Untergang? Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil und seine Auswirkungen [Departure to the Downfall? The Second Vatican Council and its implications], Freiburg-Wien 1991. 

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75)

These people like to invoke the prophet Nehemiah: "Then I said to them, "You see the trouble we are in, how Jerusalem lies in ruins with its gates burned. Come, let us rebuild the wall of Jerusalem, so that we may no longer suffer disgrace." (Neh 2:17) - In response to this biblical quotation, those who support an opening up, oppose a telling from the prophet Zechariah: “I looked up and saw a man with a measuring line in his hand. Then I asked, ‘Where are you going?’ He answered me, ‘To measure Jerusalem, to see what is its width and what is its length.’ Then the angel who talked with me came forward, and another angel came forward to meet him, and said to him, ‘Run, say to that young man: Jerusalem shall be inhabited like villages without walls, because of the multitude of people and animals in it. For I will be a wall of fire all around it, says the Lord, and I will be the glory within it.’" (Zech 2:1-5) 

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76)

The extent to which the Council was struggling for religious freedom can be seen in the fact that in the draft "On the Church", which was presented in 1962 at the beginning of the Council, “the view expressed in the nineteenth century was formulated particularly clearly and was considered the epitome of Catholic intolerance: If the majority of people in a state is Catholic, then the state must also be Catholic. For the believers of another faith, there is no right to publicly profess that belief. The state may and must, however, have to tolerate its confession because of the common good. If the majority of people in a state are non-Catholic, then the state has to follow natural law, ie. it has to allow both the individual Catholics and the Church all freedom. In this view, tolerance is mere toleration, and there can be no question of proper religious freedom.” Rahner, Karl/Vorgrimler, Herbert: Kleines Konzilskompendium. Einleitung zu Dignitatis humanae [Small Council Compendium. Introduction to Dignitatis humanae], Freiburg ²⁶1996, 656. 

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77)

„The Council sees this reasoning in the fact that human beings as persons are essentially obliged to search for and realise the truth (especially the religious truth), which is only possible for them if they have the necessary inner and outer space of freedom.“ Rahner/Vorgrimler: Kleines Konzilskompendium [Small Council Compendium], 657. 

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78)

“The Roman Catholic Church's critical stance towards liberalism and democracy following the French Revolution and through the 19th century was often entrenched, but the Second Vatican Council of the 1960’s saw a shift in the Church's attitude towards democracy. In recent years, a conflict has emerged between Church doctrine and modern liberalism under Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI.” Oftestad, Bernt Torwild: The Catholic Church and Liberal Democracy. (Routledge Studies in Modern History), New York 2019.. 

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79)

Wetz, Franz Josef: Die Würde des Menschen ist antastbar. Eine Provokation [The Dignity of People is Palpable. A provocation], Stuttgart 1998. 

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80)

The dictatorship of relativism (Italian dittatura del relativismo) is a term used by Joseph Ratzinger on April 18th, 2005 as a sign of the times. The phrase, which occurred in the sermon to the Missa pro eligendo... before the election of the pope, became a central buzz word of the pontificate of the then elected Pope Benedict XVI. The Pope repeated this concern in later speeches. http://www.kathpedia.com/index.php?title=Diktatur_des_Relativismus 

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81)

Principally Habermas, Jürgen/Ratzinger, Joseph: Dialektik der Säkularisierung. Über Vernunft und Religion [Dialectic of Secularization. About Reason and Religion], Freiburg 2005. 

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82)

Pasolini, Pier Paolo: Freibeuterschriften [Buccaneer Writings],, Berlin 1978. 

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83)

The Pius Brotherhood recently renewed this rejection of the Council and, with it, of religious freedom: "The Society of St. Pius X rejects everything that does not accord with the Catholic tradition in the Second Vatican Council." Only when this is done, a full agreement between the Pius Brothers and the Church is possible. To quote Pagliarani: "The pope must declare the decree on religious freedom wrong and correct it accordingly, and we believe that a pope will one day do it and return to the pure doctrine that prevailed before this Council. Ecumenism and the Divine Constitution of the Church have been dealt with by the Popes before the Second Vatican Council, and it is enough to revisit their teachings." KATHPRESS-Tagesdienst 308, DeCember 16th, 2018. 

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84)

The Upper Austrian tolerance area (45%) has an above-average number in the category authoritarian religious people. 

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85)

Zulehner, Paul M./Kurz, Sebastian: Muslimas und Muslime im Migrationsstress [Muslims in Migration stress], Göttingen 2016. 

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86)

Protestant Church of Germany: Church of Freedom. Perspectives for the Protestant Church in the 21st Century, Berlin 2006. 

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87)

The Second Vatican Council drew precisely this image of God in its Decree on the Revelation (Dei Verbum). This makes this a key document of the Second Vatican Council, to which one of the Presidents of the Council, the Viennese Cardinal Franz König has repeatedly referred in talks. Already at the Council, the Cardinal had been deeply involved in this issue: http://www.kardinalkoenig.at/leben/lebenslauf/0/articles/2009/06/23/a3568/. 

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88)

A good example is Khorchide, Mouhanad: Islam ist Barmherzigkeit. Grundzüge einer modernen Religion [Islam is Mercy. Basic features of a modern religion], Freiburg 2015. 

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89)

This scientific challenge is the subject of heated debate in the Islamic community today: Einenkel, Lydia-Ayscha: Ist die "historisch-kritische" Methode den Koran zu verstehen vereinbar mit dem Islam? [Is the "historical-critical" method of understanding the Koran compatible with Islam? First published in: Islamic newspaper, 21.10. 08). http://islam.de/11078. Dazu auch Khorchide, Mouhanad: Gottes Offenbarung in Menschenwort: Der Koran im Licht der Barmherzigkei [God's Revelation in Human Words: the Koran in the light of mercy], Herders Theologischer Koran-Kommentar, Freiburg 2018. 

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90)

The US President Donald Trump before the inauguration had arranged a private service in the Episcopal "President Church" St. John, in which the Robert Jeffress, pastor of the megachurch "First Baptist Church" in Dallas, preached. He had previously announced that in his homily he would compare Trump with another "great leader" - Nehemiah. 2500 years ago, God told them to build a huge wall around Jerusalem to protect the inhabitants. Jeffress supports Trump's plans to secure the border with Mexico. 

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91)

With regard to the ratification of the UN Charter on Human Rights, the Catholic Church is still hesitant because at international conferences abortion is also demanded as a human right, even though it has been fully accepted since John XXIII. Loretan-Saladin, Adrian: Die Bekehrung der Kirche zu den Menschenrechten. Ein Zeichen der Zeit [The Conversion of the Church to Human Rights. A sign of the times], in: Zulehner, Paul M./Halik, Tomas: Wir träumen diesen Traum. Theologinnen und Theologen aus aller Welt unterstützen Pro Pope Francis [We Dream this Dream. Theologians from all over the world support Pro Pope Francis], Ostfildern 2018. 

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92)

Auer, Alfons: Autonome Moral und christlicher Glaube [Autonomous Morality and Christian Faith], Düsseldorf 1995. - Virt, Günter: Epikie - verantwortlicher Umgang mit Normen [Epikie - Responsible Dealing with Norms], Mainz 1983. 

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93)

Gehlen, Arnold: Der Mensch [The Human Being], Wiesbaden1995. - Ders.: Über die Geburt der Freiheit aus der Entfremdung [About the Birth of Freedom from Alienation], Gesamtausgabe Bd. 4, Frankfurt am Main 1983. - Jonas, Friedrich: Die Institutionenlehre Arnold Gehlens [The Theory of Institutions from Arnold Gehlen], Tübingen 1966. 

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94)

Berger, Peter L./ Luckmann, Thomas: Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. Eine Theorie der Wissenssoziologie [The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge], Frankfurt ²¹2007. - Douglas, Mary: How Institutions Think, London 1987. - Esser, Hartmut: Soziologie. Spezielle Grundlagen [Sociology. Special fundamentals], Vol 5: Institutionen [Institutions], Frankfurt am Main/New York 2000. 

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95)

Berger, Peter L./Zijderveld, Anton C.: Lob des Zweifels [In Praise of Doubt], Freiburg 2010. 

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96)

On this process of "conversion": Berger/Luckmann: Construction. – Auch: Zulehner, Paul M.: Umkehr: Prinzip und Verwirklichung [Conversion: Principle and Realisation], Mainz 1979. - Schibilsky, Michael: Konversion – empirisch gesehen [Conversion – Viewed Empirically], in: LS 29 (1978) 165–170. Reprinted in: Praktische Theologie 41 (2006) 46–51. 

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97)

Episcopalis communio, Rome 2018. 

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98)

Wolf, Hubertus: Die vielen Gerüche der Schäfchen [The Many Odeurs of Sheep], in: Zulehner, Paul M./Halík Tomáš: Wir träumen diesen Traum. Theologinnen und Theologen aus aller Welt argumentieren ProPopeFrancis [We Dream this Dream. Theologians from all over the world argue ProPopeFrancis], Ostfildern 2018. 

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99)

Schumann, Robert: The Necessary Bases of a European Community. Article written by Robert Schuman for the Pax Romana review in June 1953. 

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100)

On the Development of Central and Eastern Europe: Mate-Toth, Andras: Freiheit und Populismus. Verwundete Identitäten Ostmitteleuropas [Freedom and Populism. Wounded Identities of East Central Europe], Göttingen 2019. 

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101)

Regina Polak relies on the publication of Nussbaum, Martha C.: Politische Emotionen [Political Emotions], Berlin 2014. 

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102)

Von Ackermann, Ulrike: Ist Europa zu retten? [Can Europe be Saved?] https://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/debatte/article120505798/Ist-Europa-zu-retten.html 

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103)

Quoted from a tape recording of a lecture by Carsten Bresch: „Die Beziehung des Christen zur Wissenschaft“ ["The Relationship of Christians to Science"] in the Catholic Academy of the Archdiocese of Freiburg on May 17th, 1981. https://www.podcast.de/episode/973364/Carsten+Bresch%3A+Evolution+-+Kluft+und+Br%C3%BCcke+zwischen+Glauben+und+Wissen+%281981%29/ (18.12.18) 

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104)

The statement may not have been made literally: In substance, it fits unrestrictedly with the thinking and action of the Pope. As the Romans say: „Si non e vero, e bene trovato!“ 

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105)

Even as a secular priest, he captivated by his oratory his listeners from 1835 at the instigation of Frédéric Ozanam [who had published a pamphlet in 1831 against the early socialist ideas of Henri de Saint-Simon entitled Réflexions sur la doctrine de Saint-Simon] and Archbishop Hyacinthe-Louis de Quélen in Lent sermons in Notre-Dame de Paris bringing in all the interests and movements of the time, the cause of nationality and freedom, industry and politics: Pulpit Lectures in the Notre Dame Church, also in German translation, 4 volumes, Tübingen 1846-52. 

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106)

See Zulehner, Paul M.: Christen in der Arbeitswelt [Christians in the Working World], Wien 2011. – Ders.: Religion und industrielle Gesellschaft. Zur Entfremdung von Arbeiterschaft und Kirche; eine historische und empirische Studie [Religion and Industrial Society. The alienation of Working Class and church; a historical and empirical study], Ostfildern 2016 (dissertation from 1961). 

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107)

Scheicher, Joseph: Der Klerus und die Soziale Fragen [The Clergy and the Social Questions], Innsbruck 1884, 53. 

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108)

Vogelsang, Karl Freiherr von: Die materielle Lage des Arbeiterstandes in Österreich [The material situation of the Working Class in Austria], Wien 1983, 5-7. 

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109)

At present, Viktor Orban in Hungary is playing with this concept of a "community-shaped" society. He will fail. 

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110)

Schasching, Johannes: Die soziale Botschaft der Kirche von Leo XIII bis Johannes XXIII [The Social Message of the Church from Leo XIII to John XXIII], Innsbruck 1965. 

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111)

Marx-Engels: Briefwechsel [Correspondence], vol 4., Berlin 1950, 272. 

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112)

Lentner, Leopold: Das Erwachen der modernen katholischen Sozialidee [The Awakening of the Modern Catholic Social Idea], Wien 1951, 15. 

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113)

Zulehner, Paul M.: Kirche und Austromarxismus. Eine Studie zu Kirche-Staat-Gesellschaft [Church and Austromarxism. A Study on Church-State-Society], Wien-Freiburg 1967. 

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114)

Kompendium der Soziallehre der Kirche, hg. v. Päpstlichen Rat für Gerechtigkeit und Frieden [Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, ed. by Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace], Freiburg-Basel-Wien 2006. 

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115)

Sozialstaat in Europa. Geschichte - Entwicklung - Perspektiven [The Welfare State in Europe. History - development - perspectives], ed. by Katrin Kraus/Thomas Geisen, Göttingen 2001. 

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116)

Die europäischen Bischöfe und die Neu-Evangelisierung Europas, Bonn [The European Bishops and the New Evangelization of Europe, Bonn], St. Gallen 1991. - Fürer, Ivo: Die Entwicklung Europas fordert die Kirchen heraus [The development of Europe challenges the churches], Ostfildern 2018. 

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117)

John, Gerald: Was an Kurz' These von der "Zuwanderung in den Sozialstaat" dran ist [What is true about Kurz's Thesis of "Immigration into the Welfare State"?] in: Der Standard vom 16. Juli 2017: https://derstandard.at/2000061317804/Was-an-Kurz-These-von-der-Zuwanderung-in-den-Sozialstaat (Stand 1.1.2019) 

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118)

Hirsch-Kreinsen, Hartmut/ten Hompel, Michael summarise in their article "Digitisation of Industrial Work. Development Perspectives and Design Approaches" the effects of digitisation on the world of work on the basis of existing research: "This article summarises reflections and initial research findings on the consequences for work and qualification in Industry 4.0. Conceptually, Industry 4.0 is conceived as a socio-technical system. Based on this, work perspectives are divided into two perspectives, which are understood as ‘upgrading’ and ‘polarising’ qualifications. However, the specific changes that actually occur depend on the implemented automation concept and the actual range of system distribution. Finally, it is made clear that, at best, a medium-term limited diffusion of Industry 4.0 systems can be assumed." https://www.wiwi.tu-dortmund.de/wiwi/de/fakultaet/aktuell/forschungsgebiete/FPH/aktuelles/meldungsmedien/20160210-Publikation.pdf (25.12.2018 

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119)

Recently, many public debates have been influenced by terms such as 'Industry 4.0' or 'Workplace 4.0'. It becomes clear that the advancing digitalisation will have far-reaching effects on the world of work in the future. In order to be able to estimate how the world of work will develop in the future, we must first of all clarify where Germany stands today. To what extent occupations are potentially replaceable today, because jobs that are currently being done by employees will soon be taken over by computers? In this research report we therefore determine the proportion of activities for the individual occupations that could already be replaced by computers today. We calculate these substitution potentials of the occupations on the basis of professional data from the expert database BERUFENET from the Federal Employment Agency. This allows us to take the specifics of the German labour market and education system directly into account. As a result, 15 percent of the employees subject to compulsory social security contributions in Germany in 2013 are exposed to a very high substitutability potential, ie employed in a profession in which more than 70 percent of activities today could already be replaced by computers. We present our results in detail according to the requirement level for the occupational segments as well as for the occupational segments separately for the different requirement levels according to the classification of occupations in 2010. In the Appendix we also present results for the occupational main groups separately for the different requirement levels according to the classification of occupations 2010 as well for the BIBB occupational fields. Dengler, Katharina/Matthes, Britta: Folgen der Digitalisierung für die Arbeitswelt: Substituierbarkeitspotenziale von Berufen in Deutschland [Consequences of Digitalisation for the Working World: Substitution Potential of Occupations in Germany], IAB-Forschungsbericht 11/2015, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/146097 (Stand, 25.12.2018). 

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120)

This can be done through cuts in benefits as well as through the popular populist practice of preventing a "migration to the welfare state", measures against migrants which affect also locals in many cases. 

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121)

King, Alexander/Schneider, Bertrand: Die globale Revolution [The Global Revolution], Spiegel Spezial 2/1991: Bericht des Club of Rome 1991, 42f. 

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122)

Cardinal Marx expects a renaissance of Marxism, in: Die Presse vom 23.12.2017. - Warum Marx immer noch aktuell ist [Why Marx is still up to date], in: Cicero. Magazin für politische Kultur [Magazine for Political Culture], in: https://www.cicero.de/wirtschaft/warum-marx-immer-noch-aktuell-ist/42029 (Stand 28.12.2018) 

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123)

SP-Klubchefs: „Renaissance der Sozialdemokratie“ [SP-Leaders: "Renaissance of Social Democracy"], in: Kurier, 4.5.2015, https://kurier.at/politik/ausland/sp-klubchefs-renaissance-der-sozialdemokratie/128.426.862 (Stand 28.12.2018) 

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124)

Hermann Denz (1949-2008) was one of the best empirical social scientists in Austria. Denz, Hermann: Einführung in die empirische Sozialforschung [Introduction to Empirical Social Research], Wien 1989. – Ders.: Die Grundlagen empirischer Soziologie. Der Beitrag des quantitativen Ansatzes [The Fundamentals of Empirical Sociology. The contribution of the quantitative approach], Wien 2003. 

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125)

Zulehner, Paul M./Denz, Hermann/Pelinka, Anton/Tálos, Emmerich: Solidarität. Option für die Modernisierungsverlierer [Solidarity. Option for modernisation losers], Innsbruck ²1997. 

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126)

Denz, Hermann/Zulehner, Paul M.: Das Hemd ist uns näher als der Fremde [The Shirt is closer to us than the Foreigner], in: Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter, ed. by Österreichische Wirtschaftskammer Wien, 50 (1/2003), 915. - Zulehner, Paul M./Denz, Hermann: Desolidarisation? Civil Society and Solidarity, in: The Future of Austrian Democracy, ed. by Pelinka, Anton/Plasser, Fritz/Meixner, Wolfgang, Wien 200, 85102. 

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127)

This fear was taken up by the PEGIDA movement and reinforced "demonstratively". They claim to try to save the “Christliche Abendland”. The aggressive fear of foreigners and Islam in general, of course, does not correspond to the Bible's vision of the One World and One Humanity and the peace between nations and religions. So is it not more about saving the “Christliche Abendland” for PEGIDA and its political arm, the AfD? 

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128)

Gronemeyer, Marianne: Das Leben als letzte Gelegenheit. Sicherheitsbedürfnisse und Zeitknappheit [Life as the last Opportunity. Security needs and time constraints], Darmstadt 2010. 

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129)

It is quite possible that atheising cultures in Europe (as in the Czech Republic, East Germany, but now also in Berlin and other major European cities, where believers open for a life beyond death have become a minority) are more affected by this fear and therefore xenophobic; anti-Islamic tendencies can be found more frequently. That these atheists then fight for the "Christliche Abendland", is puzzleling. This is explicable because it is not about Christian faith, but about a kind of "cultural Christianity". About these "Kulturchristen": Zulehner, Paul M.: Verbuntung. Kirchen in pluralistischen Gesellschaften [Colourisation. Churches in pluralistic societies], Ostfildern 2011. 

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130)

Enzensberger, Hans Magnus: Die Große Wanderung: 33 Markierungen; mit einer Fußnote „Über einige Besonderheiten bei der Menschenjagd“ [The Great Migration: 33 remarks; with a footnote "About some peculiarities in the hunt of human beings"], Frankfurt ⁴1992. 

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131)

A translation of the much stronger word from French „surmedicalisé“: Vgl. CCEE: Umgang des heutigen Menschen mit Geburt und Tod. VII. Symposium der europäischen Bischöfe in Rom [How today's Human Beings deal with Birth and Death. VII. Symposium of European Bishops in Rome], 12.-17.10.1989. 

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132)

The Bremen surgeon Karsten Vilmar said in a radio interview: "If this case patients need to be satisfied with less treatment, and we need to think overall whether this tough-vitality can last, or whether we need to promote socially acceptable earlier death." Asked if the government's plans would lead to a earlier death of patients, Vilmar said: "If this reform continues, then that will be the inevitable consequence.” https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sozialvertr%C3%A4gliches_Fr%C3%BChableben (Stand: 4.1.2019) 

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133)

This remains unconcerning given the global "overpopulation", as lack of population can be offset by migration. But for people with latent racist attitudes, this solution is a nightmare. Sarazin, Thilo: Deutschland schafft sich ab. Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen [Germany eliminates itself. How we out our country at risk], München 2010. – Ders.: Feindliche Übernahme: Wie der Islam den Fortschritt behindert und die Gesellschaft bedroht [Hostile Takeover: How Islam hinders progress and threatens society], München 2018. 

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134)

Renz, Monika: Erlösung aus Prägung [Redemption from imprinting], Paderborn 2009. – Dies.: Renz, Monika: Angst verstehen. Tiefer als alle Angst liegt Urvertrauen [Understanding Fear. Deeper than all fear is primordial trust], Freiburg i. Breisgau 2018. 

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135)

Moïsi, Dominique: Kampf der Emotionen. Wie Kulturen der Angst, Demütigung und Hoffnung die Weltpolitik bestimmen [The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World], München 2009. 

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136)

Furedi, Frank: Culture of fear, London 2006. – Ders.: Culture of fear revisited. Risk-taking and the morality of low expectation, ⁴2006. 

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137)

Therefore, the Bochum sociologist calls Germany a society of fear: Bude, Heinz: Gesellschaft der Angst [Society of Fear], Hamburg 2014. 

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138)

Wodak, Ruth: Politik mit der Angst. Zur Wirkung rechtspopulistischer Diskurse [Politics of Fear. What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean], Wien 2016.  

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139)

The penchant for generalization helps human beings to survive in the midst of complex circumstances. But it always leads to unjust judgments. Read more in in Rosling, Hans: Factfulness: Wie wir lernen, die Welt so zu sehen, wie sie wirklich ist [Ten Reasons We're Wrong About The World - And Why Things Are Better Than You Think], Berlin 2018. 

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140)

Baumann, Zygmunt: Die Angst vor den anderen. Ein Essay über Migration und Panikmache [Strangers at Our Door. An Essay on migration and alarmism], Frankfurt 2016. 

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141)

See also Bude, Heinz: Gesellschaft der Angst [Society of Fear], Hamburg 2014. – Ders.: Das Gefühl der Welt. Über die Macht von Stimmungen [The Feeling of the World. On the power of moods], Hamburg 2016. 

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142)

The Catholic branch of Christianity has the longest and richest experience of social teaching. This goes back to the beginning of the 19th century, finds a first peak in the social encyclical of Leo XIII (Rerum novarum, 1891) and receives in the following anniversary years of this first encyclical further deepening and updates. Another highlight reached the Catholic Social Doctrine in Pope Francis' Ecology Encyclical "Laudato sí”, 2016. In addition, there are speeches by popes and papal institutions on peace and migration. Many valuable interventions also come from different regions of the Church (Episcopal Conferences). The final declarations of the Ecumenical Assemblies in Basel (1989), Graz (1994) and Sibiu (2007 for Peace, Justice and Integrity of Creation carry great weight. 

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143)

Bauer, Joachim: Kraft der Beziehung. Bindung, Freundschaft, Resonanz [Power of Relationship. Bonding, Friendship, Resonance], Goldegg 2007. - Christian theology uses in describing Being the concept of relatio subsistens, relatedness and relationship. It is applied to God and humans alike, but the addition of the attribute words "infinita" for God and "finita" for human and created beings. Hemmerle, Klaus: Der Begriff des Heils. Fundamentaltheologische Erwägungen [The Concept of Salvation. Fundamental-theological considerations], in: Internationale katholische Zeitschrift „Communio" 1 (1972) 210-230. 

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144)

See Weber, Max: Politik als Beruf [Politics as Profession], in: Gesammelte Politische Schriften [Collected political writings], ed. by Johannes Winckelmann, Tübingen ⁵1988, 551f. See the current debate in the context of asylum policy, where Weber is invoked to legitimise a restrictive policy: Körtner, Ulrich H. J.: Gesinnungs- und Verantwortungsethik im Widerstreit. Anmerkungen zur Debatte um Einwanderungs-, Asyl- und Integrationspolitik [Ethics of Conscience and Responsibility in Conflict. Comments on the debate on immigration, asylum and integration politics], http://www.jahrbuch-politik.at/wp-content/uploads/Ulrich-H.-J.-K%C3%B6rtner-Gesinnungs-und-Verantwortungsethik-im-Widerstreit.-Anmerkungen-zur-Debatte-um-Einwanderungs-Asyl-und-Integrationspolitik.pdf 

  ↵

145)

Also possible are religere and relegere, https://www.belleslettres.eu/content/wortkunde/religion-religare-relegere.php 

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146)

In this respect the work of Eugen Drewermann is groundbreaking. Drewermann, Eugen: Die jahwistische Urgeschichte in exegetischer, psychoanalytischer und philosophischer Sicht [The Jahwist Prehistory in Exegetical, Psychoanalytical and Philosophical View], München 1977. 

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147)

Renz, Monika: Der Mystiker aus Nazaret. Jesuanische Spiritualität [The Mystic from Nazareth. Jesuanic spirituality], Freiburg i. Br. 2016. 

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148)

Thus Pope Benedict XVI in a sermon at the World Youth Day in Cologne 2005. – See also: Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre/Tardivel, Fernande: Hymne de l'univers; La messe sur le monde; Trois histoires comme Benson; La puissances spirituelle de la matière [Hymn of the Universe; Mass on the World; Three Stories like Benson; The spiritual power of the matter], Paris 1961. 

  ↵

149)

Metz, Johann Baptist: Memoria passionis. Ein provozierendes Gedächtnis in pluralistischer Gesellschaft [A provocative memory within pluralistic society], Freiburg i. Br. ³2007 

  ↵

150)

See Kermani, Navid: Einbruch der Wirklichkeit. Auf dem Flüchtlingstreck durch Europa [The Onset of Reality. On the refugee trek through Europe], München 2016. 

  ↵

151)

Heimbach-Steins, Marianne: Nicht Migration bekämpfen, sondern Armut [Not fighting Migration, but Poverty], in: KP vom 4.1.2019, 3. 

  ↵

152)

Johannes Paul II.: Fides et ratio, Rom 1998. 

  ↵

153)

Heil, Christoph: Eine wahrscheinliche Paulus-Chronologie. Institut für Neutestamentliche Bibelwissenschaft Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz [A Probable Paul Chronology. Institute for New Testament Biblical Studies Faculty of Catholic Theology Karl-Franzens-University Graz], in: https://static.uni-graz.at/fileadmin/kath-institute/Neues-Testament/Einleitung/Paulus-Biographie.pdf (6.1.2019). 

  ↵

154)

Ebner, Martin: Was die ersten Christen (so) attraktiv gemacht hat? Wie sich christliche Gemeinden im Römischen Reich profiliert haben. Gastvortrag an der Katholischen Universität in Linz [What made the first Christians (so) attractive? How Christian communities profiled themselves in the Roman Empire. Guest lecture at the Catholic University in Linz] on 13. 3. 2017. 

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155)

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (bpb): Christentum und Europa [Christianity and Europe, 6.1.2019 ( http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/das-europalexikon/176753/christentum-und-europa). This article is based on: Das Europalexikon [The European Encyclopaedia], ed. by Martin Große Hüttmann/Hans-Georg Wehling, Bonn ²2013. 

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156)

„The conflict was on the one hand a religious war between the Catholic League and the Protestant Union and at the same time a struggle for supremacy within the Holy Roman Empire between the Habsburg Emperor and Princes of several countries and between the Empire and European adversaries like France, Denmark and Sweden “. https://www.xn--dreissigjhriger-krieg-e2b.de/ 

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157)

Population decline is estimated at 33% on average. https://www.xn--dreissigjhriger-krieg-e2b.de/ 

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158)

Representatives of this burgeoning atheism are the anonymous author of Theophrastus redivivus (1659), the Abbot Jean Meslier (1664–1729), who wrote his Pensées et sentiments between 1719 and 1729 and also published anonymously, Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709–1751) with his Histoire naturelle de l’âme (1745). Paul Henri Thiry d’Holbach wrote 1770 Système de la nature. Denis Diderot (1713–1784) also referred to atheistic positions in Pensées philosophiques (1746) and the Lettre sur les aveugles à l’usage de ceux qui voient (1749), which of course also had a deistic and, above all, anticlerical side tint. 

  ↵

159)

Kuschel, Karl-Josef, Euro-Islam: Herausforderungen oder Chance? [Euro-Islam: Challenges or Opportunity ?], in: Concilium 40 (2004), 176-185.  

  ↵

160)

Sommer, Hartmut: Seelenburg und dunkle Nacht. Mit Teresa von Ávila und Johannes vom Kreuz in Kastilien [Interior Castle and Dark Night. With Teresa of Ávila and John of the Cross in Castile]. In: Sommer, Hartmut: Die großen Mystiker. Orte ihres Wirkens [The Great Mystics. Places of their work], Darmstadt 2008. – The priest and orientalist Miguel Asín Palacios (1871–1944) also points to the connection to the writings of the Sufi Abbad al-Rundi (1332–1390). Abbad al-Rundi had retreated to the Moroccan city of Salé for a few years for meditation and asceticism. He left the work Sharḥ al-ḥikam and a collection of 54 letters in which he modestly described himself as a slave to God. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannes_vom_Kreuz. 

  ↵

161)

Teuber, Bernhard: Sacrificium litterae. Allegorische Rede und mystische Erfahrung in der Dichtung des heiligen Johannes vom Kreuz, München 2003. – Johannes vom Kreuz: Sämtliche Werke. Vollständige Neuübertragung [Allegorical speech and mystical experience in the poetry of St. John of the Cross, Munich 2003. - St. John of the Cross: Complete Works. Complete re-translation], 5 vol. Edited and translated by Ulrich Dobhan, Elisabeth Hense, Elisabeth Peeters, Freiburg i. Br.1995–2000. 

  ↵

162)

Davie, Grace: Europe: The Exceptional Case. Parameters of faith in the modern world, London 2007. 

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163)

I am relying on data from the European Value Study (EVS), which has been conducted at regular intervals since the 1980s. It should be noted that the number of countries surveyed has increased in the three survey waves. But that does not change the current trend. 

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164)

Müller, Francis: Selbsttransformation und charismatisch evangelikale Identität. Eine vergleichende ethnosemantische Lebenswelt-Analyse [Self-transformation and charismatic evangelical Identity. A comparative ethnosemantic lifeworld analysis], Wiesbaden 2015. 

  ↵

165)

A similar observation was made by Emil Durkheim in his suicide study: among Catholics the suicide rate was lower than among Protestants. Durkheim, David Émile: Le suicide: Étude de sociologie. Paris 1897. 

  ↵

166)

The survey in Estonia wasn’t included in the “Aufbruch” (departure) study, but in the European Value Study. 

  ↵

167)

Tomka, Miklós / Zulehner, Paul M.: Religion in den Reformländern Ost(Mittel)Europas [Religion in the Eastern European Reform-States], 1999. - Dies.: Religion im gesellschaftlichen Kontext Ost(Mittel)Europas, 2000. - Zulehner, Paul M./Tomka, Miklos/Naletova, Inna: Religionen und Kirchen in Ost(Mittel)Europa. Zehn Jahre nach der Wende [Religions and Churches in East (Central) Europe. Ten years after the change], Ostfildern 2008. - Máté-Tóth, András / Miklušcák, Pavel: Nicht wie Milch und Honig. Unterwegs zu einer Pastoraltheologie Ost(Mittel)Europas [Not like milk and honey. On the way to a Pastoral Theology East(Central)Europe], Ostfildern 2000. 

  ↵

168)

“Above all, the future of the church depends on its ability to connect with seekers.” He also mentioned the growing number of "apatheists". For Tomas Halík, these are people who are apathetic to religion and the question of God. With them also a dialogue must be held *about what is sacred to these people*. In this dialogue we would have to accompany the others as seekers. It's about rethinking the truth. “Truth is a book that none of us have read to the end.” For Halík, it also implies that we abandon a superficial notion of God and come to a deeper, mature form of Christianity. He therefore also spoke of an “afternoon Christianity” that would be in the time of maturity. https://de.zenit.org/articles/augsburg-tomas-halik-ruft-christen-in-europa-auf-eine-tiefere-spiritualitaet-zu-suchen/ 

  ↵

169)

“Halik: widespread “Etwasisms” (somethingism) is a challenge to theology. Ö1 Series ‘Logos - Theology and Life' on the topic ‘Getting rid of God?' - Czech philosopher and priest: Atheism, Antithesis and Purification of a particular form of theism: As well as different ways to believe in God, there are many forms of atheism. Where it absolutises itself, it quickly becomes a substitute-religion, as the history of human ideas shows. Already in Patience with God (2010), the Czech priest spoke of the experience of the hiddenness of God, which is not foreign to Christians. Atheists would have similar experiences but interpret them differently.” https://www.kathpress.at/site/webmeldung_detail.siteswift?ts=1548832000 

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170)

In the East (Central) European countries examined, there are persons who call themselves atheistic. However, it is also with atheism as well as belief: The subjective consent is gradual. With three statements, which contained the answer category "I do not believe in God", an atheism scale was formed. It runs from non-atheist (0 points) to "atheising" (1 point) and "atheist" (2 points) to "fully atheistic" (3 points). Tomka, Miklós / Zulehner, Paul M.: Religion in den Reformländern Ost(Mittel)Europas [Religion in the Eastern and Central European Reform-Countries], 1999, 15. 

  ↵

171)

Tomka, Miklós: Expanding religion, Berlin 2011. 

  ↵

172)

Berger, Peter L.: The Heretical Imperative, New York 1979. 

  ↵

173)

For example, in post-Reformation Austria at the time of Ferdinand I the janitors collected confession-confirmations at Eastertime (Riegger, Paul Joseph: Corpus Iuris Ecclesiastici, Bohemici et Austriaci, Wien 1770, 100f.) This practice inspired Wilhelm Busch to the pointed verse: "In all churches, near and far; he went to confession, cheery and glad. And gave the confession slip willing to other children, but cheap.“ (Busch, Wilhelm: Der heilige Antonius von Padua [St. Anthony of Padua], Lahr 1870.)  ↵

174)

Zulehner, Paul M.: Religion nach Wahl. Grundlegung einer Auswahlchristenpastoral [Religion of Choice. Foundation of a pastoral for choiceful Christians], Freiburg 1974.  ↵

175)

Martin, David, Europa und Amerika. Säkularisierung oder Vervielfältigung der Christenheit - zwei Ausnahmen und keine Regel [Europe and America. Secularisation or pluralisation of Christianity - two exceptions and no rule], in: Kallscheuer, Otto (Hg.), Das Europa der Religionen. Ein Kontinent zwischen Säkularisierung und Fundamentalismus [The Europe of Religions. A continent between secularisation and fundamentalism], Frankfurt a.M. 1996, 161-180.  ↵

176)

Kirchenaustritt - oder nicht?: Wie Kirche sich verändern muss [Leaving the Church - or not ?: How the Church must change], ed by Markus Etscheid-Stams, Regina Laudage-Kleeberg, Thomas Rünker, Freiburg 2018.  ↵

177)

Dubach, Alfred/Campiche, Roland J. (Hg.): Jede(r) ein Sonderfall? Religion in der Schweiz. Ergebnisse einer Repräsentativbefragung [Everyone a Special Case? Religion in Switzerland. Results of a representative survey], Basel 1993.  ↵

178)

Hervieu-Léger, Danièle: Religion en La mouvement: le pèlerin et le converti [Religion in Movement: the pilgrim and the convert], Paris 1999.  ↵

179)

Peter L. Berger and T. Luckmann have made profound thoughts about such processes in their sociology of knowledge under the heading of "contrasocialisation": Berger, Peter L./Luckmann, Thomas: The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in Sociology of Knowledge, New York 1966. As conditions for a contrasocialisation, by which the identity established in the primary socialisation is profoundly changed, the authors list as follows: the existence of a "plausibility structure" with an attractive "life knowledge", "significant others", an intensive communication, a decision as well as a kind of permanent communication, which stabilises the decision. – Also: Schibilsky, Michael: Religiöse Erfahrung in der Subkultur [Religious Experience in a Subculture], in: O. Betz (Ed.), Zugänge zur religiösen Erfahrung [Approaches to Religious Experience], Düsseldorf 1980. - Krause, Katharina: Bekehrungsfrömmigkeit. Historische und kultursoziologische Perspektiven auf eine Gestalt gelebter Religion [Piety of Conversion. Historical and cultural-sociological perspectives on a form of lived religion], Siebeck 2018.  ↵

180)

Davie, Grace: Vicarious Religion: A Methodological Challenge, in: Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives, Oxford 2007, 21-35. - Davie, Grace: Vicarious Religion: A Response. Journal of Contemporary Religion. (25.2.2010), 261-266. – Davie, Grace: Religion in modern Europe. A memory mutates, London 2005.  ↵

181)

The term polycentric is first used to characterise the Universal Church, as it was honoured by the Second Vatican Council. Dazu Nacke, Stefan: Die Kirche der Weltgesellschaft. Das II. Vatikanische Konzil und die Globalisierung des Katholizismus [The Church of the World Society. The Second Vatican Council and the Globalisation of Catholicism], Bielefeld 2010. But this model can also be used for the relationship of individuals to the Church.  ↵

182)

Zulehner, Paul M.: Heirat, Geburt, Tod. Eine Pastoral zu den Lebenswenden [Marriage, Birth, Death. A pastoral for the rites of passage], Düsseldorf 1987.   ↵

183)

Zulehner Paul M.: Verbuntung. Kirchen im weltanschaulichen Pluralismus [Colourisation. Churches in ideological pluralism], Ostfildern 2011.  ↵

184)

The social psychologist used them in his study: Schmidtchen, Gerhard: Was den Deutschen heilig ist [What to the Germans is holy], Freiburg 1979. - Schmidtchen, Gerhard: Protestanten und Katholiken [Protestants and Catholics], Zürich 1982. - Schmidtchen, Gerhard: Ist Glaube altmodisch? [Is faith old-fashioned?], Köln 2001.  ↵

185)

Percentages are representative averages for the fourteen countries surveyed in 2007: Zulehner, Paul M./Tomka, Miklos/Naletova, Inna: Religionen und Kirchen in Ost(Mittel)Europa. Zehn Jahre nach der Wende [Religions and Churches in Eastern (Central) Europe. Ten years after the Change], Ostfildern 2008.  ↵

186)

Loc.cit., 76.  ↵

187)

Pollack, Detlef: Säkularisierung - ein moderner Mythos? Studien zum religiösen Wandel in Deutschland [Secularisation - a Modern Myth? Studies on Religious Change in Germany], Tübingen 2003.  ↵

188)

Heute den Glauben entdecken. Neue Wege der Evangelisierung in Europa. 16. lnternationaler Kongress [Discover Faith Today. New ways of evangelisation in Europe. 16th International Congress], Renovabis Freising 2012, 126.  ↵

189)

Zulehner, Paul M.: Säkularisierung von Gesellschaft, Person und Religion. Religion und Kirche in Österreich [Secularisation of Society, Person and Religion. Religion and Church in Austria], Wien 1973.  ↵

190)

Hahn, Alois: Religion, Säkularisierung und Kultur [Religion, Secularisation and Culture], in: Lehmann, Hartmut (ed.), Säkularisierung, Dechristianisierung, Rechristianisierung im neuzeitlichen Europa [Secularisation, Dechristianisation, Rechristianisation in modern Europe. Balance and perspectives of research], Göttingen 1997, 17-31.  ↵

191)

Peter L. Berger: The Sacred Canopy. Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York 1967.  ↵

192)

Luckmann, Thomas: Invisible Religion, New York 1967.  ↵

193)

It must be remembered that the two sociologists were operating with different concepts of religion: Berger with a substantive, Luckmann with a functional one.  ↵

194)

Berger, Peter L.: The many Altars of Modernity. Toward a paradigm for religion in a pluralist age, 2014.  ↵

195)

Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah: Multiple Modernities. The controversy about the present, 2007. - Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah: Comparative civilisations and multiple modernities, Boston 2003. - "Eisenstadt's research has been instrumental in dissociating the understanding of modernity from the Eurocentric interpretation, which saw the cultural program developed in the West as a natural development model for all societies... The European model is only the earliest one. It is the starting point. But the social reactions - be it in the USA, Canada, Japan or in the South-East Asian region - were made with very different cultural reagents.“ (Frankfurter Rundschau, 22. März 2000)###1.6.2022###  ↵

196)

Zulehner, Paul M./Denz, Hermann: Wie Europa lebt und glaubt. Europäische Wertestudie, Düsseldorf 1993 (Tabellenband, Wien 1993).  ↵

197)

Gabriel, Karl: Religion und Gesellschaft revidiert: Religionssoziologie jenseits des Säkularisierungsparadigmas [Religion and Society Revised: Sociology of Religion beyond the Secularization Paradigm], in: Fechtner, Kristian u.a. (Ed.), Religion wahrnehmen. Festschrift für Karl-Fritz Daiber zum 65. Geburtstag [Perceive religion. Festschrift for Karl-Fritz Daiber on the occasion of his 65th birthday], Marburg 1996, 139-145.  ↵

198)

Schütz, Alfred: Das Problem der Relevanz [The Problem of Relevance], Frankfurt 1971. – Schütz, Alfred/Luckmann, Thomas: Strukturen der Lebenswelt [Structures of the Living World, 2 volumes, Konstanz 1979], 2 vol., Konstanz 1979.  ↵

199)

Greschat, Martin, Die christliche Mitgift Europas [The Christian dowry of Europe], in: Fürst, Walter/Honecker, Martin (Hg.), Christenheit - Europa 2000. Die Zukunft Europas als Aufgabe und Herausforderung für Theologie und Kirchen [Christianity - Europe 2000. The future of Europe as a task and challenge for theology and churches], Baden-Baden 2001, 137-143.  ↵

200)

Cf. the important analyses of Reding, Marcel: Der politische Atheismus, Graz ²1958.  ↵

201)

Halbfas, Hubertus: Der Sprung in den Brunnen. Eine Gebetsschule, [The jump into the well. A prayer school], Düsseldorf 42004.  ↵

202)

Halík, Tomáš/Demattio, Angela: Geduld mit Gott [Patience with God], Freiburg 2014.  ↵

203)

Marianne Gronemeyer: Leben als letzte Gelegenheit. Zeitknappheit und Sicherheitsbedürfnisse [as a last chance. Time constraints and security needs], Darmstadt 1993.  ↵

204)

Furedi, Frank: Culture of fear: risk-taking and the morality of low expectation, London 2002. – Glassner, Barry: The culture of fear: why Americans are afraid of the wrong things, New York 1999.  ↵

205)

Mathias Horx, Megatrends der späten neunziger Jahre [megatrends of the late nineties], Düsseldorf 1995.  ↵

206)

Schmidtchen, Gerhard: Religiöse Legitimation im politischen Verhalten, in: Kirche – Politik – Parteien [gious legitimacy in political behavior, in: Church - Politics – Parties], ed. by. Anton Rauscher, Köln 1974, 57-104.  ↵

207)

In 2000, 21% of this group could be counted in Austria.  ↵

208)

Huntington, Samuel P.: The clash of civilisations and the remaking of world order, London 1998.  ↵

209)

This is proven by long-term gender studies. Examples are the men's and women's studies in Germany and Austria between 1992 and 2008.. Volz, Rainer/Zulehner, Paul M.: Männer in Bewegung [Men in development], Berlin 2009. - Zulehner, Paul M./Volz, Rainer: Männer im Aufbruch [Men’s departure], Ostfildern 1999. - Zulehner, Paul M./Slama, Andrea: Österreichs Männer unterwegs zum neuen Mann? [Austria's men on the way to the new man ?], Wien 1994. – Zulehner, Paul M.: Mannsbilder. Ein Jahrzehnt Männerentwicklung [Images of men. A decade of men's development], Ostfildern 2003.  ↵

210)

Müller, Anselm W., Europäische Tradition der Ethik und Moral der Zukunft [European Tradition of Ethics and Moral of the Future, in: Riedel-Spangenberger, Ilona/Franz, Albert (Ed.), Fundamente Europas. Christentum und europäische Identität [Foundations of Europe. Christianity and European identity], Trier 1995, 143-174.  ↵

211)

„"The same applies to the tasks of the Christian churches, to maintain the 'monotheistic impulse' (Assmann 2003) in the question of God, an ethical horizon of hope for the integrity and freedom of all human beings and the advantage of non-violent conflict solutions. It can be presumed that with the renunciation of the question of God, the cultural self-understanding of man would be changed radically (Kaufmann 2000, 130).“ Ebertz, Michael N.: Religion, Christentum und Kirche in den pluralen Gesellschaften Europas [Christianity and Church in the pluralistic societies of Europe], in: Schreiner, Peter; Sieg, Ursula; Elsenbast, Volker (Ed.): Handbuch Interreligiöses Lernen [Manual for interreligious learning], Gütersloh 2005, 41-56, here 52.  ↵

212)

Halík, Tomás/Demattio, Angela: Geduld mit Gott [Patience with God], Freiburg 2014.  ↵

213)

Taylor, Charles: Drei Formen des Säkularismus [Three Forms of Secularism], in: Kallscheuer, Otto (Hg.), Das Europa der Religionen. Ein Kontinent zwischen Säkularisierung und Fundamentalismus [The Europe of Religions. A continent between secularization and fundamentalism], Frankfurt a.M. 1996, 217-246.  ↵

214)

Pöllinger, Sigrid: Die Europäische Union als Friedensprojekt [The European Union as a Peace Project], in: DIE PRESSE, 26.11.2007.  ↵

215)

Loc.cit.  ↵

216)

https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/2010-today/2012/eu-nobel_de  ↵

217)

Over the course of the #ProPopeFrancis campaign, 150 experts and experts from all over the world have come up with ideas on global challenges. Zulehner, Paul M./Halík, Tomàš: Pro Pope Francis. Weltweite Unterstützung für den Papst aus dem Kirchenvolk [Worldwide support for the Pope from the church people, Ostfildern 2018.  ↵

218)

https://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/esp_sociopol_depopu14a.htm  ↵

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